Critical theory and school governance : advancing an argument for democratic citizenship by Adams, Faried
 
CRITICAL THEORY AND SCHOOL 
GOVERNANCE: ADVANCING AN 
ARGUMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC 
CITIZENSHIP 
 
 
 
FARIED ADAMS 
BA, BEd (UWC), MEd (cum laude) (US) 
 
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
In the 
 
Department of Education Policy Studies 
 
at 
 
STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY 
 
Promotor: Professor Yusef Waghid 
 
December 2005  
 i
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation 
is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part 
submitted it at any university for a degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE: ………………… 
FARIED ADAMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATE: ……………… 
 
 ii
ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation I critically explore school governance in relation to a liberal 
conception of deliberative democracy incorporating an argument for 
democratic citizenship. The notion of decentralisation and representative 
democracy informed collective decision making with the advent of South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. This emphasis on participatory democracy 
aims to enhance nation building/citizenship as South Africa endeavours to 
sever its ties with its Apartheid past. Entrenched in the practice of 
representative democracy particularly in the context of schools is educational 
governance implemented through School Governing Bodies (SGBs). I argue 
that the legitimate learner and parent voices seem to be excluded from SGB 
practices – a notion which reinforces the presence of weak democratic 
practices.   
 
My concern is that SGBs in disadvantaged communities do not necessarily 
adhere to the tenets of democracy as accentuated in the Constitution of South 
Africa, incorporating the Bill of Rights and the South African Schools Act 
(SASA of 1996). A weak form of democratic practice seems to manifest itself 
when the SASA and the implementation thereof are inconsistent with each 
other, resulting in school governance practices operating in a manner contrary 
to what the Act purports. The promotion of democracy customarily involves 
protecting the legitimate (individual and community) interests of all. It is in this 
context that this dissertation attempts to find a route towards stronger 
democratic practices, therefore endorsing some of the principles of the South 
African Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the SASA. I argue that SGB 
practices seem to undermine these legitimate interests thus posing a dilemma 
for democracy. In addition current SGBs do not seemingly establish 
conditions according to which deliberative democratic practices can be 
achieved. And, unless SGBs also connect deliberative practices with 
citizenship as well as to “experiencing what is Other”, it would remain weakly 
democratic. For deliberative practices to happen I propose that conditions 
ought to be established whereby reasonableness and the incorporation of “the 
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Other”, that is, learners and parents need to be included through pedagogic 
attentiveness – what can epistemologically referred to as “witnessing the 
“unknowability of the Other”, can counter such a weak democracy. In other 
words by including the marginalised voices that are seemingly excluded from 
SGBs, the potential to move towards strong democratic practices shall be 
enhanced. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Liberal democracy, critical, deliberation, citizenship, 
globalisation, school governance   
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UITTREKSEL 
 
In hierdie proefskrif eksploreer ek krities skoolbeheer in verhouding tot ‘n 
liberale konsepsie van beraadslagende demokrasie, tesame met ‘n argument 
vir demokratiese burgerskap. Die begrip van desentralisasie en 
verteenwoordigende demokrasie het gesamentlike besluitneming met die 
aanvang van Suid Afrika se konstitusionele demokrasie ingelig. Hierdie klem 
op deelnemende demokrasie beoog om nasie-bou/burgerskap te verhef, 
terwyl Suid Afrika strewe om sy leisels met die verlede van apartheid te 
verbreek. Ingeboesem in die praktyk van verteenwoordigende demokrasie 
veral in die konteks van skole, is onderwysbeheer, geimplimenteer deur skool 
beheer liggame (SBLe). In hierdie proefskrif word daar geargumenteer dat dit 
voorkom asof die legitieme stemme van leerders en ouers in skoolbeheer 
liggaampraktyke geminimaliseer is -  ‘n begrip wat die teenwoordigheid van 
swak demokratiese praktyke onderskraag.  
 
My kommer is dat SBLe in benadeelde gemeenskappe nie noodwendig trou 
bly tot die beginsels van demokrasie soos dit in die Grondwet van Suid Afrika, 
insluitend die Wetsontwerp van Regte en die Suid Afrikaanse Skole Beleid 
(SASB van 1996) voorgeskryf is nie. Dit wil voorkom asof ‘n swak stel van 
demokratiese gebruike openbaar word wanneer die SASB en die 
implimentering daarvan nie konsekwent met mekaar loop nie met die gevolg 
dat skoolbeheer praktyke in teenstelling werk met beleidsverklarings. Die 
bevordering van demokrasie betrek gewoontlik die beskerming van almal 
(individu en gemeenskap) se legitieme belange. Dis in hierdie konteks wat 
hierdie proefskrif poog om ‘n roete te vind tot sterker demokratiese praktyke 
en sodoende die beginsels van die Suid Afrikaanse Grondwet, insluitend die 
Wetsontwerp van Regte en die SASA te steun. Ek argumenteer dat dit 
voorkom asof SBL praktyke hierdie legitieme belange ondermyn, wat 
sodoende ‘n verleentheid vir die demokrasie skep. Bykomend wil dit voorkom 
asof huidige SBLe nie die nodige omstandighede/geleenthede skep 
waarvolgens beraadslagende demokratiese praktyke behaal mag word nie. 
Ofskoon SBLe beraadslagende praktyke in samehang met burgerskap, sowel 
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as met die “ondervinding van wat Anders is” laat saamsnoei, sal dit 
waarskynlik ‘n swak demokrasie handhaaf. As demokratiese praktyke wil bloei 
stel ek voor dat omstandighede geskep moet word sodat “redelikheid” en “die 
“Ander”, dit is leerders en ouers, ingelyf kan word. Dit mag verhaal word deur 
pedagogiese oplettendheid en beleefdheid – wat epistemologies na verwys 
word as ‘n “getuienis tot die onkenbaarheid van die Ander”. So ‘n inlywing kan 
as teenstander dien vir ‘n swak demokrasie. Met ander woorde deur die 
gemarginaliseerde stemme  wat waarskeinlik op SBLe uitgesluit is, in te sluit 
sal die potensiaal vir sterk demokratiese praktyke moontlik bevorder word.            
 
 
SLEUTELBEGRIPPE: Liberale demokrasie, kritiese, beraadslaging, 
burgerskap, globalisasie, skool beheer  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
ANALYTICAL DISCOURSE, DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND SCHOOL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1980s, while apartheid rule was the norm, the cry from the 
oppressed masses was, “the people shall govern”. This slogan became a 
rallying phrase, giving the politically expelled majority of South Africa a sense 
of incorporation or assimilation into some form of political opposition. It is my 
contention that the majority of those who rallied around this slogan might not 
have fully comprehended the significance and concomitant consequences of 
“the people shall govern”. The 1994 democratic elections gave meaning to 
what might be termed the first phase of “the people shall govern”. The 
resultant emergence of local school governance, consequently, had its origin 
within the framework of the anti- apartheid struggle.  
 
During this period, and from organising within this framework of the school 
environment, the national “Education Crisis Committee” (later to become the 
National Education Coordinating Committee) originated. At this stage most 
learners were on the streets challenging the forces of apartheid oppression, 
meaning the state’s security machinery (police force and at times even the 
army). By then the cry was “liberation before education”. These forces were 
responsible for securing the unjust apartheid regime against the oppressed 
masses who clamoured for their right to citizenship in the country of their birth. 
Education became the catalyst for a much broader struggle against apartheid. 
One of the National Education Coordinating Committee’s (NECC) first tasks 
was to convince learners to surrender their slogan of “liberation before 
education”, thus agreeing to go back to school. This was a slogan around 
which learners rallied, galvanising their intention to move towards freedom at 
the expense of their education.  
 
It is against such a background that it was essential that South Africa’s newly 
found democracy initiate an education system grounded in principles of 
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democracy, such as equality, freedom of association and movement, 
tolerance and rationality. This realisation on the part of government implied 
that the education system was in need of transformation in order to meet the 
demands of a democratic society. The government realised that education 
has an important role to play in the implementation process of a new socio-
political ideology within South Africa. This goal of a new and more acceptable 
democratic political system of the new government, included education 
transformation, which is reflected in the White Paper on Education and 
Training of 1996. The promulgation of the South African Schools Act (Act No. 
84 of 1996) also has as its aim to “advance the democratic transformation of 
society” (Schools Act 1996: 2). The Schools Act makes provision for 
democratically elected community-based school governing bodies (SGBs). 
School governance is a new terrain for the overwhelming majority of South 
African communities precisely because they had scant prior exposure or 
training to this form of governance. Prior to the promulgation of the South 
African Schools Act, education policy and governance were heavily 
centralised, meaning that the state maintained control in ways that were 
bureaucratically centralised, racially exclusive and politically authoritarian. 
This pattern was firmly established up to 1990 (Jansen 2001a: 42). It is my 
understanding that the government’s aim was to abandon the old established 
educational dogmas which were rooted in a fundamental pedagogical 
framework, thus reinforcing the existing inequalities and creating the space to 
defend and even enhance such policies. I contend that the rationale behind 
this shift is to create the necessary space for a new educational system that 
would enhance critical reflection, dialogue and rationality.  
 
Peters (in Aspin 1995: 56) states that: “Citizens of a democracy do not simply 
arrive at political maturity and stand ready, willing and able to run its 
institutions”. What follows from this is the need for training of those governors 
serving on SGBs. Consequently, for school governing bodies to function 
effectively, it is of paramount importance to ensure that those most affected 
by the decisions be included in the decision-making processes, something 
which was almost non-existent prior to 1990. Furthermore, for any structure to 
function democratically, its participants should have a fair understanding of 
 2
what democracy is. Participants need to be educated and empowered 
regarding the principles of democracy, a process which involves exploring the 
notion of democratic citizenship.  Enslin and White posit that an increased 
interest in theories of citizenship and citizenship education is attributable to 
several factors arising in different contexts, including regional and political 
restructuring in moves towards an integrated Europe as well as problems of 
democratic consolidation in societies in transition to democracy (2003: 110). 
Kymlicka refers to two other contexts, which include the failure of 
environmental policies that rely on citizens’ voluntary co-operation, and the 
stresses created by increasingly multicultural and multiracial populations 
(2002: 284). South Africa exhibits features of these trends of which two are 
conspicuous, with reference to its transition to democracy and its multi-
cultural/religious and multiracial population.  
 
My reading of these trends leads me to the realisation that an emerging 
democracy like South Africa cannot only depend on the space that its 
institutions for justice create. The South African Constitution, its Bill of Rights, 
the Constitutional Court and its multi-party democratic system cannot 
automatically transform its citizens into democratic beings. What is needed 
are citizens of a certain quality, imbued with a specific attitude, for example, 
their sense of identity and how they view potentially competing forms of 
national, regional, ethnic or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and 
work with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate 
in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold 
authorities accountable; their willingness to show self restraint and exercise 
personal responsibility. Without citizens who posses these qualities 
democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable (Kymlicka 2002: 285). 
I would, therefore, argue that SGBs would not necessarily function 
democratically, or alternatively, that effective school governance should 
inevitably rely on responsible and accountable citizens. In other words 
individuals who pursue only their own self-interest with a disregard for the 
common good could potentially undermine democratic practices 
notwithstanding such mechanisms as the Constitution, Bill of Rights and 
South African Schools Act. Waghid cogently points to an understanding that 
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effective education policy implementation relies on responsible citizenship 
(2003a: 75). It is this type of citizen whom I claim can create the potential for 
more democratic school governance, thus contesting less democratic 
practices, which still persist in disadvantaged schools. 
 
South Africa’s new democracy merits an education system that aims to 
emancipate both learners and educators from practices grounded in inequity. 
This implies that the growth of any democratic society is directly dependant on 
the principles of a democratic school system which serve as a guide to define 
our relationships with our fellow human beings/citizens. Gazman (in Chapman 
et al. 1995: 14) argues that the fundamental psychological shifts necessary to 
bring about democracy in education and in society depend largely on the 
possibility of qualitative changes taking place in the social and economic life 
of the country. It is this notion of qualitative changes, which includes a 
movement towards equality and liberty, justice and respect for evidence and 
people that partially guide this dissertation. I shall investigate these issues in 
chapter three when I explore constitutive meanings of democratic citizenship, 
particularly in relation to equity, justice and freedom.  
 
1.2. RATIONALE OF STUDY  
 
As an educator in South Africa since 1980, I have been part of many changes 
which impacted on education in schools. My interest in the process of 
democratic transformation of education is embedded in a desire to actuate 
meaningful change in South African society. The moral foundation in terms of 
which the majority of South Africans were denied access to serve and guide 
the democratisation process includes the principles of “equity, justice, 
tolerance, respect for others and personal freedom” (Chapman et al. 1995: 7), 
all significant instances of democratic citizenship. This implies that in order to 
transform and accommodate principles of democracy, government structures 
had to change in a drastic way to meet these challenges, and in doing so, the 
Department of Education needed to put an education system in place which 
would be attuned to the democratic demands of the citizens of this country. 
For the past ten years I felt the direct impact of this restructuring process. I 
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have witnessed the trauma and disbelief which accompanied the teacher 
rationalisation programme, as well as the difficulties teachers encountered 
when they were forced to deal with larger class numbers. I subsequently 
developed a specific need to understand the current processes, which guide 
democratic transformation in schools, including whether SGBs ought to be 
shaped according to the notion of democratic citizenship. I contend that if 
SGB practices are attuned to the notion of democratic citizenship, the 
potential exists for individual governors to become critical, and, therefore, 
effect their emancipation. I now turn to a discussion on the motivation for 
embarking on a study of school governance. 
 
The adoption of a new school governance policy with its commitment to 
empower all stakeholders in the education framework should be interpreted 
as an effort by government which could contribute towards the transformation 
process in South Africa in order to transcend Afrikaner Nationalist Education. 
The notion of collective or participatory decision-making guided by individual 
rights gained considerable momentum with the advent of a constitutional 
democracy in South Africa. It was inevitable that South Africa’s schooling 
system would reflect the impact of the political changes which influence 
general life in this country. A break from the old system of domination, 
authority, control and manipulation by a minority became inevitable. The 
transformation of the Department of Education brought with it a form of school 
governance attuned to the democratic principles as announced in the South 
African Constitution and the Bill of Rights of 1996. It is my understanding that 
the new system of school governance offers a practical foundation to 
transform South African society, thus giving meaning to the concept of 
democratic citizenship. This emphasis on collective decision-making aims to 
enhance the notion that “the people shall govern”, or alternatively, the process 
of nation building which links with a process towards achieving democratic 
citizenship in this country.  This shift towards the devolution of power in a form 
of local school governance creates space for ordinary individuals within 
specific communities to influence decisions which have a direct bearing on 
their community, particularly its younger generation (learners). This 
opportunity for communities may be considered as a direct break from the 
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apartheid culture of segregating South African individuals into subjects and 
citizens. Since 1948 the South African population was divided into those with 
the franchise and those without it. Those with the franchise became legitimate 
citizens, while those without it could conceivably be seen as subjects under 
the rule and control of those with voting power. The upshot of this is that 
citizens were White and subjects were Black. The 1994 elections negated this 
dichotomy, thus conferring on all South Africans the status of citizenship. Now 
these citizens have the opportunity to have their voices heard in a meaningful 
sense with regard to them now having the potential to influence important 
outcomes which directly affect them. For this reason the new system of school 
governance offers a practical space to transform societies because the 
previously disenfranchised now have the right to exercise their civic duty. 
 
However, embedded in the practice of collective or participatory decision 
making with regard to educational governance in schools is the notion that 
SGBs need to function according to the principles of democracy as espoused 
in the South African Constitution of 1996. The South African Schools Act 
emphasises the establishment of a system of school governance that 
responds to the needs of the South African society/citizens served by such 
institutions. Educational governance should, therefore, as one of its 
objectives, prepare and develop citizens in line with the government’s 
manoeuvre towards nation building. By this I do not suggest that virtuous 
citizens should only be nurtured in line with what politicians desire. On the 
contrary, the development of this country’s citizenry should ultimately be for 
achieving the common good. However, it seems as if school governance 
practices do not necessarily adhere to those tenets of democracy as 
accentuated in the South African Schools Act of 1996. Problems seem to 
arise when the South African Schools Act and the implementation thereof 
seem to be at variance with each other, that is, the practice of school 
governance seems to be contrary to what the Act purports in relation to 
cultivating virtuous citizens, or alternatively nation builders. It is in such a 
context that this dissertation attempts to explore the conceptual and pragmatic 
relationship between deliberative democracy incorporating democratic 
citizenship, school governance and a critical framework of thinking. I contend 
 6
that if school governance is framed according to deliberative/democratic 
citizenship, it has the potential to be critical and, therefore, emancipatory, thus 
enabling sustainable societal transformation, including citizens who exhibit 
what Galston refers to as “civic virtue” or “public-spiritedness” (1991: 217), 
precisely what the government professes needs to be accomplished.      
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s analytical and fundamental pedagogic 
philosophy of education dominated the field of education and hence 
permeated through school governance in this country. This resulted in a 
system of school governance which was less democratic, oppressive, and in a 
sense unsustainable. The consequences for school governance have been 
devastating in relation to our new democratic ethos. Nowhere in that system 
could the majority of the citizenry of this country claim that they had a 
meaningful input. The reality was that they were actually excluded from any 
major influence. This, however, does not translate into no influence at all. On 
the contrary, the influence that the disenfranchised majority had, fell outside of 
the bureaucratic boundaries of educational governance and within non-
governmental organisations.    
 
The promotion of democracy invariably involves securing the legitimate 
interests of all people whether as individuals or as a community. I shall argue 
that school governing body practices do not necessarily secure these 
legitimate interests, an idea which, therefore, poses a potential problem for 
democracy. I shall further argue that locating the debate on school 
governance within the framework of critical theory and democratic citizenship, 
it seemingly has the potential to lead to more democratic practices within the 
educational environment. In line with such reasoning I contend that for the 
democratisation of school governance to take place, it should become the 
preserve of the ordinary lay person, or alternatively, the democratic citizen.  
This is so because democratic citizenship incorporates a “vital function to 
perform an integrated role, a device to cultivate a sense of community and a 
common sense of purpose. Citizenship binds various groups in society and 
works against mutual mistrust and conflict”, (Kymlicka 1996: 162). Given that 
on the one hand democratic school governance operates within a terrain of 
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conflict, whilst the underlying rationale is to resolve such conflict, the notion of 
citizenship has the potential to sustain democratic governance precisely 
because it militates against conflict. I do not suggest that conflict or dissent is 
necessary bad for school governance. On the contrary, democracy thrives on 
these notions. The point is the manner in which such conflict or dissent is 
resolved becomes pertinent. On the other hand citizenship includes a notion 
of responsibility. Responsibility in terms of one’s civic duties which might 
include honesty, freedom of association, and freedom of speech are all 
moments in deliberative democracy, being the type of democratic order for 
which I shall argue in relation to school governance. Regarding the 
deliberative democratic ideal, I shall argue for the liberal communitarian 
interpretation which posits that the self cannot be understood apart from the 
social relations in which it is embedded, meaning that individuals pursue their 
objectives in collaboration with one another. The group or community 
conception of the common good has precedence over the individuals’ right to 
freely pursue his/her individual interests (Miller 2000: 99-103). I shall explore 
these notions and its influence on civic practices in chapter three.   
 
Policies promulgated in the South African Schools Act create space for the 
application of democratic principles. These spaces need to be filled or utilised 
with the distinct purpose of contributing towards sound school governance 
based on the principles as provided in the Act. Hendricks (2000: 25) posits 
that:  
 
… Participation in school-based governance has the potential of 
contributing in (sic) the democratic transformation of whole school 
communities. 
 
However, Waghid (2001a: 1) argues that: 
 
… effective policy initiatives driven by functional or instrumental 
preoccupations are not only conceptually flawed but also deprive 
education of its wider human purposes. 
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In my reading of Waghid’s interpretation, he presupposes that by simply 
participating in the system of SGBs would not necessarily lead to democratic 
transformation, as Hendricks claims. On the contrary, there are many 
variables that impact on SGBs, which have to be considered to determine 
whether their practices contribute towards principles of democracy. Although 
the South African Schools Act theoretically provides space for democratic 
transformation, it is when the Act is transformed into practice that I suspect 
problems seem to arise. I concur with Waghid’s analysis, for it is my 
contention that the manner in which SGBs give meaning to the Act, make 
these SGBs vulnerable to less democratic practices. Karlsson, McPherson 
and Pampallis (2002) reinforce this view when they argue that: 
 
Since the establishment of governing bodies, one of the key problems 
confronting provincial departments has been building the capacity of 
governing body members, especially among the previously 
marginalised and disadvantaged school communities. Without the 
necessary skills for members to participate fully in governance, these 
structures cannot claim to be democratic (in Motala & Pampallis 2002: 
168). 
 
They further posit the following: 
  
At a local level, a school community given power by legislation could 
have that power rendered useless by a lack of skills necessary for 
exercising it. This is a real danger in the newly decentralised South 
African school system, where SGBs have been given considerable 
powers but in many schools lack the skills necessary to exercise them 
effectively. (2002: 144).  
 
This finding reinforces my suspicion that school governors do not always 
posses the necessary skills to engender a system of democratic governance 
without having been trained towards such practices. Karlsson et al. (2002: 
144), however, caution that one of the reasons contributing to this state of 
affairs hinges on the claim that budgetary constraints hinder capacity building 
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projects. I am not convinced that budgetary constraints threaten the skills 
development programmes initiated by provincial education departments to the 
extent that it negates more democratic practices. I argue that it is an issue of 
priorities. If the rationale is that the system of decentralisation and, therefore 
school governance represents a break with the apartheid past, then the 
necessary mechanisms should be in place in order to drive the school 
governance strategy. Furthermore, this training which the South African 
Schools Act refers to, is law. A failure to apply this law is tantamount to 
breaking the law. Therefore, to argue in terms of budgetary constraints is to 
adopt an escapist attitude. My understanding is that school governance, to 
which the South African Schools Act alludes, drives the education process at 
public school level. To argue only along budgetary lines to justify less 
democratic practices seems unconvincing. Instead, I argue that a movement 
towards responsible citizenship where individuals become convinced of their 
civic duties could potentially erode the “burden of budget”. I argue that citizens 
should heed the call by President Thabo Mbeki of voluntary work to promote 
the common good that can be linked to the notion of civic duty, thus going 
some way in negating these budgetary constraints. The President made this 
call under the slogan of “Vukuzenzele”, meaning taking responsibility with the 
aim of getting the job done. I shall, therefore, argue that a means to overcome 
the stated constraints could conceivably be realised through governors 
becoming democratic citizens in the sense used by theorists of democratic 
citizenship. In this dissertation I argue that SGBs ought to be shaped by the 
notion of democratic citizenship which could possibly result in critical and 
emancipatory governance discourses. 
  
1.3.1. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
To appreciate how school governance in South Africa had to transform, I shall 
clarify the situation prior to the implementation of the School Governing Body 
system. I intend providing a general overview of education transformation 
prior to 1990, and later on proceed to the different phases in policy 
development. These phases in policy development extended over a period of 
time. They can be described as: 
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The positioning phase, which refers to the period 1990-1994, the 
frameworks phase, refers to the early work of the first ANC (African 
National Congress) led government from 1994 and the implementation 
phase from 1996 till present (Young in Kraak & Young 2001: 7). 
 
Until 1990 education policy in South Africa was heavily centralised. The State 
maintained control of education in ways that were bureaucratically centralised, 
racially exclusive and politically authoritarian. This pattern was firmly 
established up to 1990 (Jansen 2001a: 42). Notwithstanding this fact, the 
demand for democracy and participation in education in South Africa has a 
long history, reaching a peak of intense and bitter student struggles in the 
1980s. I shall explore this issue in detail in chapter 2. In relation to the 
struggle for democratic school governance Karlsson posits that:  
 
The South African ideal of democratic governing bodies, which would 
involve representatives of various constituencies in a school 
community, was born in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto school 
uprising and the development of a People’s Education discourse in the 
1980s (in Karlsson 2002: 327). 
 
Central to these struggles was that decision-making in schools and school 
governance structures should include all legitimate role-players. The upshot of 
this was that greater representation would ensure educational accountability, 
legitimacy and democracy (Carrim & Sayed 1997: 91). The call for greater 
participation is based on the assumption that if more people were included in 
school governing bodies, then democracy would be boosted and equality 
among schools would be ensured (Dieltiens & Enslin 2002: 5, my italics). The 
development and growth of Parent, Teacher and Student Associations 
(PTSAs) concretised these demands, giving political voice to the then 
disenfranchised. The vision of People’s Education took on a systematic 
momentum when the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) 
which had its origins within the Education Crisis Committee, supported the 
establishment of PTSAs as alternatives to what they termed to be “puppet 
governance structures” of the apartheid-era education authorities (Karlsson 
 11
2002: 328). As structures contesting the State, PTSAs operated parallel to 
State structures such as School Management Councils (Carrim & Sayed 
1997: 91). The School Management Councils were apartheid state organs, 
considered to be illegitimate by the oppressed (disenfranchised) citizenry of 
this country. From the State's perspective PTSAs were illegitimate bodies that 
had as one of its goals to undermine the status quo. It is for this reason that 
the education authorities (under the apartheid regime) called on the security 
forces of the state to vigorously repress the PTSA system. This tension 
between the “legal” education structure of the state and the “illegal” mass-
movement structure needs to be analysed in order to gain some insight into 
the rationale which drove these opposing parties. I shall explore this 
dichotomy of legitimacy/illegitimacy, its resultant repression and concomitant 
impact on school governance in detail in chapter two.  
 
Continuing with this overview, the early 1990s is characterised by a “race for 
policy position”, while the next period (up to and including 1994) could be 
described as the “race for policy frameworks” (Jansen 2001a: 42). The 
Minister of Education initiated the most important policy framework in 1995, 
focusing on the work of the Hunter Committee. Part of this committee’s 
framework of reference was to unify the education system of South Africa. 
Nineteen education departments based on race and ethnicity had restricted 
space within the democratic ethos of the South African Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights. New norms and, therefore, new legislation was critical to 
transform not only the racially divided system of education, but also the 
governance and financing of schools. To this end the Hunter Committee was 
instituted. This “national framework would govern the organisation, funding 
and management of education” (Jansen 2001a: 44). This report provided the 
framework which led to the production of the South African Schools Bill (April 
1996), which later became the South African Schools Act of November 1996. 
Although the Act emphasises the notion of participation, it also supports the 
task of equity and redress. My suspicion, however, is that eight years later 
disadvantaged schools are still struggling with the same problems that 
enveloped them during the apartheid period, raising the issue of whether the 
impact of eight years of a new form of governance brought the equality, under 
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the redress principle, as envisaged in 1996.  I shall return to the principles of 
equity and redress in chapter two.  
 
From the outset it was clear that school governance was a politically volatile 
issue and that the prime function of the policies was to ensure that hegemonic 
consensus could be engendered (Carrim & Sayed 1997: 92). In fact Jansen 
claims that, “the result is that policy makers have worked more diligently on 
appearing to improve schooling than on actually doing so”. So, despite the 
“flurry of policy” since the first democratic elections, the Minister of Education 
late in 1999 acknowledged that there still remained a crisis in education. This 
then resulted in “Tirisano” or his “Call to Action”, meaning, a race for policy 
implementation (Jansen 2001a: 51). I explore these developments and its 
resultant influence on democratic school governance in chapter two. 
 
The appointment of a new Minister of Education in 1999 had as part of his 
agenda to expedite policy implementation. Jansen questions whether the 
current political and bureaucratic machinery can in fact “deliver”. He argues 
that the instrument of choice (to speed up the delivery process) is “policy 
review”. Constitutive in the concept “review” is a suggestion that something is 
erroneous or misplaced. Conversely, if everything is adequate and 
satisfactory, a review obviously becomes unnecessary. To clarify this point I 
turn to Jansen who claims: 
 
Merely to call for a review is to concede the possibility of failure. A 
review, by its very nature, carries the threat of exposure. In the case of 
a weak state – by which I mean a state with limited bureaucratic and 
political capacity to change the practice of education “on the ground” – 
reviews are particularly dangerous (Jansen 2001a: 52). 
 
I interpret “exposure” in this context, as meaning that the shortcomings or 
what is perceived to be wrong with the original policy becomes public 
knowledge. In the public domain these “mistakes” are then scrutinised and 
criticised. Exposure or admitting to making mistakes could be perceived as 
the government operating from a position of weakness, something which any 
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government would want to avoid. Furthermore the process of policy review is 
in itself a time consuming exercise, putting another strain on 
implementation/”tirisano”.  This eventually translates into an inactive period of 
non-implementation, because of “an investiture in political symbolism in 
Curriculum 2005 in the late 1990s, which means that any attempt to change 
the curriculum would be fiercely contested” (Jansen 2001a:  57). Current 
developments surrounding Curriculum 2005 bears testimony to this 
interpretation. Grade nine (according to Curriculum 2005) was established as 
an exit point where the learner shall receive a certificate which would serve as 
the entry requirement for the Further Education and Training (FET) band. 
However, the reality is that this did not materialise, resulting in a reversal 
towards the “old subject system” as opposed to the learning areas which 
Curriculum 2005 endorses. The upshot of this is that, if the current group of 
learners (now in grade twelve) progress without fail, they shall not make 
contact with the learning areas (of Outcomes Based Education [OBE] to which 
the new curriculum introduced them), again. The other hurdle that these 
learners will have to overcome is the system of exams, for which the OBE 
system did not prepare them. Another worrying issue is the reality that the 
common tasks for assessment (CTAs) were first introduced as formal tests 
involving all grade nines in 2002. The next round of tests took place in 2003, 
however, no formal results on a national level has yet been made public, 
putting into question whether the Education Department actually have the 
capacity to initiate and oversee this system of “external examinations”. One 
should bear in mind that this form of assessment will materially contribute 
towards the achievement of a General Education and Training (GET) 
certificate at the end of grade nine.  
 
I expose the inherent difficulties in relation to Curriculum 2005 and its 
surrounding policies to give some insight into the space that exists between 
policy legislation, and its implementation. It is thus my contention that since 
1990, the road to securing a new education system for South Africa has 
proved to have many pitfalls. In fact, the space for securing the educational 
needs for the future of this country is a space of fierce and protracted 
struggle. This struggle will eventually impact on the manner in which schools 
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are governed, given the fact that the individual governors (representing their 
stakeholder groups) should ultimately implement these contested policies. 
This understanding creates the impression that the implementation of policy 
phase is still evolving, thus creating space for further development particularly 
in the arena of school governance. It is on this level that I argue that school 
governance and the implementation of contested policies can best be 
resolved by engendering a notion of democratic citizenship which has the 
potential to transform governor practices by making it more critical and, 
therefore, emancipatory. The reason is that critical governors who have the 
potential to reflect and question their decisions, have a better chance of 
implementing policies more democratically. These conceptions of 
empowerment and emancipation (to think critically and to transform) which 
democratic citizenship may effect, has its roots in a critical framework of 
thinking and acting. This is so because critical theory is based on its potential 
to transform, empower and emancipate – those features democratic 
citizenship aims to engender. When school governors are empowered as to 
their civic role within a democratic state they then have the potential to make 
informed decisions about policy. To this degree they might even be able to 
contest policies which in a sense impacts on the lives of their children. In this 
way they have the potential to enter the debate thus fulfilling in some sense 
their role as democratic citizens. I now turn to a discussion of a critical 
paradigm.  
 
1.3.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS    
 
One of the major aims of this dissertation is to ascertain whether deliberative 
democracy can foster democratic citizenship and whether it has the potential 
to engender more critical discourse practices within the realm of school 
governance. I, therefore, have to interact with individual school governors and 
also conceptually analyse the work of other researchers in this field in order to 
determine the type of practices in which they are involved. The reason is to 
ascertain the reasons that they offer in defence of their actions. In doing this I 
shall be able to determine whether their practices are either more or less 
critical.  The point is that my analysis of school governance shall firstly rely on 
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the reasons that governors give for acting the way they do. In other words 
what meanings do they give in order to explain how they perceive, and 
interpret their actions? Put differently, I attempt to understand the reasons that 
they give in fulfilling their intentions and desires.  
 
As I have earlier argued, I suspect that governors are engaged in less 
democratic practices. My suspicion is that it might be because the 
interpretation and consequently the meaning that they give of school 
governance policy is confused, fragmented and cloudy. If, however, the 
meanings can be made clear, in other words if it can be expressed in a critical 
way the potential exits that their actions would be altered, thus becoming 
more democratic.  After I have exposed their understandings of their 
practices, I shall attempt to subsequently move towards a sense where they 
realise that they could and “perhaps” should alter their practices to facilitate a 
more democratic form of action. My subsequent aim is thus to bring the 
governors to a realisation that they have the potential to transform their 
understandings, thus leading them to empowerment, which means making 
their practices more critical. I say “perhaps” because I do not propose that my 
interpretation, or hopeful form of empowerment, is the final answer or truth. In 
my deliberation with governors they might potentially gain greater insight and 
thus move beyond the practices, which I might propose.  
 
I have thus far argued that through interpretive and critical discourses with its 
aim to understand (interpret) and empower (in order to transform) SGBs have 
the potential to become more critical. My contention is that through cultivating 
the notion of democratic citizenship the critical school governor could 
potentially be awakened, thus enhancing the capacity to empower and 
subsequently transform his/her practices to become more democratic.  
 
Before I expound on a critical framework of thinking it seems prudent to first 
give some understanding of the interpretive paradigm. I base this thinking on 
a visionary claim by Fay (1975: 93) who posits that: “a critical social science is 
characterised by three main features. The first of these is that it accepts the 
necessity of interpretive categories in social science; in this regard it rests on 
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the arguments in support of the interpretive model”. The critical paradigm 
asserts that in order to have a subject matter at all the social scientist should 
attempt to understand the intentions and desires of the actors (school 
governors) he is observing. To further elucidate this point I draw on Fay who 
claims that: 
 
Critical theory is rooted in the felt needs and sufferings of people, and 
therefore it is absolutely necessary that the critical theorist come to 
understand these actors from their own point of view (Fay 1975: 94). 
 
This notion of felt needs, however, goes to the heart of the interpretive 
framework, for interpretivists “seeks to uncover those systems of social 
relationships which determine the actions of individuals …” (Fay 1975: 94). 
My reason for discussing both paradigms is simply to satisfy a potential critic 
by exposing that the critical framework has its roots in the interpretive 
paradigm. I reiterate that I am conversant with the interpretation that the two 
methodologies are not necessarily conflicting. I now proceed to discuss the 
interpretive model. 
 
1.3.2.1. AN INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM 
 
The interpretive research framework is concerned with understanding the 
daily occurrences which confront people, as well as the meanings they give in 
order to show how they perceive and interpret these occurrences. The two 
pivotal issues within the interpretive framework are therefore the self-
understanding of the individual (the basis for all social interpretations) and as 
Waghid (2002: 47) states, that human consciousness remains transparent, 
meaning that human explanations, as they appear, do not conceal any deeper 
understanding of events. Interpretive theory stresses the notion that analysis 
involves more than observation. In this regard Danner (1995: 223) explains 
social interpretation as hermeneutic understanding which aims to make 
meaning explicit, to explain, to understand and to interpret meaning. It is this 
concept of hermeneutic understanding on which I shall heavily rely when I 
argue for democratic citizenship in the quest of achieving critical school 
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governance. According to Danner, hermeneutic understanding occurs every 
time a person encounters another human being.  
 
The crucial point is, according to Fay (1975: 74), to reach the self-
understanding of the person acting in the situation, analysing and 
understanding his or her reasons for their actions. Taylor corroborates this 
view when he argues that a “successful interpretation is one which makes 
clear the meaning originally present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form. 
… what is strange, mystifying, puzzling, contradictory is no longer so, is 
accounted for” (Taylor 1985: 17).  In other words, actions cannot just be 
observed, but they have to be explained. We need to know the reasons for 
performing the action, or self-understanding for performing the act. Fay (1975:  
71) argues that the interpretive approach to social science is comprised of 
action concepts; the term which he employs to describe - “doings as opposed 
to happenings”. This analysis involves describing behaviour, which is done 
purposefully, as opposed to behaviour, which occurs without intent. An action 
concept is consequently a distinct act for which the actor had a definite aim or 
intent. The intention of interpretivism is to unearth the rationale behind the 
reason or desire of a person to perform this particular action. The crux 
according to such reasoning is to interpret. It makes sense that one cannot 
interpret any act without giving a description of that act. There is thus a link 
between interpretation and description which cannot be divorced from 
explanation (Fay 1975: 72).  
 
My reading regarding this analysis leads me to a notion of reaching the self-
understandings of those acting in the situation, in other words understanding 
their reasons for acting the way they do. For example, one person among a 
group raises his arm. How does one interpret this action? Perhaps the one is 
trying to attract the other’s attention; or is intent on neutralising some stiffness 
in his shoulder; or is attempting to warn the group of impending danger; or is 
simply waving to a person passing by. In the interpretive mode the action 
needs to be explained, that is, one needs to know the reasons for performing 
such an action; one needs to uncover its self-understanding, or alternatively 
its hermeneutic understanding. However, one should not omit what Fay calls 
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the “social element”, meaning, the set of social rules that provide the criteria 
for the action. In this regard rules mean all those shared assumptions, 
definitions, and conceptions which structure the world in certain definite ways 
(Fay 1975: 74). Taylor refers to this as “common meanings”. He argues that, 
“to understand … we have to be in on a certain experience, we have to 
understand a certain language (not just words), but also a language of mutual 
action and communication. In the end we are in on this because we grow up 
in the ambit of certain common meanings” (1985: 24). My interpretation of this 
is that an individual can only have an understanding of an action, if he/she is 
privy to certain rules (social context) within which an action occurs. It is this 
manner of understanding which informs the concept of a “social practice”. In 
this regard I support Fay’s argument which states: 
 
An interpretive theory is one which attempts to uncover the sense of a 
given action, practice or constitutive meaning; it does this by 
discovering the intentions and desires of particular actors, by 
uncovering the set of rules which give point to these sets of rules and 
practices, and by elucidating the basic conceptual scheme which 
orders experience in ways that practices, actions, and experiences 
which a social scientist observes are made intelligible, by seeing how 
they fit into a whole structure which defines the nature and purpose of 
human life (1975: 79). 
 
Taylor (1985: 17) corroborates this understanding when he emphasises that 
interpretation appeals throughout to our understanding of the “language” of 
expression (Fay’s rules), which understanding allows us to see that this 
expression is puzzling … and that these difficulties are cleared up when the 
meaning is expressed in a new way”.  
 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein (1958: 23) posits that to understand the meanings 
implicit in a concept, is to understand “forms of life”, meaning that we can only 
understand human action within its context, or within the form of life within 
which it occurs. By implication, school governance means different things to 
different people, depending on how they interpret the concept. In this 
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Wittgensteinian sense there cannot be one overarching meaning of 
educational governance. Interpreting school governance in terms of the 
meanings that governors give to the practice is, therefore, essential.  With 
regard to “rules”, “language of expression” and “forms of life”, I interpret them 
as interchangeable concepts, thus being founded on the same principle, 
meaning all refer to the social context within which the act occurs. The 
interpretive model thus asserts that social conflict is the result of 
misunderstandings which, if reconciled, could restore the order. The upshot of 
this is that the interpretive model would want to lead its participants to change 
the way they think about what they and others are doing, rather than provide 
them with a theory which could change what they and others are doing. It is 
precisely this interpretation which I aim to utilise in uncovering the school 
governors' “misinterpretations” with the view of changing the way they “think 
about what they and others are doing”. Alysdair MacIntyre (1981: 64) links 
“rule following” and “forms of life” to narratives. He argues that human beings 
are by nature story-telling beings and that narrative is a form of rule following 
that accounts for the way we give significance to our lives. Put differently, we 
give significance to what school governance mean by telling stories about the 
way we understand their meanings. In following my argument in terms of the 
interpretive framework, the interpretive paradigm seeks to change thinking as 
opposed to changing the actions of those who are acting. Consequently it 
does not claim to seek a change in behaviour, meaning it stops short from 
real empowerment, something that the critical social paradigm purports to do. 
Part of my aim is to empower school governors to indulge in more democratic 
practices and thus I aim to change their current practices which I suspect to 
be less democratic. It is in this regard that I now discuss critical theory.                  
 
1.3.2.2. A CRITICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Critical theory has its origins in the Frankfurt School (in Germany) where the 
Institute for Social Research was founded in 1923. Critical theory represents a 
different way of thinking, being concerned with primarily solving particular 
social problems. For critical theory the main interest of human beings would 
be to liberate themselves from forms of domination, which are best 
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understood as what occurs when people’s goals and means of achieving such 
goals are prescribed for them. This framework of thinking emanates from 
problems of everyday life, and is constructed with a mechanism of solving 
them. In short, the empowerment and emancipation of humanity lies at the 
heart of the critical paradigm.  
 
The critical model attempts to integrate theory and practice in that it sees 
theories as an analysis of a social situation in terms of those features, which 
can be altered in order to eliminate certain frustrations which members in this 
model are experiencing. The Habermasian notion of “theory and praxis” finds 
resonance with this type of reasoning, for Habermas argues that: “… theory 
encompasses a dual relationship between theory and practice … , therefore,  
connecting with the Aristotelian view of the distinction between praxis and 
techne” (1971: 2). Fay (1975: 94) gives some insight into this understanding 
when he posits that a critical social science is characterised by three main 
features. Firstly, this theory is rooted in the felt needs and sufferings of people 
and, thus the critical theorist should understand the actors from their point of 
view. Secondly, the theory recognises that people’s actions are caused by 
social conditions over which they have no control. The critical paradigm thus 
seeks to uncover systems of social relationships, which determine the actions 
of individuals and the unanticipated (not accidental) consequences of these 
actions. Thirdly, critical social science is built on the explicit recognition that 
social theory is interconnected with social practice. This connection between 
theory and practice means that critical theory “ties its knowledge claims to the 
satisfaction of human purposes and desires” (Fay 1975: 95). In this regard it 
employs the quasi-causal and functional laws to explain the contradictions in 
social life that underlie the tensions and conflicts which the actors experience. 
Fay explains that: 
  
This involves an attempt to develop an historical account which reveals 
how it is that the relevant social actors came to be what they are. The 
explanations, which result from such an approach would always be in 
terms of the felt needs and experienced privations or sufferings of the 
agents involved (Fay 1975: 96). 
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My understanding of this reasoning is that the critical paradigm attempts to 
account for the sufferings and felt needs of the actors in a social group by 
seeing them as the result of certain structural conflicts. It is in this regard that 
it gives an historical account in quasi-causal terms. It is with this interpretation 
in mind that my exposition on the historical development of School Governing 
Bodies (which I initiated in this chapter and) that I shall discuss in chapter two 
starts to make sense. It is by understanding the context within which School 
Governing Bodies had its origins (its quasi-causal terms) that one may begin 
to interpret the reasons why school governors act the way they do. 
Understanding the sources and nature of social action and the rationale for its 
discontent is, however, not enough. The critical paradigm envisages to 
demonstrate how such forms of (scientifically produced in an interpretive 
paradigmatic sense) discontent can potentially be eliminated by removing “in 
some specified way, the structural contradictions which underlie it”. To further 
elucidate this claim I turn to Fay who posits: 
 
This means that the quasi-causal explanations which are given must 
be related to the felt needs … in such a way that they show how these 
feelings can be overcome by the actors coming to understand 
themselves in their situation as the product of certain inherent 
contradictions in their social order, contradictions which they can 
remove by taking an appropriate course of action to change this social 
order.  … It does so by revealing how the irrationalities of social life, 
which are causing the dissatisfaction, can be eliminated by taking 
some specific action which the theory calls for (Fay 1975: 97–98).      
 
An integral part of the critical paradigm is, therefore, to demonstrate in what 
ways the ideologies of the actors are illusions. The idea is to strip these 
ideologies of their power and in the process seek to reveal a rational way of 
going about in getting what the actors feel they deserve. Ideology in this 
sense refers to a set of ideas that serve the interests of a particular social 
class. The Frankfurt School refers to this emancipatory agenda as “ideology-
critique”. The ideal underlying an ideology-critique is that of autonomous 
people who rationally analyse and criticise different ideological discourses 
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imposed upon them. In this way critical theory becomes a form of criticism in 
which everything should be questioned, and in which critical and reflective 
thinking becomes processes of criticising questioning itself. In this way 
ideology critique not only seeks to point out error, but it also attempts to reveal 
“the truth which these ideas contain by demonstrating how they point to an 
important dimension in the psychological economy of their proponents, and 
how they suggest a new self-conception which makes explicit what they only 
implicitly contained. It is only by providing an alternative or a new conception 
of themselves that these actors can overcome their situation” (Fay 1975: 99). 
Habermas (1984) furthers this understanding when he proposes the 
promotion of an “ideal speech situation” where people can communicate with 
one another and participate equally in public debates about political and social 
life. At the core of Habermasian critical theory is the idea that people need to 
communicate with and understand the other, to make themselves understood 
on the basis of reasons that could be assented to or argued against by 
reference to other reasons, with the possibility of reaching consensus. 
Habermas refers to this as the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. It is this 
Habermasian form of “critical hermeneutics” which I intend to utilise when 
arguing for democratic citizenship in my analysis of SGB practices. This 
conception which presupposes a rational way of understanding human 
actions, analyses different cultures, and then makes critical judgments about 
them, seems the ideal form of inquiry for this dissertation, in particular 
regarding an interpretation of governors' views.  
 
At this stage I feel that it becomes necessary to defend the notion that I move 
from one paradigm to another as if this is common in research. In my readings 
of these particular two paradigms the impression is created that the two 
methodologies are not neatly separated or distinctively compartmentalised. I 
believe that the borders of these paradigms are rather elastic and therefore 
pliable. It is my contention that the two frameworks of thinking under 
discussion, are consequently not mutually exclusive. In my discussion I have 
attempted to show that there seems to be a natural progression from the one 
to the other. Le Grange (2001: 73) supports this type of reasoning when he 
argues for an ever changing and dynamic view of conceptual frameworks, by 
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stating that: “a specific framework should not be used to parochially locate our 
work”. This view may conceive a perception that a particular study or research 
should not necessarily be confined to one specific framework. I have earlier 
also argued for an interpretation of hermeneutics in an interpretive 
paradigmatic sense (Danner’s hermeneutic understanding) as well as in a 
critical framework sense (Habermasian critical hermeneutics). Kincheloe and 
McLaren reinforce this understanding when they claim that: 
 
Critical hermeneutics is more comfortable with interpretive approaches 
that assume that the meaning of human experience can never be fully 
disclosed – neither to the researcher nor even to the human who 
experienced it … Critical hermeneutics grounds a critical research that 
attempts to connect the everyday troubles individuals face to public 
issues of power, justice, and democracy. In its ability to render the 
personal political, critical hermeneutics provides a methodology for 
arousing a critical consciousness through the analysis of the generative 
themes of the present era (2000: 289). 
 
Here the bridge between hermeneutics in an interpretive as well as critical 
sense is provided, thus leading to the conception that paradigms at certain 
instances can rationally overlap and are thus not in all instances mutually 
exclusive. This dissertation utilises this “bridge” to cross the (potential critics 
perceived) theoretical divide between the two stated paradigms, meaning that 
my dissertation is located within two different methodologies. In the context of 
this study I initially commence my inquiry within an interpretive paradigm, but 
later on adopt a more critical theoretical approach compatible with my area of 
investigation. The reason being that my research starts out to investigate, 
understand and explain events, then moves towards enacting transformative 
change by empowering school governors, thus leading hopefully, to their 
emancipation. As I have stated earlier in this discussion, the two 
methodologies are not necessarily conflicting precisely because the critical 
paradigm grows out of interpretivism. My reason for discussing both and 
supplying the link between the two is simply to prevent a potential critic from 
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finding fault in my jumping paradigms. I now proceed with a discussion of the 
research method. 
 
1.3.3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Now that I have elucidated on the two distinctly related (the one grows from 
the other) research methodologies I shall utilise in this dissertation, I need to 
explore the notion of method. I shall particularly refer to conceptual analysis, 
case studies, and deconstruction for I shall to a large extent rely on these 
methods. I need to state at the outset that the conceptual analysis and case 
study methods have the potential to trap the researcher in the positivist mode. 
Positivists at best only describe the social world by claiming that all events we 
want to explain are “facts of the world” (meaning they are all of the same 
logical type). For positivists there are no rational arguments relating to notions 
such as honesty or freedom. Such values are subjective and not 
“scientifically” verifiable, because for positivists there is only one proper form 
of explanation. For them the object of inquiry is to find “scientific” statements 
and then set out to falsify them. I have argued for working in the interpretive 
and critical paradigms and would consequently want to avoid falling into a 
positivist mode. I shall, therefore, qualify the framework in which I determine 
to utilise case studies and conceptual analysis, and in the process expose the 
possibility of employing them within an interpretive/critical paradigmatic sense. 
However, before I proceed I need to locate this in order to make clear where 
these methods have their origin. I first proceed with a discussion of the 
philosophy of education debate. 
 
1.3.3.1. A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION DEBATE 
 
Philosophy of education has been on the receiving end of many criticisms 
during the past decade. One of the most striking of these is the interpretation 
that it makes little contribution to the formation of educational policy or the 
improvement of educational practice. Notwithstanding these criticisms, 
arguments produced by educational philosophers are utilised to justify 
educational policy and in other instances educational practices. However, the 
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criticism that education philosophy has become ineffective cannot, and should 
not, be ignored. One needs to ascertain what the reasoning is behind such 
accusations. Carr posits two reasons for this when he argues that those in 
authority who are responsible for educational policy rarely base their 
decisions on sound rational arguments. Carr argues that policies are 
formulated and decisions are made on the basis of political expediency, 
vested interests and established power (2004: 56). If this is so then the upshot 
is that rational principles such as impartiality, truth, respect for evidence, a 
sense of justice and so on, are either being overlooked or alternatively being 
corrupted. Pring articulates the same understandings when he posits that 
there are many claims that educational research does not provide the 
answers which governments ask to decide between alternative policies; or 
research does not help educational practice (teaching methods); or research 
funding is money not well spent (2000: 1).  
 
When engaging with this debate I find that educational philosophers examine 
issues in accordance with rational inquiry while politicians, policy makers and 
other educational professionals implement educational decisions which 
generally lack intellectual rigour. An example is the current system of 
Outcomes Based Education (OBE). Educational professionals (in the employ 
of the Department of Education) including teachers, rarely interrogate the 
rationale behind OBE or the influence and impact of this system on teaching 
practice. What I do find is that teachers in particular complain, but at the same 
time do everything in their power to blindly implement the principles of OBE. I, 
therefore, contend that there seems to be a glaring difference in approach to 
education between educational philosophers on the one hand, and the 
diverse group of politicians, teachers and other educational professionals 
(curriculum advisers, education managers and inspectors) on the other. How 
does one respond to this? As I have stated earlier, there is a claim that 
educational philosophy does not present practical answers to current 
educational problems. Politicians and particularly policy makers want 
evidence-based proof with clear guidance to questions of an educational 
nature with reference to educational problems. Technology and its influence 
on modern society have influenced our daily existence to such an extent that 
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we expect instant answers/cures for any and all problems. If I have a 
headache I don’t want to debate its origins, all I want is relief or cure. To this 
end I swallow a tablet, which solves my problem. Hammersley cautions 
against this attitude when he argues that: 
 
There is a danger in looking for too direct a relation between research 
conclusions and specific rules for successful practice. Human beings 
(and the social life in which they interact) are not the sort of things 
where there can be simple causal relationships between specific 
interventions and subsequent behaviours. The impact of research may 
be indirect, a gradual shifting of public and professional consciousness 
in the light of growing evidence, rather than a direct relation of 
conclusions to practical decisions (in Pring 2000: 5). 
 
It is this type of response with its propensity for instant cures which gave rise 
to the notion of evidence based practices in education. The notion of evidence 
based practice has its origin in the medical field and has subsequently spread 
its tentacles to other disciplines, including social work, resource management 
and ultimately education. Because evidence based practice has the potential 
to incorporate effective intervention it became the mode of operation in 
medicine. The argument is that it could yield the same results for education 
thus solving problems with ready-made evidence based answers. Evidence 
based practice thus asks of educational philosophers to provide information 
and evidence in order to enact effective interventions. Research, in other 
words, has to determine what Biesta refers to as “what works”. When 
philosophers have determined “what works”, this may then be implemented as 
a treatment (intervention) in order to “solve the problem” (2004: 3). Biesta 
posits that this reasoning is perhaps valid to the field of medicine. However, 
he argues that a learner is quite different from a patient; being a learner is not 
an illness, just as teaching is not a cure (2004: 4). It is consequently a 
question of how educational philosophy approaches the questions of 
education. How does philosophy of education transcend the divide between 
theory and practice; the question that Dewey called “dualism”, that being 
between “thinking and doing” (1916: 94)? 
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To answer this question, it is imperative to firstly determine what makes an 
activity distinctly educational. In other words what does the concept education 
mean, or alternatively the term has to be clarified. Pring posits that, “clarifying 
a term is a controversial matter – especially terms like education which might 
be described as essentially contestable, meaning that the word can rarely be 
defined in a way that attracts universal agreement” (2000: 9). One of the 
major reasons for its contestability is the notion that the concept “education” 
implies a set of values and that there is disagreement over what those values 
are or should be (Pring 2000: 11). The point is that before one may seek 
solutions for educational problems one needs to have a grasp of what 
education means, thus clarifying the concept education should be the first 
step. The purpose of this dissertation is not to determine what education is. 
However, I make the point in order to show that conceptual analysis finds 
space within the framework of educational philosophy.  
 
Having stated that this dissertation does not focus on an analysis of what 
education means, I want to refer to Dewey regarding what education is. For 
Dewey education on the one hand is concerned with the development of 
distinctively human capacities of knowing, understanding, judging and 
behaving intelligently. Education is therefore concerned with the life of the 
mind, and such a life can atrophy if not carefully nurtured. Education 
consequently nurtures the mental capacities through which learners come to 
know, understand, judge, reflect and behave intelligently. On the other hand, 
the job of the teacher is to facilitate that development through putting the 
learner in contact with further experience or with what others have said (in 
literature) as they make sense of similar experiences. The teacher, therefore, 
ensures that there is a public growth of understanding (as embedded in 
society) as well as a personal one (the growth of the learner self). Education 
according to Dewey lies in the interaction between the growth of “public 
understandings” and “personal (learner) understandings”. Pring reinforces 
such an interpretation and argues that a proper description of education 
cannot avoid reference to the ”mental state” of the learner. He further argues 
that present thoughts shape future reactions; future understandings to some 
degree are adaptations or reconstructions of previous ones (2000: 32).  
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In terms of such a conception of education, the scientific/technicist model for 
interpretation of education is not the most appropriate, because there seems 
to be a major difference between inquiries appropriate to understanding 
physical reality, as opposed to an inquiry for understanding the mental life of 
people. Regarding such an argument, Biesta’s contention that the learner is 
not a ‘patient’ (seeking evidence based cures), makes sense. In this regard I 
contend that effective intervention based on evidence of “what works” should 
not be driving education, for “what works” might not be desirable. In relation to 
conceptual analysis, terms such as “effective schooling” or “effective 
teachers” overlook the question relating to “effective for what”? Conceptual 
analysis thus plays a fundamental role in researching issues of educational 
concern, unravelling the meaning of concepts and its potential influence on 
practices. 
 
Having located conceptual analysis within a framework of educational 
philosophy, I now proceed with this principle as a method utilised in my 
dissertation.              
 
The technique of conceptual analysis rests on a particular assumption about 
the nature of language and meaning. The primary purpose for analysing a 
term or concept is to show its multiple uses and meanings (Burbules & 
Warnick 2004: 4). In the words of Hirst and Peters, to have an understanding 
of a concept, “covers both the experience of grasping a principle and the 
ability to discriminate and use words correctly (1998: 30). In making sense of 
this reading of a concept, I am made to understand that in conceptual analysis 
one should endeavour to determine how people (language group or 
community) actually “use” a particular term and giving meaning to such a term 
within a specific context (grasping the principle). Apparent misunderstandings 
or disagreements are often attributable to people using the “same” terms or 
concepts in tacitly different ways; by becoming clearer about these varied 
meanings, it becomes possible to focus better on what is actually in dispute 
(Burbules & Warnick 2004: 4). To grasp a principle means to have an 
understanding of what makes a concept what it is, with reference to its 
constitutive meaning or rule (Taylor 1985: 137). In other words, what 
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“meaning” is given to a specific concept within a particular community (the 
manner in which the language group grasps the principle)? To have a concept 
could consequently imply that one should be able to relate the term to “other 
words” and recognise the cases in which the term is applied. Hirst and Peters 
further argue that, “what we do is to examine the use of words in order to see 
what principle governs their use. If we can make these explicit we have 
uncovered the concept” (1998: 30). The word “murder”, for example, is 
constituted by some “general principle”. Let me tease out this term in order to 
give some insight into this notion of a general principle, and at the same time 
make clear what is meant by the “use of a concept”. 
 
The use of the word “murder” has an historical as well as a social context. The 
word “murder”, therefore, has a particular history which is associated with 
killing. Put differently, it ultimately results in death. In other words murder is 
historically linked to death. However, in a social context such a death is 
different from what one may refer to as a natural death (because of illness, 
the failure of major internal organs such as the heart or kidneys, or old age). 
Murder refers to an illegally/unnaturally-induced death. This description or 
analysis lays bear the “meaning” given to murder within a “language 
community”, also referred to as common experiential meanings. By 
experiential I mean all within such a community has the same mutual 
understanding (experience) developed over time (history) that murder is 
“externally induced” death. If all within a language community comes to more 
or less the same conclusion as to what murder generally means, then it 
connotes a mutual understanding of the concept “murder”. In other words the 
“general principle” has been identified. Now to understand what murder is, 
one has to have some understanding of the related concepts such as “natural, 
unnatural, killing, death, illness, externally induced, and so on. The people 
who use it, and are exposed by its use in relation to other concepts therefore 
determine the meaning of a concept. So then, what makes murder, murder? 
From the above analysis it should be clear that whilst a concept has a 
particular historical context, one does not have to know the history of murder 
to know what murder is. Hirst and Peters argue that the meanings of “murder” 
could be determined by its guiding principles (which differs from its external 
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acts such as stabbing, shooting, poisoning), which makes murder what it is. 
So, murder is murder not because of its external acts, but rather because the 
language community understands it to involve killing; and, therefore, an 
unnaturally induced outcome/death. Hirst and Peters further argues that 
concepts are linked indissolubly with the social life or group, and it would be 
impossible for an individual to have a purely private concept of, say, murder 
(1998: 32).    
 
This ability to relate words to each other would also go along with the ability to 
recognise cases to which the word applies (1998: 28). This relates to 
ascertaining the scope of the concept.  To emphasise this understanding, Du 
Toit argues that conceptual analysis can help us to arrive at a clear 
description, demarcation, or definition of a concept’s scope of application. He 
argues that the scope of a concept, the things to which we usually consider 
that concept to apply, is also the meaning of that concept (in Rossouw 2003: 
24). In such a depiction the terms “concept” and “word” seem to be 
interchangeable. However, one must not equate analysing a concept with 
defining a word in the sense of attempting to provide some verbally 
synonymous phrase for the word in question. It is my understanding that 
philosophical analysis is ultimately concerned with the clear and coherent 
articulation of ideas rather than with definition of words. This understanding of 
a “coherent articulation of ideas” can be linked to the understanding of the 
“scope of a concept”. However, not everyone (within the language community) 
understands a particular term/concept in exactly the same way and 
consequently not everyone uses the term/concept in the same manner. Does 
this mean that concepts have no right or wrong interpretations; that meaning 
varies according to perspective and that to try to conceptually analyse terms 
would, therefore, be pointless?  The answer is no, for if it was so then 
communication based on language would in itself be impractical. If our scope 
of application for concepts did not at the very least, broadly correspond then 
the degree of communication and mutual understanding might become almost 
inconceivable. Du Toit corroborates such an interpretation when he argues 
that: 
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… when we conduct  conceptual analysis we look at the boundaries 
within which a term usually, typically, or comfortably belongs, and 
judge from there what the relationship between this term and another is 
or should be. In this way we investigate the boundaries between terms 
and try to reveal them clearly for ourselves. In conceptual analysis we 
are thus interested in the actual and potential use of words or 
concepts, as well as the criteria or principles which determine or 
underlie the accepted use of a word (in Rossouw 2003: 25). 
 
I interpret “boundaries” in this sense to mean, the outer parameter within 
which all related words that could conceivably give meaning to the term to be 
conceptually analysed, may fall. Thus all other terms that have some relation 
to the given term (such as murder) fall within the boundaries of that term thus 
giving a more in depth and coherent meaning to that term. All the related 
words would then give meaning to the term under analysis, reinforcing the 
“scope of a concept” version. Hirst and Peters refer to this interpretation as 
having “a sufficient condition for the possession of a concept” (1998: 28).  
 
It is consequently reasonable to conclude that when we analyse a concept, 
we are in reality examining the use of words in order to see what principle or 
principles govern their use, meaning that we make them explicit thus 
uncovering the concept. Two issues come to the fore in this statement namely 
“grasping a principle” and “discriminate and use words correctly”. To grasp a 
principle is to have an understanding of what makes a concept what it is, 
meaning its constitutive interpretation or rules/related words (Taylor 1985: 
137). A concept, according to this reasoning, has a “general principle”. To 
shed some further light on this understanding of a concept I again draw on the 
example of “murder”. 
 
The word “murder”, as I have revealed, is constituted by some “general 
principle” that it must be a (unnatural) social activity which is engaged in by 
people (meaning animals or species other than humans cannot commit 
murder) and which is shaped by material (with reference to a murder weapon) 
and intellectual conditions in which we live. Such an understanding is different 
 32
from one that explains “murder” in terms of a general empirical condition only, 
such as stabbing or poisoning. A person can stab or poison another person 
without it leading to the death of that person. Alternatively a person can have 
an “unnaturally” induced death without being murdered. He might fall off a cliff 
or be involved in a car accident which culminates in death. This brings to the 
fore other related words, such as culpable homicide, first or second degree 
(murder), suicide or accident. In this sense, merely to die an unnatural death 
is not a sufficient condition for murder. What constitutes murder is not simply 
that empirical conditions prevail whereby death occurred due to “unnatural” 
conditions. Rather, what makes for murder is the “general principle” or 
constitutive rule which guides and shapes rational social engagement on the 
part of human beings thus involving “unnatural” death in a specific sense, that 
being externally induced by someone else, but not inclusive of accidental 
death. 
 
In terms of arguing for this “general principle”, Hirst and Peters describe it as 
a search for the “logically necessary conditions” for the use of a term. They 
reason that searching for logically necessary conditions depends on how 
humans envision activities. Fay refers to this as constitutive rules, while Taylor 
calls it constitutive meanings. However, MacIntyre (1981: 72) argues the 
same principle in terms of rational meanings when he calls for reasoned and 
justifiable arguments. In this sense logically necessary conditions are not only 
“out there”, to be discovered, on the contrary one may argue to construct 
one’s own logically necessary conditions or constitutive meanings. In this way 
one can possibly avoid being lured into positivism, which posits that logically 
necessary conditions is “out there” and should simply be discovered. 
Constructing rational or constitutive meanings (as was done with the concept 
“murder”) moves one beyond positivism and into the realm of an interpretivist 
mode. We should, therefore, realise that analysing a concept cannot be done 
adequately (atomistically) by simply examining the use of words in any self-
contained way. We have to study carefully their relation to other words and 
understand the different purposes that lie behind their use (Hirst & Peters 
1998: 32). In other words it is an exploration to uncover meaning or 
understanding within the context that the concept is used. It is in this sense 
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that I argue for employing conceptual analysis. Put differently, I do not aim to 
utilise conceptual analysis in an atomistic sense for the reason that I rather 
attempt to explore meanings/understanding as opposed to simply trying to 
identify relating concepts.         
 
In this dissertation I shall analysis of the concepts democratic citizenship and 
school governance, I shall draw on Hirst and Peters’ interpretation of 
conceptual analysis as well as Fay’s understanding of constitutive rules. I 
shall thus (in chapter three) emphasise the concept liberal democracy to 
ascertain what it means (its constitutive meanings and how governors 
interpret and/or give rational meanings to the term), and what it means to 
indulge in a democratic practice. I shall further distinguish between different 
strands of liberal democracy and analyse the deliberative model. I also 
analyse what people (different stakeholders within a school community) 
understand when they refer to “governance” and how such practices may be 
deemed democratic/less democratic. I shall further draw a link between 
peoples (community) understanding of citizenship and how it unfolds within a 
democratic order.  
 
Having provided an account of conceptual analysis and its location within an 
interpretive paradigm, I subsequently introduce case studies for the reason 
that I shall analyse at least three case studies on current practices within 
School Governing Bodies.   
 
1.3.3.2. CASE STUDY METHOD 
 
I should at the outset state that I shall not employ case studies in the manner 
that I explore. The reason for giving some insight into this method is because I 
intend to make inferences from the case studies of other researchers. I shall 
consequently illuminate on case studies which are not necessarily my own. In 
other words I reflect on the insights of others who have done research on 
school governance in order to correlate it with my own findings. 
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Cantrell (1993: 87) claims that methodology guides choices concerning 
methods. Although interpretive research studies do not rely exclusively on 
methods that produce qualitative data, they are the methods most commonly 
used (Patton 1990, Cantrell 1993). In this regard it makes sense to employ 
the case study method for as Patton and Cantrell posit, it is the most typically 
used method within an interpretive paradigm. The term “typically” suggests an 
understanding that it is not the only method available to this type of inquiry. I 
consequently further explore the case study method to frame its context for 
this dissertation. In my exploration I shall contest a notion that case studies 
fall within a positivist paradigm. I shall then argue for moving case studies 
beyond positivism towards a more interpretive approach.  
 
Merriam (1988: 1) claims that although case study is a familiar term to most 
people, there is little agreement on what constitutes case study research. 
Stenhouse (1988: 49) suggests that even though quantitative indices are used 
(generally descriptive), case study research should be viewed as a response 
to research done with the psychoanalytical paradigm. He argues as follows: 
 
Case study may be seen as a response to the need for a return to 
close natural observation, or as a reaction against positivist 
epistemology implied in the psychostatistical paradigm. Case study 
methods are often described as naturalistic, qualitative, descriptive, 
responsive, interpretive, hermeneutic, or idiographic by way of contrast 
to the abstracted, quantitative, nomothetic approach of 
psychostatistical methods that strip observation to indices (1988: 49).  
 
Case studies are, therefore, useful to study problems in depth, to understand 
the stages in processes, or to understand situations in context. It has been 
argued that case studies have provided the basis for the development of the 
science of human behaviour. According to Cohen and Manion (1991: 125) 
case studies are based on observation, the purpose of which is to probe 
deeply and to analyse intensively the multifarious phenomena that constitute 
a case study unit. They claim that this offers the advantage of being firmly 
embedded in reality, with attention to the subtleties and complexities including 
 35
rich detail. I support this view, and in addition claim that case studies are not 
linked to any particular type of data or data collection method, for methods 
include participant observation, various types of interviewing ranging from 
unstructured to structured, questionnaires and checklists. The use of multiple 
methods is common. Gilgun (1994) reinforces this and further argues that 
case studies can serve many purposes, including, but not limited to 
description, explanation, prediction and hypothesis generation. For example, 
case studies can describe the subjective meanings an individual attributes, to 
life events, identify themes in individual lives, and investigate causal 
relationships between variables. In this regard, Merriam (1988: 11–13) 
recognises four features of the interpretive case study: particularistic, 
descriptive, heuristic, and inductive. Particularistic means that the case study 
focuses on a particular situation, event, programme or phenomenon. 
Descriptive means that the final case study report is a rich, “thick” description 
of the phenomenon under study. As full a description as possible is given of 
the incident or entity being investigated. Heuristic means that the case study 
illuminates and extends the reader’s understanding of the phenomenon under 
study.  Inductive means that the case study relies on inductive reasoning: 
data are grounded in the context itself. A distinguishing aspect is the issue of 
generalisability; as Vulliamy, Lewin and Stevens (1990: 72) argue when they 
claim that research could use the micro to illustrate the macro. I interpret this 
to mean that the case study could be used to interpret other cases, which 
have the same underlying features. Put differently, research which has no 
apparent meaning beyond its boundaries, has limited appeal, and even less 
potential for the application of the findings. This does not mean that I endorse 
the notion of generalisability, for I mostly equate it with empirical studies and 
positivism. I therefore cautiously argue that in moving from the “micro to the 
macro”, researchers may use conceptual analysis to interpret the case studies 
of other researchers in order to underscore the data of studies which are 
related. In other words, when data from different case studies within the same 
field of research correlate/compare, one may reasonably draw inferences 
from these. The upshot of this is that one’s inference is not necessarily the 
only or true conclusion. The point is that one should be able to rationally 
explain why one draws such inferences. In my case I shall use the case 
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studies of others who have done research on school governance practices 
(specifically related to its support for democracy) in order to underscore my 
own findings. For this reason I give some insight into descriptive research.  
 
1.3.3.3. DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH 
 
To solve problems about children, school organisation or teaching of a 
subject, information or facts must be produced about what exists. The nature 
of the prevailing conditions and existing attitudes must often be determined 
and the activities, objects and persons described (Lovell & Lawson 1970: 29). 
I draw on this understanding of descriptive research, because it specifically 
includes the problem of school organisation (school governance), where 
existing attitudes must be uncovered and explained. This understanding finds 
space within the interpretivist mode of thinking. Descriptive research does not 
consist of routine fact gathering (production), it also seeks to determine the 
degree to which underlying factors (attitudes and perceptions of individuals, 
socio-economic conditions) exist and estimate their relative importance. This 
understanding finds resonance in the notion of “language, rules and forms of 
life” as argued for earlier. Description is consequently not only about data 
production, but much rather its interpretation, taking into consideration what 
influences the actors to act the way they do. Lovell and Lawson (1970: 30) 
argue that research of this nature may not answer basic questions (of a 
technicist/positivist nature), it does not involve the use of experiments; it 
rather seeks to uncover the nature of factors involved in a given situation. It 
involves an element of interpretation of the meaning or significance of what is 
described. They conclude by stating: 
 
Descriptive research describes and interprets what is. It is concerned 
with conditions that exist, practices that prevail, beliefs and attitudes 
that are held, processes that are ongoing, and trends that are 
developing (Lovell & Lawson 1970: 31). 
 
These are precisely the criteria which I shall employ in my quest to unravel 
the current practices of School Governing Bodies. My emphasis in this 
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dissertation is, therefore, on insight as well as overview. This relates to the 
notion that this dissertation aims to explain what is actually happening and 
then relate it to what ought to be happening. Taking into consideration the 
foregoing arguments, I choose to use conceptual analysis and the 
interpretation of case studies as my method within the paradigms for which I 
argued.  
 
I now briefly discuss how deconstruction prepares us to create space for the 
inclusion of the “other”. My reasoning stems from the fact that I flirt with this 
method in chapter five where I try to include the marginalised voices that are 
seemingly excluded from the deliberative process. Deconstruction’s emphasis 
on a particular approach of handling the “other” allows for a better chance of 
including the marginalised voices in the school governance process.  
 
1.3.3.4. DECONSRTUCTION AND THE OTHER 
 
I should at the outset confess that I turned to Derrida for an understanding of 
deconstruction. I tried to make sense of Derrida, however, I am still sceptical 
of whether my interpretation and reading of Derrida is credible to the degree 
that I can claim justifiable understanding. I am consoled by the claim of Biesta 
when he posits that writing about Derrida traps you in a “catch 22 position” for 
the reason that: 
 
Getting Derrida “right”, that is, giving the final representation of the 
original meaning of his oeuvre, is at the very same time not getting him 
right (Biesta 2001: 35).  
 
In other words the very impossibility of getting Derrida right seems to open up 
the possibility of engaging with Derrida and deconstruction. Biesta further 
argues that it is the assumption that meaning can be grasped in its original 
moment, that meaning can be represented in the form of some proper, self-
identical concept, that Derrida is most determinedly out to challenge (2001: 
34). I interpret Biesta to mean that implicitly there is forever a risk of 
“misunderstanding”, meaning that “misunderstanding” is always a possibility. I 
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now attempt to give an explanation of how I understand deconstruction and its 
emphasis on creating space for the “other”. 
 
Deconstruction has often been accused of being a form of critical analysis that 
aims at tearing apart everything it finds in its way, meaning that it has nihilistic 
implications. However, at closer scrutiny one finds that deconstruction has 
distinct ethico-political implications; something that I contend is useful for 
educational governance for the reason that such governance has a political 
slant/foundation. Biesta argues that the ethico-political horizon of 
deconstruction can be described as a concern for the “other”. 
Deconstruction’s affirmation is not merely an affirmation of what already exists 
and, for that reason, can be known an identified, but rather an affirmation of 
what is “wholly other” (2001: 33). Derrida himself posits that: “Rather than 
being destructive, negative, or an enclosure in nothingness, deconstruction is 
an openness towards the other” (1984: 124). He further posits that: 
 
Once you relate to the other as the other, then something incalculable 
comes on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or 
to the history of legal structures. This is what gives deconstruction its 
movement (1997: 17-18). 
 
I interpret this to mean that you should relate to the Other with respect, the 
type of respect that you feel you deserve. This does not relate to legislated 
rules or policies. It goes beyond what is documented and rather relates to the 
interaction with others on the level that one expects for oneself. In other words 
if you relate to others as you would wish others should relate to you, then you 
operate on instinct rather than (un)-documented rules/laws. It relates to the 
age-old saying of “do unto others as you wish others would do unto you”. The 
upshot of such reasoning is that it is improbable that you would want others to 
treat you with disrespect or to harm you. The rationale is that psychologically 
the human species has a tendency to move away from harm/punishment and 
towards pleasure/good. If this claim is plausible, then it stands to reason that 
humans would expect for themselves what is good. In much the same manner 
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deconstruction argues that one operate on the same principle when dealing 
with the Other.  
 
Furthermore, this otherness is not necessarily known, meaning that if the 
other is known, then it brings to a close the idea of being “other”. One is 
therefore Other for as long as there remain a difference from oneself. Put 
differently, otherness shall remain for the reason that humans are dynamic, 
constantly changing their thinking and their behaviour patterns. For example, 
given the same set of circumstances one cannot predict that two individuals 
would react the same. In fact the same individual might react differently under 
the same set of circumstances at different occasions. The point is that to 
know the other is always in the making, always a challenge that is never 
complete. Derrida argues that “it is an affirmation of an other that is always to 
come, as an event which as event, exceeds calculation, rules, programmes, 
anticipations and so forth” (1992: 27). Deconstruction is, therefore, more than 
just being open towards the “other”; it is rather an openness towards the 
unforeseeable construction/development of the other. Caputo suggests that 
deconstruction can best be thought of as inventionalism (1997: 42). It is this 
“inventionalism” that makes the “experiencing” (as opposed to knowing) 
 of the other possible. Derrida argues that such invention “has to declare itself 
to be the invention of that which did not appear possible; otherwise it only 
makes explicit a programme of possibilities within the economy of the same” 
(1989: 60). One may thus reasonably argue that deconstruction is the pursuit 
of the impossible, meaning the possibility of its development and continued 
existence lies in the realisation that it is sustained by its impossibility. Caputo 
reinforces this view when he posits that instead of deconstruction being 
“wiped out by its impossibility, it is actually nourished by it” (1997: 32).  
 
This “impossibility“ is directly related to Derrida’s interpretation of 
understanding and misunderstanding. He argues that there cannot be 
certainty or “complete” understanding when one tries to make sense of human 
action. Implicitly there is always a chance of misunderstanding. Put differently, 
misunderstanding is part of understanding. To clarify this point I turn to 
Derrida who posits that “the structural possibility of misunderstanding must be 
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taken into account when describing so-called normality and also that this 
possibility can neither be excluded nor opposed” (1988: 157). Following this 
argument I deduce that there cannot be pure understanding but also that 
there cannot be pure misunderstanding. Biesta argues that misunderstanding 
is the essential and necessary risk of all understanding (2001: 36). He further 
claims that there is only one way of avoiding this risk, and that is not to 
engage in the act of interpretation. I have earlier argued for interpretation as a 
means of conducting my research, meaning that I am compelled to take this 
“risk”. However, I am comforted by the idea that there seems to be no other 
alternative, meaning that not taking the “risk” shall transform into stagnation, 
thus making nonsense of my earlier claim that life is dynamic.              
 
Deconstruction is aimed at uncovering our preconceived understanding of 
identity as self-sufficient presence, in order to expose us to the challenge of 
hitherto concealed, excluded, and suppressed otherness; an otherness which 
has been ignored in order to preserve the very illusion of identity as self-
sufficient presence. In other words deconstruction is aimed at revealing the 
otherness which is excluded and suppressed in order to maintain the myth of 
a pure and uncontaminated original presence. Put differently, “otherness” is 
actually constitutive of that which presents itself as pure, self-sufficient and 
self-present (Biesta 2001: 44). Furthermore, at stake in deconstruction is an 
attempt to bring into view the “impossibility to totalise, the impossibility to 
articulate a self-sufficient, self-present centre from which everything can be 
mastered and controlled. In doing this, the possibility of exclusion is exposed, 
giving deconstruction its source to do justice to what is excluded. Justice, 
according to Derrida, is always directed towards those who are excluded, 
alternatively towards the other. He argues that: 
 
If justice is a concern for the other as other, for the otherness of the 
other, for an otherness that, by definition, we can neither foresee nor 
totalise, if justice, in short, always addresses itself to the singularity of 
the other, we are obliged – in the name of justice – to keep the 
unforeseen possibility of the in-coming of the other, the surprise of the 
“invention” of the other, open (Derrida 1992: 20). 
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Justice towards the Other is consequently sustained by its impossibility, 
however, impossibility in this sense does not refer to that which is not 
possible, but rather that “which possibility cannot be foreseen” (Derrida 1992: 
16). The upshot is that if impossibility refers to that which is not possible, then 
it becomes akin to prediction. Put differently, to determine whether something 
is impossible is to predict that it is not possible. To be able to do this one has 
to have some measure of what possibility is. Only by having an exact 
measure of what is possible can one determine whether something is 
impossible. However, that which might seem to be impossible today might 
become possible in future. To further explain this point I relate an example. 
Prior to the space age, walking on the moon was deemed as an impossibility 
in the sense that it cannot be possible. However, today this is not only 
possible, but also a reality. It is in this regard that Derrida argues for 
impossibility as that which cannot “now” be foreseen. However, the possibility 
always exists that it might come to fruition in future. In relation to the other this 
means that we confront the other as other with infinite possibilities. In this way 
the other has the possibility of inclusion, as opposed to being excluded. 
Justice towards the other, according to this argument, is forever evolving and 
never complete. We can never decide once and for all what justice is. In this 
regard Biesta (2001: 48) argues that: 
 
Justice is therefore not a principle or a criterion (as this would mean 
that we would know right now what justice is), nor an ideal (as this 
would mean that we would now be able to describe the future situation 
of justice), nor even a regulative ideal (which would still imply a 
description of what justice is).  
 
The point is that to do justice to the Other, one has of necessity to include 
whatever justice might mean, making the task a task of constant growth and 
evolvement. By doing so the possibility of excluding the Other becomes 
remote, or alternatively exclusion would transform into injustice. Having given 
some insight as to how deconstruction aims to create space for the inclusion 
of “the other”, I now move onto a discussion of the questioning method.               
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1.3.3.5. QUESTIONING 
 
One of the purposes of this dissertation is to question educational policy 
development, its formulation, and its implementation with specific reference to 
school governance. The point is to find what normative implications these 
policies entail, and to suggest alternative implementation practices. Burbules 
posits that a good deal of work in philosophy of education is less concerned 
with discourses, principles, and systems, and more with fairly specific policies 
and practices that define educational business. The reason for questioning 
specific policies and practices may be to find whether they support or violate 
principles of justice, fairness, or equality or whether they may violate certain 
rights (Burbules & Warnick 2004: 10). I use this method in this regard, and to 
further challenge “the political motivations and agendas that have given rise to 
many calls” for inclusion in the school governance process (Burbules & 
Warnick 2004: 11). To further clarify my reasoning for employing this method I 
quote Burbules and Warnick who posit that: 
 
In carrying out questioning, philosophers will inevitably bring in 
substantive positions derived from larger philosophical orientations or 
“isms.” Liberals will tend to unpack these problems in one-way; 
conservatives or traditionalists another; pragmatists yet another; 
feminists perhaps still another. … the differences among these 
characteristic ways of approaching the study of educational policies 
and practices also make possible a further kind of investigation, 
namely, one that juxtaposes these different versions of the phenomena 
and their characteristic modes of analysis, not with an eye toward 
picking the “right” one, but as a way of understanding the complexity of 
the problems and the unique contribution that each “way of seeing” can 
offer to appreciate the multifacetedness and difficulty of the issues at 
stake (2004: 11). 
 
It is in this regard that I explore the different interpretations of liberal 
democracy and how it impacts on school governance policies and practices in 
disadvantaged schools in South Africa. I should immediately add that I do not 
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explore all the possible interpretations for this would be almost impossible. 
The point is that interpretations change as peoples’ understanding permits 
them to reflect, and reinterpret that which previously existed. Questioning and 
re-evaluating in this sense becomes a dynamic process, constantly open to 
change.  
 
Exploring the mentioned methods one may reasonably argue that there 
seems to be a binding thread that connect these methods. This connecting 
thread is visible in the sense that I argue for the utilisation of these methods. It 
is my contention that the movement towards creating meaning, and therefore 
understanding brings these methods together. In other words the methods 
that I propose are not mutually exclusive but rather that 
meaning/understanding (for the sake of clarification) forms a link between 
them. Put differently, conceptual analysis is not necessarily foundationalist but 
can also compliment deconstruction in a sense that whilst its endeavour is to 
uncover meaning/understanding, deconstruction seems to take the further 
step, suggesting that it goes beyond meaning. Deconstruction aims to identify 
the internal contradictions or ambiguities in the uses of the concept. In this 
way deconstruction also clarify meaning and therefore understanding within a 
particular context in which the concept is used. It is for this reason that I argue 
for a complimentary relationship between conceptual analysis, deconstruction 
and questioning.    
 
1.4. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I briefly outlined the situation that prevailed prior to the 
realisation of School Governing Bodies (SGBs). In this regard I made 
reference to the South African Schools Act (Act 84 of 1996) and highlighted its 
insistence on democratic practices. I then proceeded to elucidate on the 
position that “citizens” occupy in this democratic framework by referring to 
Aspin who argues that citizens of a democracy do not simply arrive at political 
maturity being ready and able to run its institutions (1995: 56). Democratic 
practices are thus not innate and materialise naturally. Then I gave some 
insight into my reasons for embarking on this research, stressing that I felt the 
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direct strains and anxieties of new education policies. I further argued for my 
suspicion of less democratic practices with reference to the divide between 
policy formulation and its implementation. My next step was to pose my 
research question and briefly argue for bridging this divide via a critical 
discourse and working towards a notion of deliberation and democratic 
citizenship. I followed this by claiming that a means of bridging this divide, 
thus leading to more democratic practices, which are attuned to the South 
African Schools Act and The Bill of Rights, is to employ an understanding that, 
if school governance is framed according to democratic citizenship 
(incorporating deliberation), it has the potential to be critical, that is 
emancipatory and transformative, i.e. securing more democratic practices. 
This is also my main claim. Furthermore I have explored the distinction 
between method and methodology, emphasising those that I shall employ in 
this dissertation.  
 
1.5. PROGRAMME OF STUDY 
 
In chapter two I shall provide an overview of the history of education and its 
influence on the genesis of school governance in South Africa. I endeavour to 
start this overview in 1976 when the first major challenges regarding 
education in particular had to be confronted, with particular reference to those 
agencies which I believe influenced the thinking of the apartheid rulers of 
South Africa. I shall traverse this course by continually linking the significant 
historical development with the impact or potential influence that it might have 
on the road to democratic school governance in South Africa. 
 
Chapter three firstly links the historical perspective to current discourse in 
educational governance. It proceeds to explore the influence of globalisation 
on South African politics in general and education policy (with specific 
reference to school governance) in particular, emphasising the role of 
decentralisation. I then explore some constitutive features of liberal 
democracy, emphasising the conception of representation. I argue that such 
representation has the potential to undermine and exclude the marginalised 
groups (particularly parents and learners) who serve on the school governing 
 45
body. I then proceed to produce empirical evidence/case studies relating to 
actual school governing body practices in disadvantaged communities in 
order to expose the inconsistencies it presents for representative democracy 
as currently interpreted in school governance practices. The objective is to 
uncover whether SGB practices further or retards democracy as referred to in 
the South African Schools Act. 
 
In chapter four I shall focus on two strands of liberal democracy. I argue for 
preferring a communitarian strand as opposed to a libertarian strand. I then 
attempt to link a deliberative conception of democracy to citizenship thus 
producing an argument for democratic citizenship. My aim is to provide a 
defence for a stronger form of democracy in order to minimise the limitations 
of libertarianism, which I argue tends to support a weaker form of democracy. 
I further explore citizenship and argue that deliberation potentially creates 
more space for inclusion thus reinforcing my argument towards a stronger 
democracy. I shall argue that to be more attuned to the Bill of Rights and the 
South African Schools Act regarding democratic practices, a realisation of a 
notion of democratic citizenship is essential. I further argue that a more 
tenable route to acquire democratic transformation within school governance 
is when the notion of a “virtuous citizen” is employed. I further argue that 
deliberation afford citizens with the opportunity to reconsider and reflect on 
their preferences as well as the views of others, leading to a more critical 
analysis of “the common good”. Such deliberative citizens, I argue, have the 
potential to create for themselves the space and opportunity for empowerment 
thus furthering their emancipatory prospects. 
 
In chapter five I argue for the implications of a deliberative model of 
democracy on citizenship and school governance practices. However, I first 
relate this to the practices as I alluded to in chapter three and argue for the 
necessary conditions that I deem needs to be adhered to in order for school 
governance to occupy its rightful space in South Africa’s young democracy. 
By identifying the weaknesses in school governor practices I expose how 
such practices might be at variance with the notion of deliberative democracy 
and the type of citizenship as argued for in chapter four. I then proceed to 
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argue that reconstructing school governance in relation to the notion of 
deliberation, and consequently democratic citizenship, has the means of 
potentially steering towards more democratic practices, which are attuned to 
the South African Schools Act and the Bill of Rights. This I claim reinforces my 
notion of a stronger, more sustainable school governing body regime in 
disadvantaged schools in South Africa. I then conclude by making a few 
autobiographical leaps through this dissertation, uncovering its weaknesses 
and arguing for space for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS INTO (BLACK) EDUCATION AND ITS 
INFLUENCE ON SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter one I alluded to the long history of struggle waged towards 
ensuring participation in education and attaining democratic school 
governance in this country. In this chapter I shall give an historical analysis of 
the development of particularly black education with the view of linking its 
advance to the growth of school governance in South Africa. Taylor argues 
that, “any discussion on governance in education, which includes school 
governance, must acknowledge at the outset that education in general and 
schools in particular have been sites of struggle between competing interests 
and ideologies” (1998: 65). I contend that the context of the struggle for 
participation in the sphere of education and the thrust for democratic school 
governance (an issue I shall explore in chapter 3) was moulded in the frame 
of black education in this country. It is with this understanding that I analyse 
the historical development of particularly black education in South Africa.  
 
In 1994 the ANC articulated the following vision for the governance of the 
future (the period beyond 1994) education and training system: 
 
Governance at all levels of the integrated national system of 
education and training will maximise democratic participation of 
stakeholders, including the broader community, and will be 
oriented towards equity, effectiveness, efficiency, 
accountability, and the sharing of responsibility (ANC, 1994: 
22). 
 
The rationale was to transform an education system characterised by 
inequalities according to race, class and geographic location with specific 
reference to the divide between rural and urban areas. I trace the rationale 
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behind this transformation in order to give an insight into how school 
governance developed to become what it is today. Furthermore there was 
firstly an assumption (with reference to the ANC's 1994 vision) that education 
will enhance and sustain national development, and secondly, that a 
decentralised management system would ensure delivery at all levels of the 
education system (McLennan in Mhone & Edigheji 2003: 182). The notion of 
decentralisation has a direct bearing on school governance and, therefore, I 
shall address this issue and its concomitant influence on equity and redress 
later on in this chapter. Before I proceed with my historical analysis I need to 
briefly present my understanding of cooperative governance, because it has 
an impact on decentralisation. 
 
A major challenge that the democratic government faced was to redress the 
apartheid injustices. This meant that the relations between government and 
the broader South African society had to change in order to involve all the 
social actors, irrespective of race, ethnicity, and cultural or religious 
persuasion. Consequently there have been legislative and institutional 
reforms, favouring cooperative governance. This is in contrast with the 
autocratic and unilateral governance style of the apartheid era. Cooperative 
governance refers to a reciprocal relationship between the state and civil 
society to formulate and implement public policy. Edigheji argues that co-
operative governance can take two forms: “either that interest groups are 
directly represented in negotiating forums or that their interests are 
internalised within regulatory regimes that subject the activities of private 
agents to self-imposed discipline” (in Mhone & Edigheji 2003: 72). Edigheji 
also claims that cooperative governance includes “fostering a constructive 
relationship between civil society, trade unions and the democratic 
government”. He further argues that: 
 
This would involve the establishment of participatory structures to 
promote consultation to enable civil society to take part in decision-
making and implementation (2003: 70). 
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It is within such a framework of establishing participatory structures that the 
new educational governance policies materialised. Rodrik reinforces this view 
when he posits that: “co-operative governance gives voice to various actors, 
thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the system” (in Mohne & Edigheji 2003: 
72). In relation to SGBs in particular, the interest groups (including learners, 
teachers, parents and non-teaching staff) are directly represented via elected 
governors, meaning that the elected governors are part of the decision 
making process, as well as participating in its implementation. I am, however, 
more interested in the idea of “promoting consultation”, because it embeds 
notions of deliberation, contestation and reflection which are constitutive 
meanings of deliberative democracy (a concept that I explore in chapter 3). I 
therefore concur with the interpretation of Edigheji and Rodrik when the 
constitutive meanings (as mentioned) are part of their understanding. Having 
given a brief glimpse into cooperative governance I shall return to this concept 
when I address decentralisation later on in this chapter. I shall again refer to 
this concept in chapter 3 in my discussion on deliberative democracy.  I now 
proceed with the historical analysis. 
 
It should be reasonably acceptable to argue that school governance, and in 
particular School Governing Bodies (SGBs) as they exist in a democratic 
South Africa, could not have originated in a vacuum. SGBs, as they exist 
today, have a context within which they unfolded. It is in this sense that a 
historical analysis into education could possibly locate the progress of school 
governance in a particular context. School governance per se cannot be 
divorced from the broader educational development in South Africa. On the 
contrary its context is inextricably linked to educational development, and to 
the broader political development of this country. To this extent separate 
facilities were deemed necessary for the sound educational development of 
different racial/ethnic groups in South Africa. In order to appreciate why 
separate facilities and differing degrees of education were provided to South 
Africans, the concept of “separate development”, more commonly known as 
apartheid, should be understood. Because this is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, I presume this to be a given, save to mention that the four major 
ethnic/racial groupings who were the recipients of this unequal education 
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provision were the Blacks (majority), the Coloureds, the Indians and the 
Whites. Kallaway concludes that: 
 
 The consequences of this system (of apartheid education) in terms of 
 human suffering and the abrogation of human rights are difficult to 
 overestimate, and it has been recognised as one of the most dramatic 
 cases of institutional education injustice in the history of the twentieth 
 century … (2002: 2-3). 
 
Since the formation of The Republic of South Africa (1961), the 
integration/segregation option was a recurring debate throughout the history 
of this country. One may even reasonably presuppose that the two conflicting 
forces (those who wanted integration of the races as opposed to segregation) 
started with the landing of Van Riebeeck (1652), for as Houghton posits: “the 
official policy and desired aims of all governments at the Cape were 
concentrating on containing White settlement and keeping the races apart” 
(1967: 20). One could argue that the concepts of integration and segregation 
formed the major debate of inter group or inter personal relationships in South 
Africa. This tension is also embedded in any debate about education in this 
country. The manner in which individuals or organised groups reacted to this 
tension, shaped or at least influenced policy in general, and education in 
particular. This developed into a kind of pendulum movement between 
“action” and “reaction”. At times the government would act by implementing 
policy, which would trigger reaction from the masses (majority of the 
population that I earlier stated is black) that the policy affected. Alternatively, 
the masses would act in such a way that triggered policy development and 
implementation to curb or influence the action. In such a scenario the state 
reacts. It is precisely such an Act by government (initiating policy) regarding 
the medium of instruction that evoked a reaction from the black (those other 
than white) school population, which resulted in developments which I claim 
the state did not foresee and was, therefore, unprepared to manage 
reasonably.    
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It is my understanding that a major challenge which can be regarded as a 
watershed in terms of the provision of schooling in all its facets (financing, 
infrastructural development and governance), confronted the Nationalist 
Government in 1976. For this reason I shall give attention to educational 
discourse in South Africa after this watershed event. To describe what 
occurred in schools during 1976 as an event is actually erroneous, for it was 
rather a process than an event, meaning it was not a once-off occurrence. 
The reason for referring to it as an event is simply to say that it had its origin 
within a particular Gregorian year (1976). As this narrative unfolds it will 
become clear that this “event” in reality formed the foundation for subsequent 
progress on the path to democratic school governance where ordinary 
citizens could participate in, and influence decisions regarding school 
governance in this country. I shall, however, not limit my discussion to 
developments after 1976, but shall also continually make reference to issues 
that predated the 1976 Soweto school uprisings.  
 
When one refers to school governance or any other form of governance for 
that matter, one shall inevitably refer to the notion of legitimacy. The 
legitimacy principle in terms of governance is consequently crucial at any level 
of government. In this regard Muller (1992) argues that when a system falls 
far short of public expectations it loses its recognition-worthiness; it loses the 
faith of the citizens in the ability or capacity of the entire system – the 
administrators, the planners, the politicians, indeed the existing government 
and the party that serves it as a whole – to serve the common good. As a 
result it becomes less trustworthy and, therefore, a certain sub-minimum of its 
legitimacy evaporates, while all further attempts by the existing authorities to 
crisis-manage or reform the system only make matters worse. Such a system 
is then said to have a legitimacy crisis, and nothing short of a change of 
governing authority will reinstate public faith in its governing and delivery 
capacity. South Africa’s education system is the international exemplar par 
excellence of a system in such a crisis (in Heese & Badenhorst 1992: 10-11). 
Such an interpretation of legitimacy and its concomitant consequences 
affected the responses of the mass democratic movement in South Africa. 
The call from grassroots was that “the people shall govern”. This became a 
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rallying as well as mobilising phrase for those who actively sought to end the 
apartheid regime. This understanding of developments in the political realm in 
general and in education in particular summarises the conditions which 
prevailed immediately prior to and which existed for more than a decade in 
the aftermath of the Soweto school uprisings of 1976. At this juncture it could 
be argued that the ruling National Party1 was totally out of sync with the broad 
democratic movement.  
 
The Nationalist ruling party, though realising a loss of legitimacy, argued that 
the crisis could be handled on the one hand by repressing through force the 
aspirations of the democratic forces, while on the other hand resorting to what 
they claimed to be policy improvements, with specific reference to the 
Education Renewal Strategy (ERS). The ruling Nationalist government 
referred to this dual approach as part of their “total strategy”, to confront and 
deal with what they claimed to be a “total onslaught”. This “total strategy” 
concept was initiated in 1977 with the view to enable the various population 
groups of a meaningful input in legislation. “The outcome of this was the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act (Act 110 of 1983), which created a 
Parliament consisting of three chambers" (Behr 1988: 17). This “Tri-Cameral” 
system later created the space for the “total strategy” in education to be 
implemented on the recommendations of the De Lange Report.2 I shall 
discuss this initiative later on in this chapter.  
 
With reference to the concept of legitimacy, I contend that the decisive rupture 
of legitimacy was inaugurated with the school student revolts in 1976 and their 
associated influence on political development. These revolts and boycotts, 
continuing for more than a decade, were initially reactive (as a consequence 
of being forced to take lessons in the Afrikaans language), but later on 
galvanised into methodically planned actions with the distinct intention of not 
only improving education for the disadvantaged majority, but in effect to 
                                                          
1 The National Party (NP) came into government as the ruling party in 1948 and legislated racial 
segregation known as apartheid. 
2 The Human Science Research Council (HSRC) was commissioned (in June 1980) by the Government 
to investigate all facets of education in S.A. under the chairmanship of Prof. De Lange who tabled this 
‘De Lange Report’ in October 1981. 
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transform or renew the entire education system. With reference to my earlier 
argument of action/reaction between the state and the majority of the 
population, it seems as-if the initial mass response was reactionary. If this 
assumption is valid, then one may reasonably argue that the state acted while 
the masses reacted. However, as the developments unfolded the masses 
started to plan their actions more methodically through organised structures 
thus transforming their reaction into action. To this action the state then 
reacted. Whilst the initial idea (from the mass-democratic movement) was to 
transform education, their efforts soon snowballed into the broader political 
arena, encompassing the broader struggle against apartheid. This effectively 
means that the rationale (within the mentioned decade) moved beyond the 
scope of education and rather encompassed the repressive political realm of 
its time. Davis reinforces this interpretation when he argues that:  
 
The mass resistance demonstrated in Soweto was not only (against 
Afrikaans as a language of instruction) anti-apartheid but apparently 
anti-capitalist as well” (in Kallaway 1984: 343, my italics).  
 
The impact of the 1976 school uprising thus had a major influence on the 
educational and political development during the subsequent years. I now turn 
to this watershed on South Africa’s road to transforming the education 
landscape (including educational governance).    
 
 2.2.1. BACKGROUND TO THE 1976 SCHOOL BOYCOTTS 
 
The period prior to the implementation of the Bantu Education Act (No. 47 of 
1953) saw the social order in urban areas under threat. Large numbers of 
youth were roaming the streets, because the schooling system could not 
provide for them. They became easy prey for African nationalist political 
movements. The urgency of the situation dictated governance policies that 
were driven by a desire for the social control of particularly the black urban 
youth. Notwithstanding the Verwoerdian apartheid ideology, the National 
Party permitted expansion in urban housing (under the 99 year lease-hold 
agreement) and education. This was a deviation from the ideal of the migrant 
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labour system, which underpinned the notion that the urban settlements in 
South Africa are the domain of the white ruling class. Soweto (Johannesburg), 
Kwazakhele (Port Elizabeth), Duncan Village (East London) and Nyanga 
(Cape Town) thus came into being. 
 
The existing mission school system could not provide for the growing 
numbers of urban youth on the one hand, and more importantly was unable to 
exert social control over them. The relaxation of the migrant labour system 
and the development of urban housing, together with the introduction of Bantu 
Education, created the mechanism the state needed to control the urban 
youth. It also generated a semi-skilled workforce for which urban industrialists 
were clamouring. Even the liberal opposition parties within government 
supported the idea of the state controlling black education (Hyslop 1999: 54). 
Hyslop argues that the National Party government used education in its 
attempt to create a new hegemonic social order. It tried to lure black parents 
into the school system through the establishment of school boards and 
committees (1999: 51).  
 
My understanding of this new hegemonic social order was to create a political 
consciousness that would be in line with the ethnically divided Bantustan 
system, on which the Verwoerdian “Grand Apartheid” notion was premised. In 
terms of the Bantu Education Act, school committees would be partially 
elected by parents, while the majority were to be directly appointed by the 
Native Affairs Department (NAD). The real power, according to Hyslop (1999: 
61), was locked within the school boards whose members were all appointed 
by the NAD. The school boards had considerable powers, including the hiring 
and firing of teachers. It provided more conservative members of local 
communities a degree of control over teachers, which in effect alienated 
rather than incorporated teachers into the new education system (Hyslop 
1999: 82-86). The school boards in effect served to implement the policy of 
unequal and inferior education for Blacks. The appointed members of the 
board, whilst being from the community, actually worked against those who 
propagated the notion of “equal education for all”. The board members 
actuated their duty by unquestioningly implementing whatever policy came 
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from the Bantu Education Act. In this regard Hyslop claims that those who 
propagated equal education for all “saw the school boards as an intrinsic part 
of Bantu Education’s imposition of a totally separate and inferior education 
system” (1999: 83). Their style of governance was autocratic, leaving no 
space for dialogue. “The boards also became the instruments of the state’s 
purge of politically dissident teachers from the profession … “ (Hyslop 1999: 
86). School governance via the Bantu Education Act was consequently in 
reality state controlled, with little or no real power to influence decisions by 
either teachers or parents. Even the elected parents who served on the 
school committees had slender influence on decisions, precisely because 
those decisions had to fit into the policy of separate development. The other 
factor to consider is that even when the elected parents contested issues and 
offered counter views, they were in the minority, meaning that when the issue 
was voted upon, they would inevitably lose such a vote. This is by virtue of the 
fact that the “government appointed representatives” outnumbered the elected 
representatives. The appointed members were there to specifically counter 
those whom the state referred to as “agitators”. My interpretation of this is that 
the NAD wanted parental participation without giving them real control. Even 
though parent representatives initially participated in this system under the 
guise that they would have some means of influencing decisions, it soon 
became clear that they were under a misconception. This governance 
structure, therefore, became intolerable to local parent communities. 
However, they were in a position where they either had to accept the system 
or forego the opportunity for their children to receive a formal education.  
 
Notwithstanding the opposition to this form of education (with reference to the 
ANC initiated boycotts in April 1955), by the early 1960s the system of Bantu 
Education had been securely established throughout the country. Hyslop 
argues that the most important reason for the defeat of the resistance to 
Bantu Education was the capacity of the state to provide mass schooling. The 
urban working class parent desperately needed to counter juvenile 
delinquency that was taking root as a result of the previous school structure 
not being able to absorb the growing number of urban youth (1999: 78). They 
were thus prepared to live with this new system of Bantu Education. By 1969 
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there were 509 school boards and 4108 school committees involving more 
than 50 000 people (Hyslop 1999: 113). 
 
The historic foundation of Bantu Education is rooted in the findings of the 
Eiselen Commission which informed policy in 1958 with the Bantu Education 
Act. This report claimed that the basic foundation of education would be to 
guarantee the preservation of cultural identity (Behr 1988: 32-37). This 
understanding of ethnic exclusivity in turn lay behind the Extension of 
University Act (Acts 40, 43, 47, 49 and 50 of 1969), which formalised the 
system of not only racially, but also ethnically divided universities (Behr 1988: 
194). Thus Fort Hare, Zululand, Western Cape, Durban-Westville and the 
University of the North became distinctive ethnic/racial institutions. These 
institutions in turn would produce the teachers who would be responsible for 
educating the masses at racially exclusive schools. The ideal was to preserve 
cultural identity as described in the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which 
provided for transferring control of schools to the Department of Native Affairs, 
thus securing a foundation for divide and rule (Fatton 1986: 16, my italics). 
Although the Act specifies the preservation of cultural identity, the oppressed 
masses interpreted this as “a racist attempt to educate Africans for 
subservience” (Fatton 1986: 17). Notwithstanding Fatton’s interpretation, 
Bantu Education appeared to be working well on the surface six years prior to 
the Soweto uprisings. However, by 1970 there was again a shortage of space 
for urban youth, because of a policy to provide secondary schooling within the 
Bantustans. The development of schools in urban centres had been frozen, 
making space within urban schools a scarce commodity. This policy of 
providing secondary schooling within the Bantustan framework was counter-
productive for it intensified a rising demand for urban schooling facilities 
ensuring that the apparent quiescence of students up to 1970 did not last 
much longer.  
 
In relation to governance, the Nationalist government in South Africa operated 
in such a manner that state power and its bureaucracies were concentrated in 
the centre, with those in opposition (the disenfranchised masses) on the 
periphery. There was forever a tension between centre and periphery with 
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those in the centre exercising control through psychological and physical 
repression measures. This tension caused the apartheid authorities towards 
“wholesale repression of popular oppositional movements where education 
was harnessed to the application of apartheid policy” (Hyslop 1999: 102). 
Karlsson argues that those on the periphery have the propensity to revolt and 
exercise power from below. Such a scenario played itself out in 1976 in the 
schools and streets of Soweto (in Kallaway 2002: 347). The school boycotts 
resulted from the educational authorities insistence on a policy of “Afrikaans” 
as medium of instruction. This then became the catalyst for youths to vacate 
their classrooms to embark on a journey of what we today refer to as the 
Soweto schools mass resistance. Afrikaans as a medium of instruction 
became the symbol of oppressive Bantu education and the response was a 
massive uprising by learners exercising their power by taking control of the 
streets of Soweto. However, to conclude that the Afrikaans language was the 
only reason for the Soweto school boycotts is to have a rather restricted view 
of the raison d’être for the school uprisings. Other variables such as economic 
development from 1960 onwards and the internal financial structure of the 
Black Education Department (BED) were major contributory factors to the 
uprisings.  
 
2.2.2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE OF BANTU 
          EDUCATION’S INTERNAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE   
 
From 1972 onwards there was a major shift in government policy towards 
Black education. By this time it was clear that the policy of Bantu Education as 
it existed at that time did not fulfil in the requirements of producing a docile 
urban dweller on the one hand and a satisfied industrial elite on the other. In 
short, the products of Bantu education failed to meet the needs of industry in 
terms of skilled and semi-skilled labour on the contrary it undermined the 
possibilities for economic development. At the same time the internal financial 
structure of the Department of Black Education was deemed not to be viable 
thus generating an impetus toward restructuring education policy. The 
financial problems within the Black Education Department (BED) became so 
acute that the state had to make loans to the BED to prevent it going 
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bankrupt. The result of these pressures was that from 1972 the state allowed 
for the expansion of secondary and technical education, which they had 
earlier frozen (Hyslop 1999: 135, my italics). By now the government had 
conceded to the notion of a permanent black urban population in contrast to 
an earlier belief that blacks are in the urban areas only temporarily. The 
rationale prior to this concession was that blacks be rooted in urban 
settlements within their “homelands” as envisioned by the model of “Grand 
Apartheid”. The pressure from the business community was considerable 
because it included Afrikaner capitalists who had political clout within the 
National Party. By late 1971 the basis had been laid for important changes in 
state labour and education policies (Hyslop 1999: 143-144). The most 
important was the expansion of black urban schooling and institutions for 
technical and teacher training. The immediate impact of education policy of 
1972 was the rapid expansion of the number of learners in secondary schools 
who increased from 67 000 in 1965 to 389 000 by 1976 (Hyslop 1999: 151). 
This resulted in ever increasing learner/teacher ratios, because the building of 
new classrooms did not keep pace with the number of learners seeking 
accommodation. In other words, by squeezing larger numbers of older 
learners into an under-resourced school system, the state generated an 
environment in which rebellion might grow. According to Hyslop, “the injection 
of larger numbers of students into an educational system of limited resources 
led to declining educational standards (1999: 151). This perceived declining 
standards then further fuelled the call for “equal education”, in fact at this 
stage the “street-talk” in reference to the type of education that was received 
was termed “gutter education”. 
 
Part of the reorganisation of education after 1972 was a decision to change 
the year-structure of black schooling. The structure had previously comprised 
of an eight-year primary course and a five-year secondary course. The 
subsequent system was a six-year primary course and a six-year secondary 
course. This new structure had to be implemented at the start of the 1976 
school year. This resulted in both the standard five and standard six learners 
who passed in 1975 having to be catered for at secondary school level 
without adequate planning to absorb them. The upshot of this is that the first-
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year secondary class would be at least twice the size of the class of the 
previous year. Hyslop posits that the ill-planned measure of “doubling-up” 
resulted in chaotic overcrowding on overstrained facilities, causing absolute 
confusion (1999: 152). The strain on a poorly administered and ill equipped 
education service caused further disaffection among teachers and sparked a 
greater level of resentment among learners. This reorganisation of education 
and the implementation of its policies had to be driven by particularly the 
school boards. I have earlier alluded to the suggestion that these boards were 
essentially created to implement policy at local (school) level. This 
materialised in relation to “the year structure” reorganisation in schools. I have 
also alluded to the management style of these boards. Notwithstanding the 
dissatisfaction and resentment this policy caused, the school boards’ (and 
consequently government) representatives dictatorially administered this 
policy in schools. To further enhance this issue I quote Hyslop at length when 
he posits: 
 
Paradoxically, it was the youth’s common experience of a poor quality 
of mass schooling system that created a common sense of identity and 
grievance. As one teacher memorably puts it: “Bantu education made 
us black.” The common experiences of youth provided the basis for a 
new outlook (based on) the experience of a segregated and inferior 
school system. The political calm of the 60s ended with the emergence 
in 1969 of the university-based South African Students Organisation 
(SASO). It spearheaded a new political current - Black Consciousness. 
Black Consciousness … called for the assertion of a black cultural 
identity, psychological liberation from notions of inferiority, and the unity 
of all blacks including “Coloureds” and “Indians” (1999: 153-154). 
 
It should be clear that these issues (to which I earlier referred as variables) 
had a direct impact on developments leading towards the 1976 Soweto 
uprisings. This, together with a shift towards “Black Consciousness”, 
transformed urban political attitudes, which in turn undermined the 
conservative influence of those serving on school committees and the school 
governing boards. In contrast with their earlier practices, school board 
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members in particular became more sympathetic towards the cause of those 
who were struggling against what was perceived to be detrimental to 
education. In reality school boards and committees gradually became part of 
the growing protest against education policies after 1972. The changed social 
and political environment created an urban student movement for which the 
government did not bargain. The system of Bantu education was supposed to 
ensure that the generations schooled by this system would accept racial and 
ethnic exclusivity. One year prior to the 1976 Soweto school boycotts, it 
seemed as if the system of enforcing ethnicity and racial exclusivity was 
counter productive. Testimony to this are the developments within schools 
during 1975 when there were sporadic boycotts in township schools, such as 
at Morris Isaacson School (in Soweto) Thembalabantu High (in Zwelitsha) and 
Nathaniel Nyaluzu High School (in Grahamstown) to name three (Hyslop 
1999: 157). The situation within black education had thus become a fertile 
foundation on which the 1976 uprisings would occur. I now return to the issue 
of Afrikaans as medium of instruction, because it is my view that the 
developments surrounding this medium of instruction gave direction to a 
clamour for a more inclusive form of governance. It is this ‘inclusive’ rationale 
that directed the emergence of democratic SGBs in South Africa.  
 
2.2.3. THE AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE ISSUE 
 
The language policy directly relates to governance in the sense that such 
policy would ultimately be implemented via the school boards and the school 
committees. The Black Education Department assumed that this would occur, 
because at that stage there was no reason to doubt the performance of 
individuals who served on school boards. However, the apartheid authorities 
did not keep pace with developments within the “townships”. This I glean from 
the way in which the Black Education Department managed and responded to 
the developments in black education. 
 
The militancy among learners since 1972 was more explicit in its actions. This 
“new-style” confrontational approach had its origins within the manner in 
which the Nationalist government responded to the needs of particularly black 
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secondary school learners in urban South Africa. This militancy gradually built 
from 1972 onwards, snowballing, until it dramatically erupted in mass revolts 
during and subsequent to 1976. The language policy (with reference to 
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction) did not suddenly surface in 1976. On 
the contrary it has its roots in the intolerable “fifty-fifty” rule dating back to the 
early 1950s. The fifty-fifty rule emphasised that at secondary school level, half 
of the exam subjects should be taught in English and the other half in 
Afrikaans. However, this policy was not strictly enforced and schools were 
given permission by the Black Education Department (BED) to depart from 
this rule. A majority of secondary schools were given permission to bypass 
this rule for the reason that their teachers lacked the linguistic abilities or that 
there was a shortage of text books in the prescribed language. Given that the 
BED was under financial strain it lacked the financial resources to overcome 
the textbook shortage. Notwithstanding this situation, it is my understanding 
that the real battleground for the promotion of Afrikaans as a language of 
instruction lay within the heart of the ruling Nationalist Party.  
 
By 1973 there was political infighting leading to a struggle for positions 
between “left” and “rightwing” Afrikaners within government. The left or 
“verligte” group under the stewardship of Gerrit Viljoen (who became the 
leader of the Broederbond in 1972) was engaged in political battle with the 
right or “verkrampte” group led by Andries Treurnicht (who lost the leadership 
of the Broederbond in 1972). This struggle culminated in the group of Gerrit 
Viljoen gaining ascendancy within the National Party. Treurnicht was 
unsuccessful in his attempt to regain his leadership position within the 
Broederbond in 1974 and subsequently led a strong conservative group within 
the National Party. The Prime Minister, in an attempt to contain the dissent 
within his party, started to tilt towards the conservative group of Andries 
Treurnicht. Hyslop argues that it is within such a context that the “rightwing” 
members within the educational apparatus utilised the Afrikaans language as 
an issue of symbolic political importance. “The lack of assertiveness … on the 
use of Afrikaans was seen as … a pattern of weak commitment to traditional 
National Party values” (1999: 159). Hyslop further reports that: 
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This feeling emerged most clearly at the 1975 conference of the 
“Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings” (Federation of Afrikaans 
Cultural Societies). The conference passed a motion calling on the 
government to promote Afrikaans in all possible ways to achieve its 
“rightful position” in schools for blacks and Asians. Proposing the 
motion, Professor J.H. Senekal said: … For the continued existence of 
Afrikaans it was important that it should become “a language of use of 
the black man” (1999: 159). 
 
To give credence to this call to “Afrikaans”, Bantu Education Department 
Circular No. 6 of 1974 re-asserted the need for the notorious “fifty-fifty” rule, 
which again came into force via Regional Circular 2 of 1974 forcing the 
teaching of maths and social studies in Afrikaans (Hyslop 1999: 160). The 
new drive to enforce a policy of Afrikaans instruction was unpopular among 
teachers and learners alike. Therefore, it failed to enhance the ideological 
drive for Afrikaner nationalism and further alienated the already militant black 
secondary school learners. Even the previously dishonourable school boards 
resisted this policy, leading to them being threatened with disciplinary action 
by the Department. Hyslop reports that, “In Atteridgeville, the chair of the 
school board was sacked for his opposition to the Afrikaans policy. Several 
school boards in Soweto persisted in instructing their teachers to use English 
as the sole medium of instruction” (1999: 161-162). The Department’s 
response was decisive in the sense that teachers who refused to cooperate 
would have their salaries stopped by the Department, effectively transforming 
into they being fired. It should, however, be clear that the previous rift 
between the school boards and the general school community was bridged to 
a considerable degree. The opposition to the policy of Afrikaans seems to 
have been internal (with reference to the stand of most school boards) as well 
as external (with regard to the black school population).  
 
Notwithstanding these warnings the State was adamant in implementing this 
policy. The replacement of political leadership during this potentially volatile 
period could be interpreted as making a practical contribution towards 
reaching this goal. In 1976 the leader of the conservative group, Andries 
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Treurnicht replaced Punt Janson as Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration 
and Development. This was a clear signal from the Prime Minister with regard 
to the position the Afrikaans language should occupy in secondary schools. It 
should be obvious that Treurnicht had made his stand for the conservatives in 
Parliament and his new position gave him the necessary leverage to fulfil his 
“Afrikaner” loyalty. Following the previous arguments, one may reasonably 
infer that it was his unshakeable commitment to the language policy and his 
relentless drive not to compromise on the issue that ultimately triggered the 
Soweto student uprisings.  
 
During the month of May 1976, five Soweto schools formally applied for an 
exemption from the “language rule”. However, on 11 June Treurnicht 
announced that the applications were rejected. Another consideration to 
inform developments during this period is the activities of the Black Peoples’ 
Convention (BPC), incorporating the South African Students' Association 
(SASO) and the South African Students' Movement (SASM). As the intensity 
of the language conflict accelerated, the security police increasingly became 
involved. The situation became volatile at the start of the mid-year 
examinations when learners at many schools in Soweto refused to write. This 
produced a call for collective action to the extent that SASM (the secondary 
school arm of SASO) convened meetings from which emerged the Soweto 
Student Representative Council. This organisation arranged for mass student 
protest against the Afrikaans policy on June 16 1976. The response of the 
security police generated the impetus for further protests.       
               
During one of their marches to the offices of the education authorities, a 
confrontation ensued between the protesting learners and the police which 
resulted in a street massacre. The photograph of a dying Hector Peterson 
being carried away in the throes of anguish after being shot by the police 
made international headlines. This effectively positioned the South African 
education system in the world’s spotlight, etching into the minds of all South 
Africans this Hector Peterson picture of June 16 1976. Cashing in on this 
symbol, the anti-apartheid forces assured that they transformed this into a 
national symbol depicting the brutality and disconcerting attitude of the 
 64
apartheid state’s repression. For the first time in the history of formal 
education in South Africa the unarmed youth took it upon themselves to 
confront the police, who without any prior training to combat such actions, 
resorted to shooting and killing school children on the streets of Soweto.  
 
The state’s security forces effectively took control of those schools identified 
as fuelling the mood of militancy. One such school is in Zwelitsha (a township 
in King Williams Town – Eastern Cape), where police cancelled examinations 
and guarded exam venues to ensure that orders are obeyed, meaning that 
exams could not continue (Barnes & Haya in Kallaway 2002: 149). The school 
uprisings became the catalyst for further protests where school children made 
the streets the battleground to confront, not only the education issue, but also 
the forces of apartheid in general. They confronted the security forces, 
endured torture, detention without trail and even death in their effort to 
overcome their status as non-citizens. I should mention that it is my 
understanding that although the catalyst for the uprising was the Afrikaans 
language, it quickly transformed into a broader struggle against apartheid 
oppression. I therefore argue that while the contestation had its roots in the 
arena of education, it moved from this arena into the broader framework of a 
struggle against apartheid. The other argument relating to these uprisings is 
founded upon the ability of students to organise and plan their actions, which I 
argue had its origins within a particular context. This leads to an 
understanding that different ideas, opinions and strategies had to be 
entertained. Organisation and planning invariably had to take into account 
differing student voices. Such an understanding leads me to deduce that 
within such conversation/deliberation, persuasion and contestation invariably 
impacted upon determining the appropriate form of protest thus giving shape 
to a future deliberative form of educational governance.  
    
The response of both the security forces and of the ruling Nationalist Party 
had many consequences, which included youths fleeing the country to take up 
arms under the banner of “Umkhonto we Sizwe” (the military wing of the 
ANC); while others left the country to further their education in exile. Another 
consequence of the school boycotts was that public schools became targets 
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for arson because it represented the sites of the repressive Nationalist 
government. Because the uprising could not be restricted to Soweto (it spread 
to South Africa’s southernmost tip, the Western Cape), learners took it upon 
themselves to assert their authority in defiance of the apartheid authorities. 
The upshot was that school children started to organise themselves, forming 
committees which represented schools within a particular district. My 
understanding of “asserting their authority” and “organising themselves”, 
relates to their ability to accomplish some reasoned form of outcome. In terms 
of school governance one may reasonably deduce that different views had to 
be entertained and contested, leading to an understanding that it required an 
inclusive participatory process. Within such a participatory process dissenting 
voices would invariably be heard, suggesting a form of deliberation 
(identifying the more persuasive argument) with the aim of reaching 
understanding or consensus as to the appropriate cause of action. To me this 
suggests an advocacy for a future democratic form of representative 
governance, a type of governance for which the disenfranchised masses 
would later call. Along the lines of such principles, marches and protests 
would be organised involving all the schools within that district. The seeds 
were laid for a different form of school governance outside of the framework of 
state control. It is in such a context that the Parent Teacher Student 
Associations (PTSAs) had its origins. PTSAs thus originated from a different 
mindset, as opposed to how state governance was driven. Firstly the manner 
in which these bodies were constituted again gives rise to the notion of 
inclusivity in the sense that it involved most of the major stakeholders. The 
glaring difference is the inclusion of students effectively creating space for a 
voice that previously had scant recognition. Secondly, members who served 
on this body (PTSA) were not appointed, but rather elected within their 
particular forum, meaning that parents elected their representatives while 
students elected theirs. Voices from differing stakeholders could now be 
heard within a forum, which I would argue was specifically created to counter 
the form of governance that the state instituted. The idea that major 
stakeholders (parents, teachers and students) had a voice within a structured 
forum where they could air their views and produce reasoned arguments to 
further their cause towards more democratic practices leads me to an 
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interpretation that this “body” (PTSAs) invoked the type of governance 
features which was commensurate with more democratic practices, an ideal 
that the future school governing body system envisaged. I shall now address 
the broader context within which these PTSAs developed.  
 
To understand the foundation of governance outside the framework of state 
control one needs to go back to at least the 1960s, with the genesis of the 
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The ideological content of the BCM 
was vital in providing a new political awareness among students. This 
awareness galvanised thinking and also contributed towards a movement 
outside the formal education structures, where planning occurred to counter 
state education policy initiatives.      
 
2.3.1. PEOPLE’S EDUCATION AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS   
          MOVEMENT 
 
Although the major struggles against apartheid had its foundation in local 
conditions, much of it can be traced to the trends in an international struggle 
for democracy. One such influence from beyond the borders of South Africa is 
the impact of literature. During the 1960s the anti-imperialist thoughts of Paulo 
Freire in his significant work, “The Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, impacted 
upon and further shaped student, teacher and community consciousness 
against apartheid education. He argued that the student and/or the oppressed 
could not liberate themselves without a thorough understanding of power 
relations and their concomitant domination through conquest, divide and rule, 
manipulation and cultural invasion. Freire’s view of education as cultural 
action for freedom had a significant influence on the nature of the educational 
struggle and the broader liberation movement in South Africa since the late 
1960s. Nekhwevha posits that South African activists from both the Black 
Consciousness Movement and the People’s Education Movement used the 
Freirean pedagogy for the politicisation of the oppressed (in Kallaway 2002:  
136). I agree with such an interpretation, because a feature of the campaigns 
against apartheid education was characterised by a language of protest fused 
with Freire’s conception of humanism. An example that immediately springs to 
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mind is demands for “education for liberation” or “people’s education for 
people’s power”. The National Party Government, realising the influence of 
the Freire literature, banned the book in the 1970s but failed to prevent its 
circulation among Black Consciousness Movement activists in higher 
education institutions (for blacks), such as the University of the Western Cape 
and Fort Hare University. One may consequently reasonably argue that this 
literature amongst others, made a significant impression on a key activist 
named Steven Biko.      
 
 2.3.2. BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT 
 
Bantu Steven Biko, born in Ginsberg (a small town in the Eastern Cape), is 
generally known as the father of the Black Consciousness Movement in South 
Africa. As mentioned earlier, Paulo Freire’s thoughts influenced the thinking of 
Biko. To clarify this statement I turn to Biko who wrote: 
 
Conscientisation is a process whereby individuals or groups living 
within a given social and political setting are made aware of their 
situation. The operative attitude here is not so much awareness of the 
physical sense of their situation, but much more their ability to assess 
and improve their own influence over themselves and their 
environment … thus then “conscientisation” implies a desire to engage 
people in an emancipatory process in an attempt to free them from a 
situation of bondage (in Woods 1979: 145).  
 
The key concept according to Biko is that of conscientisation, or alternatively 
making people aware of their own capacity to rescue themselves from a 
repressive, almost bondage situation. This internal strength that people 
posses should be accentuated in order that they may emancipate themselves. 
This was the critical framework within which the Black Consciousness 
Movement had its origins. It is on this basis that I argue that Paulo Freire 
influenced the thinking of Black Consciousness activists, for Freire argued for 
the same type of consciousness, which should lead to emancipation. 
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The violent destruction of the Defiance Campaign that culminated in the 
Rivonia Trial effectively robbed the oppressed masses of their leadership. 
This, together with the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), left oppressed South Africans without a 
viable means of protest and internal opposition. Fatton argues that, “the 
sudden decapitation of the internal revolutionary leadership whose raison 
d’être was to direct armed resistance created an inevitable political vacuum 
and engendered a profound sense of defeat in the African population” (1986:  
31). He further posits that “it was also part of a larger malady of fear, 
demoralisation and submissiveness” which undermined the struggle for 
equality (1986: 64). It is in such a context of despair that the Black 
Consciousness Movement materialised. To get further insight into what Black 
Consciousness involved I turn to Biko when he answers the question as to 
what is meant by Black Consciousness: 
 
I mean the cultural and political revival of an oppressed people. This 
must be related to emancipation of the entire continent of Africa. Africa 
has experienced the death of white invincibility. Before that we were 
conscious of mainly two classes of people, the white conquerors and 
black conquered. The blacks in Africa know now that the whites will not 
be conquerors forever. I must emphasise the cultural depth of Black 
Consciousness. The recognition of the death of white invincibility forces 
blacks to ask the question: Who am I? Who are we? And the 
fundamental answer we give is this: “People are people”! So, Black 
Consciousness says: “Forget about colour”! But the reality we faced 
ten to fifteen years ago did not allow us to articulate this (Biko in 
Woods 1979: 145-146)   
 
Drawing from Biko’s response the underlying rationale seems to be 
emancipation, again drawing a link to the critical pedagogy of Freire’s call for 
“cultural freedom”. It is not unexpected that African students who were 
arguably the only black social group to have escaped the mood of despair 
planted the first seeds for Black Consciousness.  The Movement embraced 
not only Africans, but also all those groups who suffered from apartheid 
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exploitation. The concept “black” meant virtually all who suffered non-
citizenship (excluded from political franchise) and were exploited and 
oppressed by the apartheid regime. With such an interpretation Blacks and 
those of Indian descent (Asians) and Coloureds (people of mixed racial 
descent) became fully integrated under the banner of the Black 
Consciousness Movement. The term “black” was, however, not attributed to 
all blacks. On the contrary, the Movement reserved the term “non-white” to 
define those Africans, Asians and Coloureds who collaborated with the white 
authorities. Fatton posits that the Movement “condemned the African 
bureaucratic elite of the Bantustans for its incorporation into and acceptance 
of the political structures of apartheid” (1986: 32). One may reasonably infer 
that Black Consciousness did not merely emphasise race as a decisive factor 
in the struggle against white domination, but also stressed the interracial 
linkages preserving and enhancing the racist reality (1986: 32). Fatton further 
argues that to be “black” in the Movement's sense implied a determined 
antagonism to apartheid and the political will to eradicate it (1986: 32). He 
further posits that “being black was not determined by colour alone; it was 
determined by the daily experience of enduring oppression as a class of 
exploited people" (1986: 58). As such, the emancipation of Africans involved 
the emancipation of the oppressed as a whole. 
 
The blow of the “Rivonia Trial” had a severe impact on the psyche of Africans 
reinforcing the condition of an acute sense of inferiority amongst blacks. The 
condition of blacks under apartheid at that time was symbolic of almost 
everything negative. Thus “black” came to denote being sinful, barbaric, 
backward, inconsiderate, unreliable, irresponsible and ignorant. In such a 
scenario many “non-whites” strived to espouse the norms and values of the 
white oppressor, believing that being civilised meant slavishly imitating the 
white condition, thus rejecting their blackness. The hegemony of the white 
ruling class which instilled into the black mind a sense of inadequacy and 
inferiority had to be contested, and in its place a new black identity had to be 
constructed. The notion of Black Consciousness was initially the vehicle of a 
black philosophy of pride and self-affirmation in opposing the white 
ascendancy of apartheid on a cultural plane and asserting the intrinsic worth 
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of black people (Fatton 1986: 31-56). The development of Black 
Consciousness can, therefore, be interpreted as a counter-consciousness 
emphasising the racial myth of white supremacy and subsequent black 
inferiority. Inculcating a notion of equality of humans notwithstanding their 
colour transforms the subhuman culture, which one may argue existed 
amongst blacks after the “Rivonia Trial”, into a new moral and ethical vision of 
the equality of all human subjects.  
 
The Black Consciousness Movement had as one of its aims to convince the 
subordinate masses of South Africa that they have the capacity to undermine 
the power of the ruling class and as a consequence determine their own 
destiny as conscious human agents. Thus Black Consciousness was 
premised on a black philosophy of pride and self-affirmation opposing the 
negative stereotyping (by white racists who argued for white supremacy), and 
championing the intrinsic worth of black people. Fatton (1986: 58) reinforces 
this interpretation when he argues that Black Consciousness was essentially 
a “process of intellectual renewal and creativity” in much the same way as 
educational governance required a form of dexterity and creativity. The effects 
of such an understanding of the equality of humans reinforced the struggle 
against apartheid in the aftermath of the Rivonia trial. The notion of African 
Communalism was emphasised stressing the ideal of “self-help” and 
encouraging identification with those less fortunate than “one’s-self”. One may 
reasonably suggest that it involved a call for going “back to our roots”, 
meaning the re-emergence of unique African values as opposed to slavishly 
incorporating the values of the dominant class or ideology. African 
Communalism or Communality in this sense includes values, such as 
interdependence, rendering mutual aid, collective action and an obligation on 
the individual to think and act in the interests of the group/community (Gyekye 
1997: 252). Following such a line of reasoning, I argue that it is such values 
that could conceivably have framed the thoughts of how elected 
representatives on PTSAs envisaged their form of interaction and thus of 
governance. Thinking and acting in the interest of the broader community 
provided a framework that could conceivably inform future governance 
practices. Kunnie reinforces Gyekey’s view when he argues that these values 
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embedded in the conception of African communality are the same principles 
which drove the Black Consciousness Movement towards organisational 
commitment and independent thinking (2000: 215). It is at such a level of 
implementing communal values that slogans of an educational nature became 
the hallmark of driving the struggle against unequal education. The call for 
“each one teach one” or “an injury to one is an injury to all” immediately 
comes to mind. Again the ideal of acting in the interest of the collective 
(inclusivity) becomes visible. It is consequently not implausible to argue that 
features of communality could possibly have shaped a more democratic form 
of educational governance.  
 
As stated earlier, Biko carried this Black Consciousness philosophy to the 
underprivileged masses in a quest to bring the pride back to being black, 
alternatively being African. In December of 1968 black students formed the 
South African Students Organisation (SASO) with Steve Biko as its first 
president. The hallmark of his contribution was his work with dedicated 
colleagues to ensure that his ideals were practiced via a set of “action-
oriented community-based programmes” to drive some of the first community 
based NGOs in South Africa (Barnes & Haya in Kallaway 2002: 146). The 
reasoning was that since oppression was the outcome of conscious human 
action, its demise should result from counter human action. On a practical 
level related to “action oriented community-based programmes”, one project, 
operating from Biko’s house, was a bursary fund named the “Ginsberg 
Educational Fund” that received funding from international church structures 
linked to the Black Consciousness Movement. Deserving students were 
carefully selected, always considering political involvement and their ability to 
“spread the Gospel”, with reference to championing the cause of Biko’s Black 
Consciousness Movement. For these students, educational opportunity was 
intimately linked to political activity, thus strengthening the ideals of the Black 
Consciousness Movement  (Barnes & Haya in Kallaway 2002: 147). Most of 
the students were politicised through the South African Students Organisation 
and those coming from Ginsberg were respected, and their advice sought, 
because of their personal association with Biko. These students, however, 
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paid the price for their activism, particularly during and after the 1976 Soweto 
school uprisings.  
 
On 19 October 1977, the Internal Security Act caused the banning of the 
South African Student Organisation (SASO), the Black People’s Convention 
and all other Black Consciousness Movement organisations. This occurred a 
month prior to the killing of Biko while in police custody. One may reasonably 
suggest that from the advent of this Movement (filling the vacuum created 
after the Rivonia trial) resistance to apartheid oppression became more 
organised and more threatening. The students who graduated from “bush 
colleges” (a term reserved for ethnically exclusive institutions of higher 
learning) mostly qualified as teachers and caused a revolutionary awakening 
among their learners. These students invariably had to engage in critical 
debate during their undergraduate years at these “bush colleges”, thus 
galvanising their practices in relation to how they conceive of reaching 
outcomes. I would deduce from this a particular way of approaching and 
informing their learners about the struggle. It is rather unlikely that they did not 
make unobtrusive demands in a subtle way regarding a form of democratic 
governance. I emphasise this point because such an approach could be 
linked to the Habermasian notion of communicative action. This, together with 
the experience of the 1976 Soweto student uprising, gave impetus to the 
cause for liberation. By now the cry was “liberation before education”. The 
state resorted, as always, to repressive means via overt force to overcome 
the “revolutionary culture” and maintain the status quo. On the other hand 
teachers and parents collaborated to overcome what they referred to as a 
counter educational culture. It was, however, clear that the vigour of 
resistance could no longer be quelled by the cultural hegemony of white 
supremacy.  
 
The notion of black consciousness, I argue, is the foundation of this break 
from slavishly imitating white cultural norms at the expense of what I refer to 
as natural human values. Black consciousness shattered the ruling party’s 
exaggerated notion that black is unattractive, dishonest, repulsive, 
unscrupulous or any other derogatory name used to describe a subjugated 
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group of people at the southernmost tip of the African continent. This is not to 
say that all blacks were proud to be black (in the Movement’s sense), on the 
contrary there were those from amongst them who collaborated with the 
State’s security forces in order to undermine the movement towards liberation. 
This, however, was not strong enough to undermine a reinvigorated belief 
among the majority of the blacks that they have it within themselves, not only 
to overcome oppression, but also to replace it with another more acceptable 
emancipatory ideology.  
 
A potential critic may argue that I romanticise and overestimate the influence 
of Black Consciousness as a revolutionary framework in the South African 
reality. I contest such a claim by turning to Fatton who argues that, “the 
making of a revolution requires not only organisation but also a process of 
ideological diffusion whereby the hegemony of the dominant class is 
disarticulated and ultimately displaced by a new philosophy of emancipation” 
(1986: 125). My interpretation of the work of activists under the banner of 
Black Consciousness effected such a disarticulation and displaced the 
dominant ideology with another based on the belief in equality between races. 
It confounded the myth of white being superior to black on the basis of 
biologically determinant criteria and rooted in the minds of the black majority 
the notion of a non-bifurcationist view of race.  
 
I have further argued that the concept of Black Consciousness had its roots in 
the ethnically divided universities from where it was nurtured and transported 
to other educational institutions including schools. Whilst the concept had as 
its frame to influence the ideals of the majority of blacks (including workers), 
its educational roots are of significance because its premise was to educate 
the masses. One may reasonably argue that this notion of educating the 
masses, as a counter to Bantu education, translates into the origin and 
development of the notion of “people’s education” in a South African context.  
Therefore, I turn to a discussion of people’s education with the idea of 
determining its impact on education in general and the development of 
education (governance) policy in particular.                   
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2.3.3. A NOTION OF PEOPLE’S EDUCATION 
 
One manifestation of resistance to apartheid was the appeal by various 
organisations for a “people’s education” which would contribute to political and 
educational liberation. The liberatory aim of people’s education was 
embedded in the specific socio-political context of apartheid capitalism. In 
much the same way as Black Consciousness relied on reinvigorating the 
consciousness of the oppressed, people’s education utilises the same 
strategy as part of a liberatory education. Vio Grossi purports that “this 
requires the oppressed to be mobilised and conscientised to become aware of 
their oppression” (1984: 307). Such conscientisation attempts to bring about 
popular participation in the educational processes of society, “so that people 
become aware of their potential to participate” (McKay & Romm 1992: 25).  
 
The concept “people’s education” is rooted in, and inextricably linked to 
emancipation and the freeing of individuals from a system of oppression and 
bondage. On another level, it usually denotes the need for both a new system 
of education and socio-political change creating an understanding that it forms 
a precursor to liberation. This is in line with what I earlier argued for in terms 
of the “legitimacy principle”. In this regard McKay and Romm posit that, 
“People’s education envisages a connection between education and the 
political struggle for liberation in society” (1992: 1). Conceptually it 
incorporates the understanding that education will have popular input and be 
made available to everyone. By popular input I refer to the masses that should 
be in a position to influence the direction of educational change precisely 
because it shall directly impact on them. In such a sense the notion 
contributes towards an understanding that people in general should 
participate in order to determine their own education and thus their own 
future. This call for “people’s education” came from outside the formal 
education and political structures of South Africa. Its proponents, working 
within the “non-formal” sector aimed to provide a link between education and 
liberation.   
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In promoting “people’s education” it seems prudent that the concept should be 
defined. However, the difficulties involved in defining the concept are actually 
one of the concept’s strengths (McKay & Romm 1992: 3). Vio Grossi argues 
that people’s education defies being conceptualised as either a complete 
methodology or a theory. He posits that: 
 
It is still in the process of definition, and is more a social and political 
fact … than a coherent method. This limitation may be one of its most 
remarkable strengths, since people’s education emphasised the value 
of processes rather than results. One of the most important lessons 
that we Latin Americans have learnt from years of struggle is the 
difficulty of finding final solutions apart from those which emerge from 
day-to-day people’s practice (1984: 304). 
 
I concur with this view because it keeps the notion open for debate, making it 
a dynamic principle which evolves as practices influence it. It consequently 
allows the dominated, oppressed and exploited sectors of the population to 
tackle the causes of their problems, instead of reinforcing the status quo. In 
much the same manner one might argue that such reasoning impacted upon 
“the peoples’ ” notion of how to incorporate such practices into their form of 
educational governance. Such a perspective on people’s education lends 
itself towards struggling to overcome the problematic social practices which 
impact on the daily existence of people. As a process, which is continually “in 
the making”, people’s education signifies a struggle to preserve the discursive 
character of social reality, so that any posited “new order” never becomes 
sacred, as Freire puts it (Freire 1985: 106). In terms of this understanding, 
“process” becomes the operational word, meaning that the outcome is 
secondary. Regarding governance, one may then deduce that it should 
operate along the same principles, meaning the process of democratic 
practice (including critical debate, producing rational and persuasive 
arguments through collective/inclusive deliberation) becomes essential. In 
other words the outcome should not be primary, meaning that the process of 
deliberation should precede the outcome. Making deliberation primary 
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translates into the outcome becoming dynamic for the reason that views and 
argumentation are always open to reflection, contestation and critical inquiry.    
 
2.3.4. “PEOPLE’S EDUCATION” - THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
In South Africa, the movement for people’s education occurred within the 
“non-state sector”, meaning it became part of the popular movement which 
resisted the compartmentalised form of education which the Nationalist Party 
instituted under the guise of “separate development”. It espoused political and 
educational aims contrary to those generated by the apartheid regime and in 
opposition to white domination. My interpretation of people’s education in the 
South African context is to “educate for democracy”. In this regard a 
correlation occurs between education on the one hand, and the political 
system on the other. McKay and Romm purport much the same 
understanding when they argue that the link between both the educational 
and the political aims are “necessary if one is to educate for democracy in a 
context where there is a high degree of illiteracy, a lack of free and 
compulsory education for the black population, a lack of facilities, and a 
system of education which failed to educate for democratic participation" 
(1992: 20).   
 
“People’s Education for People’s Power”, became a major slogan and 
strategy of popular political movements in South Africa in the 1980s and was 
often perceived as an entirely new development. But in a strictly historical 
sense “People’s Education” is not a new concept. During the 1955 to 1956 
boycotts, the African National Congress (ANC) advanced the slogan 
seemingly in the same sense in which it was to be used in the 1980s. They 
advanced an understanding that it should be a “democratic-liberatory 
education” (Hyslop 1999: 71). During the 1955-1956 boycotts, this slogan was 
transformed into practice under the system of “cultural clubs”, driven by the 
African Education Movement (AEM). However, it could not be sustained 
because of a lack of resources and the Bantu Education Act prevented these 
cultural clubs from presenting themselves as schools or from teaching formal 
courses. Notwithstanding this, these clubs of People’s Education survived 
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until the late 1950s. As a national movement one may safely claim that these 
clubs were unsuccessful simply because it reached a very small portion of the 
learner population. However, in terms of its operational content, these clubs 
were instrumental in organising a network of relationships based on reasoned 
argumentation and rational debate. Such relationships were forged to create 
an alternative to the status quo thus the reference to “democratic-liberatory 
education. This transforms into an understanding that the organising 
principles (including a network of relationships based on rational conversation, 
reasoned debate and a drive towards including previously marginalised 
voices) of these clubs were informed to produce democratically governed 
institutions. If such an interpretation is plausible then one may reasonably 
presume that it could conceivably have influenced the organising principles 
and structures of governing bodies, as we know it today.   
 
The concept of “People’s Education” was to seriously resurface during the 
aftermath the 1976 school revolts. At that time the government did everything 
in its power (within the framework of institutionalised apartheid) to manage 
and quell the nation-wide upsurge against apartheid in general and against 
unequal education in particular. It followed a dual approach of repression on 
the one hand, and shifting policy on the other, to the extent that Afrikaans as a 
compulsory language of instruction was dropped. Hyslop makes the claim that 
the state was reeling in the period following the 1976 uprising. He further 
posits that “this had as much to do with the upsurge of popular resistance as 
with the internal power squabbles within the National Party ruling elite” (1999: 
168). The aim of state repression (until the end of 1977) was to stop student 
protests via expulsions, school closures, arrests of students and finally by 
banning eighteen Black Consciousness groups including SASM and SASO 
(Davis in Kallaway 1984: 351). Furthermore, school boards and certain 
individuals who served on school committees (those who were appointed) 
were manipulated and at times coerced (by the Bantu Education 
Department’s authorities) to expedite student suppression by “informing” on 
who the student leadership was. Inherent in the functioning of school boards 
was, therefore, collaboration with the State to exclude the voices of the 
majority stakeholders (those being the students and the parents), thus 
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vindicating the call for democratic governance. In its quest to “normalise” the 
situation, the word “Bantu” was removed from the naming of the education 
department, which now became the Department of Education and Training. 
This shift was a strategy to give the impression that change has been 
effected, with the expectation that schooling would “normalise”. 
  
Under constant pressure to reform, something had to be done educationally in 
order to overcome the image of South Africa in the international arena as a 
society that could respond to genuine educational grievances only by 
indiscriminately killing its school children. Together with the internal crisis, this 
led the government to introduce the “Education and Training Act” (Act 90 of 
1979) which repealed all existing legislation relating to black education 
promulgated between 1953 and 1978 (Behr 1984: 200). One can thus safely 
argue that this Act was as a direct consequence of student action in 1976. 
However, Davis (in Kallaway 1984: 349, my italics) responds by claiming that, 
“the intention of the Act has been not to abolish massive discrimination in 
education but to obscure its operation by giving new policies a more class-
differentiated twist”. I have earlier stated that learner resistance was not only 
premised on the educational regime in South Africa, but also against capitalist 
exploitation. Kallaway is even more explicit when he claims that: 
 
… education should and must promote democracy, equality and 
individual development – and on the assumption that progressives 
agree that none of these goals can be achieved within the context of 
racial discrimination (1997: 22). 
 
The “Education and Training Act” therefore did not fool the learners 
(identifying the “class” structure) who continued with their resistance to 
segregated education. This resistance snowballed during 1980 and 1985 to 
the extent that the rallying phrases became “liberation before education” and 
“liberation now, education later”. Student militancy and an increased level of 
support for the ANC within schools and universities were unmistakable signs 
that the struggle would continue. The cry around the country among the youth 
as well as adult population was “Aluta Continua” (the struggle continues). 
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During this same period, black student organisations such as the Congress of 
South African Students (COSAS) and the Azanian Students Organisation 
(AZASO) gained prominency and were deemed to be more belligerent than 
the banned SASO and SASM (Davis in Kallaway 1984: 365).   At this stage 
the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) came into being, with a 
mandate to curb the students from alienating their communities and 
addressing the boycott crisis. Also, during the month of June 1980, “in 
response to demands for a judicial enquiry, the government requested the 
Human Science Research Commission (HSRC) to conduct a scientific 
investigation into all aspects of education (including all population groups) 
provision in South Africa” (Taylor 1998: 66).  
 
The committee under the chairmanship of Professor J.P. de Lange tabled the 
“De Lange Report” in October 1981. In terms of apartheid Nationalist ideology 
this report had major historical value. To support this claim I turn to Taylor 
who argues that: 
 
The historic importance of the De Lange report was that it was the first 
thorough and large-scale document attempting to bring the entire 
education system of the country into one integrated policy framework 
(1998: 67). 
 
Notwithstanding the Report’s recommendation of a single education ministry 
and free and compulsory education, the report still recommended different 
education departments for the different racial groups. The Report was bound 
by the new Constitution Act of 1983 (Act 10 of 1983), which defined education 
as a so-called “own affair” (part IV, section 14[1]) in consonance with the 
Tricameral governance structure. Government, as recommended by the 
Report, rejected even the call for a “single ministry of education”. The 
government insisted that education had to “allow for the full scope of self-
determination for each population group … as an own affair” (Behr 1988: 58). 
According to this Tricameral arrangement blacks were excluded and were 
only catered for in 1986 when the Department of Education and Training 
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(DET) was established. The report consequently recommended educational 
operation within an apartheid framework.  
 
In terms of school governance, the Report recommended a three-tier system 
with parent involvement on the “third level” where powers should be vested in 
school governing bodies. Such school governing bodies would interpret the 
needs and wishes of parents regarding education and mediate between them 
and the professional staff of the school. Control and management at local 
level should provide for mechanisms that would ensure “the greatest possible 
degree of autonomy“ for individual schools, and “freedom of parental choice” 
in subject selection (Behr 1988: 55). The report refers at length to the principle 
of “free association” with the view of protecting the favourable position that the 
white population maintained. While the report made reference to school 
governing bodies it was silent as to how such bodies would be comprised, 
what their particular function should be and to whom they would be 
accountable. It is, therefore, difficult to draw conclusions in relation to the 
current system of school governance from this report. It is this vagueness on 
educational governance which gave rise to the criticisms by the National 
Education Crisis Committee (NECC) in its National Education Policy Initiative 
(NEPI) Report. It is glaringly visible, however, that such governance structures 
(with its parent involvement) as recommended by the De Lange report should 
operate within racially divided schools located within racially divided 
neighbourhoods or “group areas”. The use of the term “governing bodies” 
was, however, significant, for it is the first time that this term was used within 
the formal state education structure (regarding black education). It was a 
significant move away from school boards and school committees.    
 
The De Lange recommendations ultimately failed to convince students to 
forego their march towards a non-racial and equal education system. The 
Nationalist government, in its quest to alter policy with the rationale of quelling 
the unrest, was in effect unsuccessful. By the end of 1985 students were 
calling for 1986 to be “The Year of No Schooling” (Hyslop 1999: 172). My 
response to such calls is that by 1985 black schooling as a system of state 
schooling had for all intents and purposes disintegrated. It was the NECC with 
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its strategy of “people’s education” that rescued the student movement from 
destroying itself, for by then student militancy fragmented rather than 
cemented their local communities.  
 
In October 1985 the Soweto Civic Association convened a mass meeting of 
parents to address the school crisis from which resulted the Soweto Parents 
Crisis Committee. While this committee improved community-student 
relations, its impact was minimal in terms of the national student march to 
“Liberation before Education” (Hyslop 1999: 174). A national education crisis 
conference was called which resulted in the formation of the National 
Education Crisis Committee (NECC) consisting of a network of Parent 
Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs). This alternative educational authority 
challenged state control of education, while students went back to school “on 
the 28th January 1986 rather than the official opening date of 8 January” 
(Hyslop 1999: 174). This was the first major move by the NECC to inform the 
formal education authorities that they had the necessary power to exhibit 
some form of control over mass public schooling. It is my contention that a 
central intention of the NECC was to get community control over schools from 
which it would be able to pursue its wider political objectives, hence its call to 
government to hand over control and management of schools to the 
community. During February 1986 the NECC called for negotiations with the 
government, which resulted in preliminary talks with the Deputy Minister, Sam 
de Beer. However, the preliminary talks did not have the desired effect with 
the result that negotiations were refused, and wide scale arrests of NECC 
officials together with a state of emergency were declared in June of that year 
(Hyslop 1999: 175).  
 
2.4.1.  THE PERIOD (TEN YEARS) PRIOR TO DEMOCRACY; MOVING 
TOWARDS DECENTRALISATION AND COOPERATIVE       
GOVERNANCE 
 
The late 1980s heralded a period when it “became increasingly clear that … 
the days of the apartheid regime were numbered (Jansen 2001b: 13-14). It is 
my view that the event that best defines the irreversible moment in the 
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movement towards the termination of apartheid was the announcement by the 
then President, FW de Klerk on 2 February 1990 of Mandela’s release. With 
the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of all political 
organisations, South Africa entered a new era, including the realm of 
education. This period witnessed a flurry of political education activity from 
both sides of the political spectrum. The Nationalist government made a last 
ditch attempt to modify education policy as the country increasingly moved 
towards popular rule. The ruling National Party conceded that racial 
differentiation in education was no longer acceptable resulting in a process of 
deracialising education. The product of such thinking was the Education 
Renewal Strategy (ERS of 1992)) whose vision for restructuring education 
was based upon decentralisation, cost-effectiveness and efficiency (Weber 
2002: 621-622). I shall address the notions of decentralisation, effectiveness 
and efficiency in chapter three. Following the route of efficiency and 
effectiveness, the ERS overlooked other major concerns such as the redress 
of past inequalities, confronting issues regarding non-racialism and non-
sexism as well as consulting with the representatives of the broad democratic 
movement (which could be construed as a lack of democratic participation). 
The ERS further advocated a new education governance system that 
provides for a central education authority and regionally based departments, 
including:  
 
• a three tiered education system with devolution of power to 
institutional level based on the principle of the more parents pay for 
schooling, the greater should be the control they exercise in the 
school; and 
• the sharing of educational responsibilities among political and 
education authorities at different levels: parent communities, the 
organised teaching profession and other stakeholders, to ensure 
effective education for all (Karlsson, Pampallis & Sithole 1996: 32). 
 
The promotion of a unitary education system (not based on race) represented 
a significant change from the apartheid model of education. Also included was 
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the idea that governing bodies shall control the admission policy of their 
school. The ERS in effect called for a movement towards decentralisation with 
reference to the “devolution of power to institutional level” and “the sharing of 
educational responsibilities with parents”. Mogale argues that “this form of 
decentralisation is designed to facilitate and open up … opportunities for 
citizen participation, by placing more power and resources at a closer and 
more easily influenced level of government” (2003: 217). It is my 
understanding that the ERS’s call for decentralisation was an attempt to pre-
empt educational developments in order to influence future policy. Its claim to 
deracialise education was in effect a strategic move on the part of the 
Nationalist government. It is my interpretation that linking the degree of parent 
participation to the amount that parents were willing to pay, indirectly 
disqualified the majority of South Africans simply because they occupied the 
lower ranks of the economic spectrum of this country. It was therefore a 
means of assuring that White parents participate in the decision-making 
process while at the same time it effectively disqualified the majority who 
formed part of the Black “economically disadvantaged” population. 
Furthermore, one may reasonably argue that placing admission control of 
learners in the hands of parents was deliberate in the sense that it 
incorporates the question of “standards” while at the same time it theoretically 
protects “diversity”. What I am saying is that the ERS realised that their 
policies might lead to a lowering of the standard of education in White 
schools. To counter such a realisation parents at those schools should have 
the power to “exclude” those whom they believe might potentially be 
responsible for lowering standards. So, while the ERS seems to be a 
movement towards cooperative governance signalling a willingness to come 
to terms with an ideal of non-racialism it in effect reinforced the status quo. 
This is done in the sense that it would not reflect colour but much rather the 
socio-economic conditions which apartheid so effectively shaped (by forced 
removals, instituting the group areas and job reservation acts). Carrim refers 
to the three models of schools introduced by the then minister of “white” 
education, Piet Clase (Models A, B and C) to argue that “the opening of white 
schools was done in ways to ensure white privilege and security” (1998: 312). 
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Although those people of colour who were previously debarred from “white” 
schools could now enter it, there were specific conditions. These included: 
 
1. all schools needed to ensure that 51% of the school’s population 
remained white; 
2. the cultural ethos of such schools remained intact; 
3. the state and/or school were not obligated to provide any financial 
aid to any “black” incoming student (Carrim 1998: 312).  
 
Weber goes as far as claiming that the ERS’s “philosophy was consistent with 
the 1981 De Lange Commission of Inquiry into education (2002: 618). School 
governance according to the ERS also involved paying for the maintenance of 
school grounds and financing services such as electricity (Weber 2002: 623). 
The financial issue seems to increasingly filter through (an issue that I shall 
address in chapter three). 
    
Another watershed development came in February 1992 when the education 
Minister gave practical effect to a key ERS principle by announcing that all 
white state schools would become state-aided (Model C) schools, opening the 
“white school doors” to all communities (irrespective of race, ethnicity or 
religious conviction). On the one hand, increasing school fees would limit the 
number of Blacks while on the other travelling expenses (from black 
settlements which resulted from the group areas act) would further curtail the 
number of blacks capable of accessing such schools. Jansen argues that, 
“the ERS was expressly criticised on the one hand for working within the 
apartheid paradigm, and on the other for not addressing ‘fundamental’ 
problems with the education system. For example, by emphasising vocational 
training rather than academic education … vocational training for blacks and 
academic education for whites. This was a racial theme established long 
before the apartheid education laws of the 1950s” (2001b: 19). 
Notwithstanding these reforms, one may reasonably argue that by 1990 
education policy was still heavily centralised. The apartheid state maintained 
bureaucratic control that was centralised, racially exclusive and politically 
authoritarian.     
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During the same period (1991) the NECC (now the National Education Co-
ordinating Committee) became the initial vehicle through which the ANC 
steered development of education policy. The NECC (a broad alliance of 
student, teacher and labour organisations) including the Congress of South 
African Students (COSAS), the South African Democratic Teachers Union 
(SADTU) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
commissioned the National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI) to develop 
education policy options for the broad democratic movement (Jansen 2001: 
17). The NEPI section on educational governance was a critical response to 
the de Lange report and the government’s ERS document specifically for its 
vagueness about school governance (Steyn & Waghid 2000: 69). The NEPI 
reports researched and examined school-based governance. Unlike the ERS, 
a strong central state was seen as acting in respect of equalisation, and the 
redress of historical disadvantage. According to NEPI, “statutory provisions 
and a charter of education rights would institutionalise governance structures 
(1992: 38 – 44). The main contributions of NEPI were: 
 
• Establishing a values framework within which a post-apartheid 
education policy could be conceived, i.e. the pillars of non-racialism, 
non-sexism, equity, democracy and redress; 
• Engaging academics from universities in policy development, 
thereby effectively displacing the earlier tradition of policy criticism 
which characterised progressive academic work in education; 
• Signalling the parameters within which a more refined education 
policy could be developed in the future; and 
• Creating a frame of reference within which oppositional or rival 
policies would invariably develop their own policy positions (Jansen 
2001b: 18). 
 
The ANC also produced a discussion document on education policy in June 
1991, in which it expressed the view that, in accordance with democratic 
principles, all people should be consulted so that all interested parties can 
participate in the development of a new post-apartheid policy. Of particular 
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importance are the proposal of local governance of schools, and the 
recommendation that learners be included in the school management system 
(Steyn & Waghid 2000: 69). The Education and Training Framework 
discussion document (January 1994) proposed among other things that; 
“institutional governance within the school system has been one of the 
weakest and least coherent aspects of education” (ANC 1995: 24). The period 
prior to the democratic elections are replete with policies that indicate a 
movement away from institutionalised segregation. The above discussion 
highlights this. Not only from the side of government but also from extra-
parliamentary organisations.  Although schools were still segregated and the 
majority of parents were still excluded from school decision making processes 
during the pre-democratic era, there have been a number of initiatives from 
both sides of the political spectrum to move in the direction of the 
democratisation of the education system. 
 
2.4.2. THE EARLY DEMOCRATIC PERIOD 
 
When the new era of democracy dawned on South Africa, the catch phrase 
was “transformation”. I interpret this term as changing from one system or 
form to another. However, such change would be fundamentally for the better. 
Viewed from such a perspective, transformation is not its own end but rather 
its aim is an improved, more just and more equitable society. Transformation 
is consequently firstly a critical reflection on the past, with the idea to respond 
in such a way that the future you envisage is under the influence of constant 
rethinking. In this regard transformation becomes a dynamic process of 
continual re-evaluation en- route to building the future that everyone feels 
proud of and comfortable with. To support this view I quote Carrim in his 
argument on the South African education situation: 
 
The system of apartheid seriously affected the nature of education 
provision and order in South Africa. It ensured that South Africans were 
schooled in segregated environments. This means that every level of 
schooling was cast in a racial mould … Transforming education in 
South Africa, therefore, entails erecting changes on all … levels. This 
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requires no less than an overhaul of the past educational order, a 
redefinition of the culture prevalent in schools throughout the country 
and a shift in mentality, from being racist and authoritarian to being 
non-racial, democratic and enabling (1998: 301). 
          
In reading Carrim I realise that this seems to be a tall order. I am particularly 
concerned with the necessary “shift in mentality” that transformation 
demands. It is along this line of reasoning that I determine that transformation 
should be under continual revision, put differently, it should by its very nature 
create a society within a climate of critical and interpretative responsibility 
which enables people to develop confidence in the formation of conclusions. 
Fostering such a climate is the means to ensuring that liberation entails the 
active participation of people in the process of decision-making within 
societies/communities institutions. This is what I mean when I make the claim 
that “transformation” should be a dynamic process. The central issue is, 
therefore, not “what” system evolves, but “how” the system comes into 
existence, transforming into the crucial link between knowledge and power. 
Accordingly, the notion of transformation takes on a meaning that addresses 
itself to the struggle for human emancipation.  Transformation is thus a model 
of focussing on how to involve people (knowledge) in participating in 
democratic discourse (power) about social reality. McKay and Romm (1992: 
60) concur with this view when they argue that, “this penetrates to the very 
root of the struggle: the struggle to invoke people’s ability to appropriate 
knowledge about reality. Without this one cannot speak of democracy, 
because democracy in terms of this model implies the empowerment of 
people to participate in the very definition of what reality is”.     
 
Returning to the early democratic period of education policy formulation, the 
first Minister of Education, Sibusisu Bengu, initiated the most important policy 
framework in 1995, focussing on the work of the Hunter Committee (also 
referred to as the Hunter Commission of Inquiry). Part of its framework was to 
unify the education system of South Africa. Nineteen education departments 
based on race and ethnicity had restricted space within the democratic ethos 
of the South African Constitution and the Bill of Rights. New norms needed to 
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be established to bring coherence into the system of education. New 
legislation was critical to transform not only the racially divided system but 
also the governance of schools. This was imperative in the light of the goals of 
equity and democracy as established by the first White Paper on education. It 
is to this end that the Hunter Committee was instituted.  
 
The Hunter Committee report provided for the organisation, governance and 
funding of education. This led to the production of the South African Schools 
Bill (April 1996), which later became the South African Schools Act 
(November 1996). This Act is based on cooperative school governance and 
calls for school governing bodies to become a major player in schools. All 
stakeholders are part of this governance structure, however, parents should 
be in the majority because they are deemed to have the most interest in their 
children’s education. This would, for the first time, bring about democratically 
representative governance at all schools in South Africa. Although the Act 
emphasised the notion of community participation, it also supports the task of 
equity and redress (I shall return to these issues in chapter three). Some of 
the major functions of a school governing body include: 
 
• The development and adoption of a constitution; 
• adopting a mission statement based on shared beliefs and values; 
• the adoption of a code of conduct for learners and to; 
• help the teaching staff (including the principal) perform their 
professional functions; 
• determine the school’s admission policy, subject to the law; 
• determine the times of a school day consistent with the conditions 
of employment of the staff; 
• administer and control the schools property, buildings and grounds 
and; 
• determine, in collaboration with the broader school community the 
amount of compulsory school fees and draft an annual budget 
(Department of Education 1997: 31).     
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From the outset it was clear that school governance was a politically volatile 
issue and that the prime function of policies was to ensure that hegemonic 
consensus could be engendered (Carrim & Sayed 1997: 92). In relation to this 
Jansen posits that “the result is that policy makers have worked more 
diligently on appearing to improve schooling than on actually doing so” (2001:  
51). So, notwithstanding the democratically developed South African Schools 
Act, by late 1999 the Minister of Education acknowledged that there remains a 
crisis in education. At this stage the gap between policy development and 
policy implementation seems to impact negatively on the transformation 
process particularly in relation to education. This then resulted in “Tirisano” or 
a “Call to Action”, meaning, a race for policy implementation (Jansen 2001a: 
51). This phase on the road to education transformation is still unfolding.  
 
It is, consequently, my considered view that since the early 1990s, the road to 
securing a new education system for South Africa has been a terrain of fierce 
and protracted struggle. This struggle will eventually impact on the manner in 
which schools are governed given the fact that the individual governing bodies 
must ultimately implement these contested policies. 
                       
2.5. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I have expounded on the situation that prevailed while South 
Africa was governed by apartheid rule. I emphasised the impact of this form of 
undemocratic governance on the majority of the population in general and on 
education in particular. I further explored the pendulum movement between 
action and reaction in relation to policy development. I then argued that the 
domain of education was utilised to create a foundation from which was 
launched a broader struggle for democracy. After this I moved on to expound 
on the reasons that drove the 1976 Soweto School Uprisings and its 
concomitant influence on education, including its governance.  
 
The quest for democracy after the Rivonia Trial, I claimed was executed 
under the banner of “People’s Education”. I then moved to the notion of Black 
Consciousness to demonstrate that this concept framed the thinking that 
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changed the mindset of the masses to the extent that it gave direction to this 
struggle. Finally I traced the steps in policy development on both sides of the 
political spectrum and highlighted their influence and ultimate achievement of 
democratic governance, including school governance in South Africa. I framed 
this within the context of cooperation and decentralisation. As I moved along I 
continually made reference to the impact that this historical development had 
on educational governance. I referred to the Black Consciousness Movement 
and its quest to conscientise the masses regarding their right to freedom 
along the lines of inclusion and equality. I moved on to explain how the notion 
of People’s Education framed the mindset of the masses in relation to the 
organising principles of democratic governance with reference to rational 
argumentation and reasoned debate. Furthermore I made a connection 
between the de Lange report, the ERS and the NEPI reports highlighting the 
movement towards decentralisation, co-operative governance based on 
stakeholder participation and the inclusion of them irrespective of race or 
ethnicity. I linked these ideals (of inclusion, rational debate, co-operation and 
deliberation) with the development of democratic school governance in this 
country and argue that such a conceptualisation of governance could possibly 
lead to “stronger” democratic governance. I concluded this chapter by arguing 
that this new form of democratic school governance is still unfolding within a 
domain of contestation.    
 
In the next chapter I shall interpret constitutive features of liberal democracy, 
particularly the concept of representation for the reason that it is my 
understanding that the liberal ideals of democracy is key to the development 
of the South African Schools Act (SASA) and in particular school governance 
policies. Imbedded in the notion of liberal democracy is the interaction 
between the central state and the community, which is underscored by the 
principle of decentralisation. However, I shall argue that such decentralisation 
is not founded on the call for democratic school governance as argued for in 
chapter two. On the contrary the notion of globalisation, which I argue 
potentially leads to “weak” democratic governance structures/practices also 
impacted on school governance policy. It is my understanding that 
globalisation cannot be ignored when one attempts to understand and 
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interpret school governance or any other form of governance for that matter. It 
is my interpretation that globalisation is embedded in the liberal conception of 
democracy, which I argue leads to what may be referred to as “weak 
democracy”. Put differently, it is underpinned by notions of managerialism 
incorporating decentralisation, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, 
corporatisation and so forth. I shall refer to some of these notions in chapter 
three when I explore the effect of globalisation on school governance in South 
Africa. Therefore, I investigate how traces of globalisation impacted upon the 
thinking of particularly policy makers in their quest to provide a policy 
framework for democratic school governance in this country. I then proceed to 
explore the constitutive meanings of liberal democracy emphasising 
representation, participation, freedom, tolerance and accountability.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, 
GLOBALISATION AND SCHOOL GOVERNING BODIES (SGBs) IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I start by linking globalisation to the historical perspective of the 
previous chapter. I then proceed to explain how the notion of globalisation 
came into play in South African politics, particularly relating to educational 
governance. I argue that these traces of globalisation are embedded in a 
conception of liberal democracy. I therefore explore some constitutive 
features of liberal democracy with particular emphasis on representation. I 
argue that such representation has the tendency to undermine and exclude 
the marginalised groups (learners and parents) who serve on the governing 
body. I then produce empirical evidence/case studies to underscore my claim 
that representation, as it occurs within the realm of SGBs, potentially exclude 
the marginalised. I now proceed to make the link between the historical 
perspectives and how it potentially shaped current trends in school 
governance, particularly relating to policy. 
      
We cannot interpret and understand our present without knowing our past. 
History has the uncanny ability to inform about the past (as explained in 
chapter two) but at the same time does not give us answers for the present. 
At best it is left to the individual/society to interpret and derive lessons from 
the past in order to inform (which might explain) the present and even 
potentially influence the future. History consequently helps to inform us in 
order that we may better determine our present and plan our future. It is in this 
regard that the previous chapter analysed the historical development of 
education and how it could potentially have shaped governance policies and 
practices. Linked to this development towards democratic rule in South Africa 
(as explained in chapter two) is a tendency among its citizens to see this 
country as unique in the sense that they were responsible for what is referred 
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to as the South African “political miracle”. Habib and Kotzé posits that for a 
very long time “there was South Africa, then the rest of Africa and, finally the 
rest of the world”. Such a mentality was reinforced by our isolation during the 
apartheid era. On the political front there was “a euphoria” to sustain a belief 
that we could do “our own thing” regardless of prevailing trends in the rest of 
the world (in Mohne & Edigheji 2003: 252-253), with reference to 
globalisation.  
 
The response of the new ANC government to globalisation was to develop the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), informed by Keynesian3 
assumptions and policy prescriptions which moved against the tide of 
developments in the rest of the world. For a while it seemed as if “we were 
different” and that the ANC had earned the right to address our problems, 
inherited from apartheid, in our own way, despite the pressures from local and 
particularly international business (Habib & Kotzé in Edigheji & Mohne 2003: 
253). However, this trend to go it alone was only “allowed” to run for two 
years, for by 1996 pressures from the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund and multinational corporations were increasingly impacting on the 
course of policy, culminating in the adoption of the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) policy. According to Habib and Kotzé this signalled that 
we could not sustain our “going it alone”, that we were not unique and that we 
were party to global forces, particularly concerning policy development (in 
Mohne & Edigheji 2003: 255-256). It is significant that policy developments 
were increasingly being framed by the notion of globalisation.        
 
I made reference to the ERS of the Nationalist apartheid government and the 
NEPI reports by the broad democratic movement (in chapter two) and also 
alluded to the idea that the issues of decentralisation, efficiency, effectiveness 
and finance seemed to constantly filter through. These concepts are also of 
particular importance in shaping the future democratic educational 
governance model in South Africa. The proposal that decentralisation in 
particular should inform future policy was not taken in isolation, for it 
                                                          
3 Policy based on strong social development including poverty relieve, access to clean piped water, 
electricity, health facilities and a social grant to ensure socio-economic justice. 
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resonated well with the agenda of the South African business sector (Weber 
2002: 621). Furthermore decentralisation was at this stage a buzzword in 
terms of educational, political and social developments outside the borders of 
this country. Weber claims that South Africa’s clamour for decentralisation 
(both from the Nationalist government as well as the broader democratic 
movement) as a vision for future democratic governance structures was 
consistent with “roughly contemporaneous reforms in England and Wales, 
Australia, New Zealand, Holland, the United States, Brazil, Chile and 
elsewhere” (Weber 2002: 621). Considering such a claim, I contend that 
decentralisation’s impact on policy development was, therefore, not restricted 
to policy formulation in South Africa alone. On the contrary it seems to have 
an international underpinning. This worldwide phenomenon, according to 
McLennan, is motivated in part by a political rationale to improve democratic 
participation, but also as an attempt to share the growing costs of education 
provision. “However, it is also linked to a managerialist trend to make 
education services more responsive and accountable to the communities they 
serve” (in Mhone & Edigheji 2003: 186).  In relation to the ERS, as well as the 
NEPI proposals regarding transformation/decentralisation of education 
governance, one finds a strong resonance with the principles that informed 
government policy in the Australian state of Victoria during 1992–1996. 
Pascoe and Pascoe list some of these principles when they claim that there 
is: 
 
• a preference for market mechanisms in the provision of public 
services; 
• a focus on clear accountability for results for public agencies; 
• the empowering of consumers/stakeholders of public services; 
• the minimising of government bureaucracy for consumers and 
• a professional and business-like management of public agencies 
(Pascoe & Pascoe 1998: iv). 
 
In making sense of these principles (from beyond our borders) I form the view 
that it, in the very least, had a bearing on education policy development in 
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South Africa. In this regard Weber claims that there is an international context: 
“as in many other countries, decentralisation, ‘rolling back the state’, 
privatisation, increased racial and class disparity and greater parental 
governance responsibilities, have been persistent themes and overall 
outcomes of the new education legislation” of South Africa (2002: 618). 
Although educational governance and the transformation process (policy 
development) is a national issue, it seems to be intertwined with international 
developments. My reasoning therefore is that international developments had 
a bearing on education policy development and the transformation process in 
South Africa. I shall argue that such international developments under the 
banner of globalisation informed policy on the one hand and guided 
governance practices along weak democratic lines on the other. To support 
my reasoning for such an argument I turn to Young who posits that, “… all 
countries regardless of their history or stage of development have to confront 
similar forces of globalisation and their impact on national economies” (in 
Young & Kraak 2001: 19). In other words globalisation’s influence on the 
economy would invariably impact upon the type and amount of resources that 
would be available for education. I now turn to a discussion of globalisation. 
 
3.2.1. GLOBALISATION AND SCHOOL GOVERNANCE POLICY 
 
Economists, sociologists, political theorists and politicians all over the world 
have noted that the world has undergone significant change since particularly 
the 1970s. Most, if not all, claim that the significance of such changes is 
equivalent to the industrial revolution. The crux of these changes involves the 
formation of an international market economy ruled by multi-national 
corporations (Isaacs 1997: 10). The international economic crisis of the 1970s 
with its concomitant erosion of welfare policies framed or at least influenced 
the neo-liberal agenda which drives globalisation. The major proponents of 
such market oriented views (Friedman and Hayek – two economic Nobel 
Laureates) argue that market capitalism has the potential to rescue poor 
communities/countries from their plight. Influenced by my research, I 
therefore, argue that globalisation has its roots in capitalism which boomed 
after the Industrial Revolution and the Second World War. Both of these 
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events secured stronger economic ties between countries. In much the same 
vain others argue that the developments within the world economy during the 
1970s represent a turning point, shifting capitalism to its next phase. This new 
phase or process is called globalisation. Nyamnjoh posits that while 
international flows of capital, consumer goods, people, and products of culture 
and knowledge could be traced back to when humankind first attempted the 
domestication of time and space, it is generally agreed that the rapid 
advances in communication and information technologies of the last 20 years 
have had the greatest impact on the process (in Hoogvelt 1997: 20). Will 
Hutton in conversation with Anthony Giddens posits that this change “is 
different in the sense that change is all-encompassing and carries a new 
inevitability; its momentum is a superior power to any other, even that of the 
state" (in Hutton & Giddens 2001: 2). I deduce from his view that the effect of 
globalisation seems to be wide-ranging and all-embracing to the extent that it 
infiltrates every aspect of human life. It seemingly invades our political, social, 
economic and cultural interactions in such a way that people all over the world 
will in some way be affected by it. Hutton further reinforces this view when he 
claims that globalisation is so powerful because of the sense that there is no 
escape, meaning one is confronted with its influence irrespective of one's 
geographic location. In this regard it evokes responses across a spectrum 
from those who on the one hand defend it (like Giddens) as the answer to the 
problems of the world, meaning it cannot be stopped or even retarded by 
virtue of its inevitability; to those (like Hawken and Vivienne Forrester) who 
contest it, and predict that it would lead to mayhem and social dislocation 
(Hutton & Giddens 2001: 2).  
 
But how can globalisation be defined; put differently, what do we mean by 
globalisation? Giddens posits that globalisation is “the intensification of 
worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away, and vice versa” 
(1990: 63-68). He further claims that: “globalisation refers to transformations 
happening on the level of everyday life” (Hutton & Giddens 2001: 2). This 
interpretation of globalisation reinforces my earlier argument that education 
policy development in South Africa had an international context, meaning it 
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was shaped by “events occurring miles away”. What is more enlightening to 
me is the claim that “transformations happen on the level of everyday life”. 
This creates the space for the day to day functioning of school governing 
bodies within a framework of global influences. Nzimande (in the foreword of 
Kallaway et al. 1997) claims that globalisation is the transformation of the 
world into a single market that is controlled by multi-national companies, 
traditionally emanating from the developed countries of the north. In his 
interpretation it seems as if globalisation has its origins within developed 
economies from where it possibly influenced less developed countries. If one 
considers that South Africa is a developing economy, and Nzimande’s words 
hold true, then one may argue that education governance policy was shaped 
by the developed economies in collaboration with what he refers to as multi-
national companies. I shall address this issue later on when I refer to the role 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.                 
 
It is my perception that a conspicuous change in relation to education came in 
the movement from a Keynesian mode of governance that emphasised 
employment security, state welfare provisions including health and education 
towards a more globalised mode where multi-national corporations through 
their economic clout could influence policies within the boundaries of nation 
states. In this regard Lingard posits that: “the globalisation of the economy 
has reduced the apparent policy tools of national governments, destabilised 
the postwar (Keynesian emphasis) policy settlement, and witnessed the 
restructuring of the mechanisms for delivery of a different range of policies. 
Such a different range of policies included the “reduction in corporate tax 
levels and a meaner and leaner welfare system” (in Burbules & Torres 2000: 
83-84). What this means is that policy (including education policy) should be 
geared towards the production of clearly stipulated outcomes at the lowest 
possible cost. This is in line with a neo-liberal interpretation which utilises 
globalisation as a mechanism to execute its objectives by emphasising the 
privatisation and marketisation of state enterprises based upon minimum 
expenditure to gain maximum profits.  
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Under pressure from the International Monetary fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), developing economies 
(such as South Africa) had to ensure a reduction in state public expenditure 
on particularly welfare, health and education. The motivation for complying 
with reforming education policies was the pledge by these organisations of 
financial aid. Giving practical expression to this pressure, education 
transformation in South Africa included the retrenchment of thousands of 
educators under the guise of redeployment. Class sizes increased with higher 
teacher/learner ratios becoming prescribed by legislation. This was done 
under the mantel of “efficiency” and “cost effectiveness” and the claim that it 
would enable a movement towards equity and redress. The retrenchment 
packages of “redundant” teachers were subsequently partially funded by First 
World economies. Such evidence underscores the view that traces of 
globalisation influenced education policy, by succumbing to a call for a 
reduction in state funding on the one hand and implementing “sound 
economic principles” in the “management “ of education on the other. This 
brings me to the role of globalisation on school governance policy in 
particular. 
 
3.2.2. TRANSFORMING PROPOSALS INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
          SCHOOLS ACT 
 
In this section I shall review the basic provisions of the South African Schools 
Act (SASA) in relation to the market as driven by globalisation in order to 
further illustrate how the neo-liberal agenda shaped education policy in South 
Africa. Prior to the development of the SASA (later referred to as the Act) the 
ANC government instituted the Hunter Commission of Inquiry to investigate, 
inform and make recommendations to government on the “organisation, 
governance and funding” of schools. In keeping with the “Hunter Report” 
recommendations, two categories of schools were recognised, and these are 
public schools and independent schools. All public schools, according to the 
Act, shall institute and be governed by school governing bodies. This 
constitutes a major shift from past policy where governance of schools was 
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heavily centralised and vested in the state. It represents a shift in power from 
the central state to the community surrounding a particular school, meaning to 
a level where the power of governance had not previously existed. In essence 
the Act gave expression to the demand for democratic participation in 
education, which travelled a long and arduous road (as elucidated in chapter 
2). Central to these struggles were that school based decision making should 
include all those with a vested interest in schooling. So when the Act 
legitimised school governing bodies and included all legitimate role-players, 
one may be forgiven to presuppose that the democratic ideal (which the 
previously marginalised masses clamoured for) in relation to school 
governance had been achieved. However, it is my view that with closer 
scrutiny one realises that school governance included more than what the 
previously disenfranchised masses bargained for. With this devolution of 
power came responsibilities, including financial responsibilities, which I argue 
would impact on poor communities’ ability to gain access to education thus 
reinforcing my argument towards weak democracy.               
          
The SASA rejected the three models4 of school finance proposed by the 
Hunter Commission who favoured an interim arrangement leading to a 
situation where payment of school fees would be optional. Instead, the SASA 
instituted the recommendations of two “private consultants” (Colclough & 
Crouch) made during the policy formulation process (Pampallis in Weber 
2002: 629). According to this law parents were obliged to pay school fees (as 
determined by the general council of the school governing body). 
Decentralising the power to determine fees would reinforce collective 
decision-making and, so Shaeffer argues, would create a sense of community 
ownership of schooling thus leading to local communities becoming more 
willing to share the costs of education delivery (in Mhone & Edigheji 2003: 
186). This determination of paying fees can be linked to the reality that market 
forces would in future determine the cost of schooling, transforming schooling 
                                                          
4 The minimalist-gradualist approach which would allow most existing governing bodies to continue to 
function including ex-Model C schools. The equitable school-based formula which is similar to the 
previous approach but argues for equal per capita expenditure and prohibits schools from raising 
additional funds. The partnership approach includes an equal per capita expenditure, but the state’s 
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into becoming a commodity that has to be purchased. Sayed posits that this 
educational marketplace does not operate on the classic model of supply and 
demand. He claims that:  
 
User fees reflect the deregulation of educational provision and ensure 
that the quality of a good education is correlative of the price that is 
paid. The worth of the educational product is thus secured in the 
exchange of its value (1997: 359). 
 
Realising that marketisation could seriously affect the education possibilities 
of poor communities in South Africa, the SASA included a sub-clause giving 
the Minister of Education the power to set “equitable criteria allowing parents 
who are unable to pay school fees to be granted degrees of exemption or in 
certain cases total exemption”. Notwithstanding such an inclusion, it is 
pertinent in this regard that the rationale of economic austerity under the 
influence of a market driven economy comes into play, reinforcing my 
argument for traces of globalisation in education policy. I also argue that the 
sub-clause regarding “exemption of fees” is to counter an interpretation of a 
weaker democracy for the reason that it reinforces exclusion. So, in order to 
include all stakeholders the “criteria” was devised. I conclude that charging 
school fees would allow the state to save on one aspect of school funding with 
the view to utilise such savings for redressing past inequities; a position that 
was stated prior to “redeployment”. This would be in line with what the NEPI 
proposals in relation to equity and redress called for. Sayed, however, posits 
that “there is no indication in the SASA or any other government policy text 
that savings effected from user fees will be used for redress and equity 
concerns” (1999: 146). The point is that the contestation (between the ERS of 
the former regime and the NEPI reports of the mass democratic movement) to 
determine policy content seems to lean towards the proposals of the ERS that 
emphasised cost effectiveness and efficiency (both managerialist notions of 
globalisation).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
commitment to operating costs is reduced depending on parental contribution (Department of 
Education, 1995b).   
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The ERS understood the education problems of that time (during legislated 
apartheid) in politically-neutral, technical, and managerial and business terms 
(Weber 2002: 622). According to Collins and Gillespie this becomes 
problematic because “such an approach insists on being value-free and 
objective". Furthermore, such an approach “is based on a Human Capital 
thesis and relies mainly on manpower planning and an instrumentalist view of 
education” (1993: 36). With such an approach key issues including the 
redress of past inequalities, the redistribution of resources and dealing with 
poverty (all issues that NEPI raised), are ignored. My sentiments are 
consequently with the reasoning of Collins and Gillespie for the reason that I 
understand the “instrumentalist view” in this sense to mean that good schools 
(incorporating the sound collection and management of school fees – both 
functions of SGBs) would be those schools that are profitably managed in 
accordance with market principles thus not being dissimilar to corporate 
managerialism. In short, education for national development, effective and 
efficient management, accountability, shared responsibility and equity 
underpinned the approach to education governance in South Africa. These 
notions are in line with the “instrumentalist” ideal, emphasising the “external 
good” of education. Waghid posits that such an approach “is to justify 
education (governance) according to empirically verifiable extrinsic reasons … 
that ignore the reasons constitutive to education” (2002: 11). This is 
problematic because it relies on “results” and does not consider its 
participants, with reference to the previously mentioned “marginalised 
masses”. Peters cautions against such an approach when he posits that:  
 
This of course, is not an entirely irrelevant or immoral way of looking at 
a practice. But if it predominates a widespread and insidious type of 
corruption ensues. For the point of view of the participants in a practice 
becomes of decreasing importance. They are regarded basically as 
vehicles for the promotion of public benefit (in Hirst & White 1998:213). 
   
I raise the issue and particularly emphasise its possibility to corruption and the 
decreasing emphasis on the “humans” involved. The point is that globalisation 
and the instrumentalist approach has the tendency to undermine the human 
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element under the guise of efficiency and effectiveness. Issues relating 
directly to the human element, such as the redressing of past inequalities, the 
redistribution of resources and dealing with poverty, get lost in the maze of 
technical, managerial and sound business principles, based on the argument 
that in this way society would ultimately benefit. This approach I claim 
reinforces weak democracy for the reason that instead of “inclusion” (a 
principle that “decentralisation” strives for) the outcome is “exclusion”. 
     
The South African Schools Act thus reflected a worldwide trend to transfer 
powers to communities on the assumption that it would enhance democracy 
and deliver the stated aims, at the lowest possible cost to the state. A 
combination of globalisation, and a particular historical context, seems to have 
strained policy development and, therefore, governance and transformation 
within schools. Such strains reinforce a claim for weak democracy.  
 
With reference to this historical context, 46 years of apartheid left the majority 
of South Africans to live below the “poverty line”, insufficiently educated, 
inadequately housed (if at all) with little or no access to electricity and clean 
piped water and also deprived of uncomplicated access to health facilities. 
Addressing such socio-economic inconsistencies would seem to be the 
natural response of a government serious about socio-economic justice, that 
came to power on a broad base of popular support that embodied the hopes 
and expectations of the millions of poor citizens of this country (Habib & Kotzé 
in Mohne & Edigheji 2003: 253). The resulting Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) was premised on state led development 
incorporating an attack on poverty alleviation with massive state initiated 
employment projects, as well as broadening welfare provisions including 
health and education. However, as earlier stated, this project which could 
potentially have intensified the ability of millions of South Africans to become 
“free” from the shackles of poverty thus reinforcing a strong democracy, was 
shelved for the GEAR policy with its resultant weak democratic 
consequences. Habib & Padayachee posits that GEAR has had a devastating 
effect on the lives of millions of poor and low-income families. They further 
claim that: 
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The ANC’s implementation of neo-liberal economic policies has meant 
disaster for the vast majority of South Africa’s poor. Increasing 
unemployment and economic inequalities associated with neo-liberal 
policies have also pushed even more of South Africa’s population into 
the poverty trap (in Mohne & Edigheji 2003: 257).      
 
The international connection in the form of neo-liberal ideology in macro-
economic policy and education governance, which I attempted to expose, 
culminated in what Weber refers to as “more a continuation with the apartheid 
past than a break with it” (2002: 635. My italics). While the SASA is intent on 
giving parents powers previously denied them, those powers came with 
constraining responsibilities, which I argue further marginalises the millions of 
poor in this country. It is these millions whose children would have to access 
the schooling system where more financial responsibilities would come to 
bear. Furthermore, it is also these poor who would have the responsibility of 
driving school governance policies transforming it into practice. My concern is 
that it seems that such an expectation is unrealistic under the present 
conditions. It is, therefore, my understanding that unless governance is 
framed within a context of democratic citizenship it would seemingly be 
trapped in a frame of weak democratic practices. Put differently, cultivating a 
particular type of citizen has the potential to make them more critical and thus 
imbue them with the potential to identify their restricted ability to participate in 
democratic structures. Such a realisation has the potential to lead them onto a 
path of reflecting and reconstructing the “democratic” landscape in order that 
they may reasonably participate on a more equal basis. Democratic 
citizenship, therefore, has the potential to lead to stronger democracy. I shall 
address this issue in more detail in chapter four. I now move to an exposition 
of my understanding of what incorporates a conception of representative 
democracy. 
 
3.2.3.1. A CONCEPTION OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
A classical conception of liberal democracy may be summarised in the view 
espoused by Jagger (1983: 40) when he claims that: 
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The liberal assumption (is) that human individuals are essentially 
solitary, with needs and interests that are separate from if not in 
opposition to those of other individuals. This assumption is the starting 
point of liberal theory. It generates what liberals take to be the 
fundamental question of political philosophy: what are the 
circumstances in which essentially solitary individuals might agree to 
come together in civil society, what would justify them in doing so and 
how might conflict be prevented when they do so? 
 
Jagger’s interpretation that individuals are “essentially solitary” and separate 
from other individuals, confirms classical (seventeenth century) liberalism’s 
insistence with a “non-associated individual” who disregards the societal 
impact. My interpretation goes beyond this view and would rather incorporate 
an understanding of a “socially positioned individual”. By this I mean the 
individual cannot be divorced from the society within which he interacts and 
socialises. To clarify my stance I turn to Waghid who posits that: “If one 
accepts that individuals’ goals and interests are products of social interactions 
such as political decision making, then the classical view that individuals are 
pre-social seems to be misconceived” (2003a: 35). In this sense, individuals 
who participate in school governance are influenced by and influence others 
who serve in the same context. Put differently, it is unlikely that actions within 
a confined space (such as a SGB) can be solely individual, without other 
individuals (within the same space) not having a bearing on the actions of the 
individual. The individual in the SGB system is thus socially positioned and 
consequently cannot escape the social interaction and its resulting influences. 
It is within such a frame of social interaction that I situate my understanding of 
representative democracy as a strand of liberalism. 
           
In a democracy there are many opposing views as to the path that should 
politically be embarked upon thus reflecting the different interests and beliefs 
of the broad society (political community). Regarding democracy as a 
representative system I turn to Macpherson who distinguishes between three 
models of representative forms of decision-making, which include Western- 
liberal democracy, non-liberal Communist democracy and non-liberal, non-
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Communist democracy. However, I refer to the one that has a direct bearing 
on this dissertation, meaning Western liberal democracy, where Macpherson 
posits that: 
 
Western liberal democracy was brought into being to serve the need of 
a competitive market society – a product of successfully developing 
capitalist market societies. Liberal representative democracy created 
by capitalism relocates power and domination from the state to civil 
society, to private property and the compulsions of the market. It is a 
kind of liberal democracy that accentuates the predominance of 
individual rights over collective rights, power of the people over any 
other regulatory institution and equal rights for all citizens (1966: 35). 
 
In this view liberal democracy accentuates individual rights over collective 
rights as well as the devolution of power from central government to “the 
people”. I have earlier argued that it is within such a conception of democracy 
that school governing policies were galvanised. According to Miller, in his 
exposition on deliberative democracy and social choice, the problem is to find 
the structure that best meets the requirements of equality and efficiency, 
meaning how to reach a fair and efficient compromise given the many 
conflicting preferences expressed by the political community (Miller 2000: 9). 
In the liberal conception of democracy each individual’s preference should be 
granted equal weight. The aim of democracy from a liberal perspective is thus 
to combine individual preferences into a collective choice in as fair and 
efficient a way as possible (Miller 2000: 9). This should, however, be 
accomplished within the rationale of the liberal ideal which emphasises the 
role/preference of the individual. The idea is consequently to aggregate the 
individual views in such a way that all are comfortable with the final outcome. 
This collective view is then presented via a representative who speaks on 
behalf of “the people”. Stromberg posits that, “ … democracy insists that every 
citizen must be directly involved as an active participant in decisions affecting 
the community, otherwise it isn’t democracy, but a travesty of it” (1996: 169). I 
agree with Stromberg in relation to his call for involvement and participating in 
the decision making process, however, his insistence on the involvement of 
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every citizen is problematic. The term citizen may refer to those who have the 
right to vote. In a representative system this does not translate into those who 
may not vote becoming non-citizens. On the contrary they still enjoy 
representation and may influence decisions under specific circumstances, 
such as an SGB. In this regard, an understanding of what constitutes a citizen 
is required (an issue that I address in chapter four). The understanding of 
liberal representative democracy as interpreted by Macpherson, Miller and 
Stromberg invokes concepts such as participation, freedom, tolerance and 
accountability, which are all constitutive features of representative democracy. 
Before I explore these concepts, I explain how the SASA reflects the 
representative model. 
 
The South African Schools Act (SASA) favours the representative model of 
democracy, incorporating all “stakeholders” in the education process. The 
major stakeholders, according to SASA, are the learners, teachers, non-
teaching staff, parents and other “co-opted” community based individuals 
together with the school principal. The learner representative needs to be 
officially enrolled at the school at a level not lower than grade eight, and has 
to be an elected member of the school’s Representative Council of Learners 
(RCL). The teacher/educator representative should be officially employed by 
the Education Department and be a registered member of the South African 
Council of Educators (SACE). The teacher representative must also be 
elected from within the educator corpse of the school. The non-teaching staff 
representative (not an educator) has to be employed as a member of staff 
whose duties involve issues other than teaching. This representative also 
needs to be elected, but only non-educators who are officially employed at the 
school may participate in the election of this representative. The parents 
whose children are officially registered at the school elect the parent 
representatives. A parent can also be a guardian or any person who fulfils the 
role of ensuring a learner’s education. The elected members of the governing 
body may co-opt two members from the surrounding school community, but 
such members do not have voting powers. The principal gains space on the 
governing body by virtue of his position, meaning that the principal is not 
elected. The parent representatives have to outnumber the other 
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representatives by one (excluding the co-opted members). In other words if 
the governing body should have 12 members, then the parent grouping must 
be 7. One may reasonably dispute the composition of the governing body that 
predetermines a majority for parents and an appointed principal on 
democratic principles, but this is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I raise 
the point simply because there seems to be a bias towards the parents as a 
representative group, meaning that they are favoured in cases where 
decisions can only be instituted via voting. This, the other representative 
groups may argue, is less democratic, or alternatively the governance 
structure undermines the democratic process.  
 
It should by now be reasonably clear that the liberal conception of democracy 
favours representation. Representative democracy generally means that 
collective deliberations concerning the whole community are taken by people 
elected for this purpose and not directly by the members of that community.  I 
now proceed to explore two forms of representation that have a direct bearing 
on SGBs. I include the conception of accountability in this discussion, after 
which I shall explore the constitutive features of participation, freedom and 
tolerance that I mentioned earlier. 
 
3.2.3.2. REPRESENTATION WITH REGARD TO SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
 
I introduce the notion of representation by turning to Hobbes who posits that a 
representative is an individual who acts in the name of another, meaning that 
he/she has been given the authority/power to act by that other, so that 
whatever the representative does is considered the act of the represented 
(Hobbes in Pitkin 1969: 8). This view holds that representation is authority. 
Put differently, it is the right given to the representative to make commitments 
and to incur consequences for another. However, Hobbes does not refer to 
consulting those who are being represented about their ideals, or about 
protecting their interests or of being responsible to them. For this reason 
political theorists claim that, “Hobbes missed the very essence of 
representation because representation is when a representative is 
responsible to those for whom he acts. Conceding to Hobbes’ interpretation 
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would mean that representation has nothing to do with democracy, public 
interest or self-government. On the contrary Rousseau claims the practice (of 
representation) to be a form of 'tyranny' if it does not guarantee that the 
“representative’s will coincides with the will of the represented” (in Pitkin 1969: 
9). Now conforming to such a lofty ideal (as suggested by Rousseau) is 
impractical since in order for representation to claim some form of legitimacy, 
one needs to look at discovering when individuals feel that they are being 
represented.  
 
Put differently, what may reasonably count as evidence for representation? In 
this regard representation is an activity which entails responsiveness to the 
represented, attending to their aims and ideals. In short accountability 
becomes the essence of representation, meaning that the representative acts 
in the interest of his/her constituency. In other words the representative is 
more cautious when acting on behalf of others, considering their interests 
above his/her own. In such an understanding of representation the 
representative is seen as the subordinate, while those being represented is 
dominant. Pitkin posits that “we are expected to act as if we would eventually 
have to account for our actions. Thus we ought to have reasons for what we 
do, and be prepared to justify our actions to those we act for …” (1967: 119). 
It is such an understanding of representation that interests me, for it is my 
understanding that representative accountability underscores the type of 
representation within SGBs. The notion that “representation is a relationship 
that involves trust and obligation” on the part of the representative as well as 
the represented is critical (Pitkin 1967: 128). The activity of representation as 
played out in school governance relates to what the representative does and 
how he/she determined that what he/she did was in the interest of those 
whom he/she represents. This goes to the heart of how the electorate is being 
represented, bringing into play the mandate-independence controversy. Put 
differently, should the representative on the SGB be bound by mandates or 
should he/she be free to act as seems best to him/her in pursuit of the 
electorate’s welfare? In this regard Bobbio argues for two types of 
representation. I refer to his theory to clarify this point (Bobbio 1987: 47): 
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How does A represent B? A can represent B either in the role of a 
delegate or in the role of a “fiduciary”. If it is a delegate, A is purely and 
simply a spokesperson, an ambassador, an emissary, a messenger of 
those he represents, and thus the scope of the mandate is extremely 
restricted and revocable ad nutum. If on the other hand, A is in the 
position of fiduciary, this confers the power to act with a certain 
independence in the name of and on behalf of those represented. 
 
With regard to school governance, a conception of “pure” mandation curtails 
compromise which is essential, given that different stakeholders (parents, 
teachers and learners) are being represented. Representation as a “delegate” 
who is bound to a mandate undermines democracy because the outcome 
(mandate) precedes whatever discussion may arise. Put differently, 
notwithstanding convincing arguments against the mandate, the 
representative is bound to that mandate, thus rendering discussion obsolete. I 
am thus more attracted to Bobbio’s “fiduciary” where the representative has “a 
certain” independence. My understanding of “certain” in this respect leads to a 
more moderate position where the representative may exercise some 
discretion, but his/her actual judgement should be such that it does not incur 
irreconcilable conflict with those represented. Implicit in this understanding is 
that the representative is still answerable to his/her constituency, again 
bringing into play the notion of accountability. Pitkin (1967: 224) reinforces this 
view when he claims that: “The representative system must look after the 
interest and be responsive to public opinion, except insofar as no-
responsiveness can be justified in terms of the public interest”. Within the 
context of school governance this creates a space for deliberation and 
compromise, which I argue, are prerequisites for addressing conflict. It is my 
view that the composition of SGBs seems to be a recipe for conflict because 
each representative is bound to “deliver” to his/her stakeholder group. For 
democracy such conflict is not necessarily bad, for it incorporates the notions 
of deliberation, compromise, understanding and consensus. I shall address 
the link between power and representation when I account for actual school 
governing body practices. I now explore the concepts that I referred to earlier 
in this chapter.                      
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• Participation 
 
A representative democracy cannot exist without participation. The manner in 
which participation manifests itself has a direct bearing on school governance 
and the practice of democracy. Two requirements are of paramount 
importance in the participatory system of governance. On the one hand, in a 
representative democracy, all members will not take part (participate) in the 
finale decision-making process. The ideal is that all members be allowed to 
debate and submit their concerns directly (participate) to the representative 
who shall be party to the development of a decision. On the other hand, a 
participatory democracy is also a form of direct democracy. This stems from 
the principle that individual members have the right to air their views on the 
debated issue before a decision is implemented. In this regard Pateman 
posits that: “Participatory democracy … is built around the assertion that 
individuals and their institutions (SGBs) cannot be considered in isolation from 
one another …” (1970: 41). She argues that the development of democratic 
attitudes and qualities in the individual depends on “maximum participation” in 
all spheres of society because, the development of democratic attitudes and 
qualities, “takes place through the process of participation itself” (Pateman 
1970: 42). I emphasise the idea of “all spheres of society” for it brings to the 
fore an understanding that participation is a movement towards the protection 
of, and respect for individuals outside of the SGB structure, meaning those 
individuals who rely on a representative to further their cause. The right of 
participation, therefore, affords community members the opportunity to 
influence outcomes in a forum (the SGB) where they are not physically 
present to do so. Participation subsequently makes it possible for the broader 
school community to impact on decisions which affect their lives, albeit via 
representation. Pateman further claims that each individual member of a 
decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of a 
decision (1970: 7). The inference here is the invocation to rational debate 
prior to determining a particular decision, which permits the understanding 
that participation may be linked to notions of freedom, tolerance, responsibility 
and accountability; all features of representative democracy as earlier stated. 
It is consequently clear that within the context of school governance, 
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participation as a constitutive feature of representation is paramount. Put 
differently, without participation representation cannot fulfil in the ideal of 
democracy.      
 
• Freedom 
 
Before I explore the notion of freedom I need to first locate myself in terms of 
debates surrounding this concept, meaning that liberal theorists are not all 
agreed on what freedom entails or should entail. There is a tendency among 
liberals to deny that freedom is a “fundamental good”. They argue that one 
should distinguish between “specific freedoms” and “overall freedom”. In this 
sense specific freedom refers to having the freedom to do (act) something 
specific, like to stand or to speak or to practice your trade. Overall freedom is 
the amount of freedom one has in either absolute or relative terms, meaning it 
is an aggregation/combination of one’s specific freedoms. Dworkin (a “specific 
freedom” promoter) argues that liberty cannot be some sort of commodity (a 
fundamental good), “as if we could say that one restriction of freedom were 
more undesirable than another on the grounds that in the first case the 
amount of that commodity taken away … is, for some reason, either greater in 
amount or greater in its import than the second” (1979: 172). The inference 
here is towards a measurement: “For liberty is not something which can be 
taken to be even roughly measurable” (Dworkin 1985: 189). Oppenheim 
endorses this view and claims that for this reason (immeasurability) freedoms 
cannot be aggregated, meaning there is no such thing as “overall freedom”. 
He further posits that freedom is a relational concept. Put differently, it 
expresses a relation between an “agent” who is free to perform a specific 
“action”. To imagine that various specific freedom relations can somehow be 
combined into overall measures of freedom is to treat liberty like a commodity” 
(Oppenheim in Carter 1999: 19). However, Benn and Peters state that: “liberty 
is not a commodity to be weighed and measured. I am free to do x, y and z, 
but not p, q, and r – but there is no substance called freedom of which I can 
therefore possess more or less (in Carter 1999: 19). To further clarify this view 
I turn to Kristjánsson who agrees that freedom is a “relation,” and not a 
commodity or property. He posits that: “freedom is not something that one 
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happens to possess or stumble across like a chest of gold, it is a relation 
between agents” (1996: 11). The point is that these theorists argue that there 
is no such “thing” as “freedom as such” (overall freedom) because the term 
freedom describes a relation between agents and should not be taken to refer 
to a “thing”. If this argument for “specific freedoms” as opposed to “overall 
freedom” holds true, then the obvious question would be: what specific 
freedoms? The obvious answer might be those ideals which are constitutive 
of liberalism, meaning in Dworkin’s terms, treating people/individuals with 
equal concern and respect. According to Carter this translates into 
concentrating on giving people the “right” liberties (1999: 20). Rawls endorses 
this view when he posits that no priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if 
something called “liberty” has a pre-eminent value and is the main if not the 
sole end of political and social justice (1970: 302).        
 
Kymlicka also agrees that overall freedom (freedom as such) is not one of the 
foundational values of liberalism. The emphasis is, therefore, on giving 
individuals the freedom to do “specific things” (specific freedoms) that should 
be justified by reference to values other than freedom. Kymlicka explains that: 
 
We don’t answer (the) question (of how valuable specific freedoms are) 
by determining which liberties contain more or less of a single 
commodity called “freedom”. … For the reason it is important to be free 
in a particular situation is not the amount of freedom it provides, but the 
importance of the various interests it serves. … The idea of freedom as 
such (overall freedom), and lesser or greater amounts of it, does no 
work in political argument (1990: 145-151). 
 
The overall claim by these theorists is consequently that firstly, there is no 
such thing as “overall freedom”, secondly, that if there is it cannot be 
measured and thirdly that there is no point in measuring “overall freedom” 
(Carter 1999: 21). Following from this, if someone claims that he/she have 
freedom, the logical response should be, “freedom to do what?” and “freedom 
with respect to whom?” because freedom on its own does not refer to 
anything. 
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 For the purpose of this dissertation I shall employ the concept freedom in the 
“specific freedom” sense. This, however, is not to say that one should 
dispense with the notion of “overall freedom”, for Carter in his work on “A 
Measure of Freedom” convincingly argues that “overall freedom” (freedom as 
such) can and should be measured if libertarians want to do justice to the 
concept of freedom.  
 
I have shown that “freedom” is a contested term, meaning that to formulate a 
definition becomes problematic. Having located myself in relation to the 
debate, I now explore the concept freedom without seeking to define it. 
 
Our normal expectation of a person is that he is a chooser. Being a chooser is 
a standard expected of everyone – which is related to norms of rationality. 
Thus the individual, being aware of rules which structure his social life, subject 
such rules to reflection and criticism to form a code of conduct (Peters in 
Doyle 1975: 123-124). From this one may deduce a freedom of choice that 
each rational individual may exhibit. The democratic form of governance is 
taken as the condition for human freedom, where freedom is conceived in 
terms of the liberty of individuals to do as they choose without external 
constraints (Gould 1990: 31-32). Put differently, freedom is the absence of 
certain preventing conditions on agents’ possible actions. Interpreting this 
understanding of freedom, democracy is a system of rule where freedom is at 
its utmost and constraints (to ensure social order) are by mutual consent. 
Peters reinforces this view when he argues that, “freedom does not mean the 
acceptance of constraints. It is just a general empirical fact that the 
acceptance of some form of constraint by all is necessary for the avoidance of 
more grievous forms of constraint by some others” (in Doyle 1975: 121). From 
this follows some sort of relationship between “freedom” and “constraint” 
(preventing conditions). Regarding this tension Birch posits: 
 
The inherent importance of liberty to human beings arises from the fact 
that they are essentially choosing creatures, constantly taking 
decisions about how they want to act. The limitations on freedom arise 
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from the fact that human beings are also social creatures, constrained 
in their choices by all kinds of social pressures (1993: 96). 
 
In terms of my earlier argument, it is these social pressures that inform the 
notion of “specific freedoms”, for the reason that the social order shall 
collectively determine what shall involve (according to Dworkin) the “right” 
liberties. Benn and Peters also suggest that, “in general, when we say a 
person is free, we mean that, if a person wants to do something, he will not be 
impeded by some kind of constraint or limitation” (in Gould 1990: 35). I use 
the terms liberty and freedom interchangeably creating the impression that 
they are synonymous. Arend (in Birch 1993: 95), however, suggests that, “in a 
political context the terms are commonly used in slightly different ways, with 
liberty more likely to be used when the writer means the absence of restraint 
and freedom more likely to be used when the writer means the opportunity to 
engage in some activity, such as political participation”. Berlin utilises the 
same terms, meaning freedom when he refers to the concept of positive 
liberty, and liberty when he refers to the negative concept of liberty. What is 
evident is the distinct difference between Berlin’s positive and negative liberty. 
Birch (1993: 96) elaborates on this interpretation and claims that: “On the one 
hand liberty has been defined as freedom for the individual to do whatever he 
or she wants to do; in short, that liberty is the absence of restraint. This is the 
negative concept of liberty. On the other hand, liberty has been asserted to be 
freedom to do things that are worth doing, to engage in self-development, to 
have a share in the government of one’s society. This is positive liberty. I 
should emphasise that my attraction is to the positive conception of liberty for 
the reason that it endorses the idea of self-development.  
 
In relation to “self-development” Gould explains that the concept of freedom 
should be understood more broadly than the absence of external constraints. 
She argues that “not only for the absence of external constraint, but also for 
the availability of social and material conditions necessary for the 
achievement of purposes or plans” (1990: 32). She claims that the traditional 
view of freedom (negative freedom) fails to address two key features:   
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1. It ignores the contemporary requirement, or alternatively the “enabling 
conditions” that the means necessary for the realisation of a choice 
should be available. In other words the material and social means for 
realising purposes are essential to freedom.  
2. It omits from consideration the development of a person over time, 
meaning the individuals ability to realise long-term plans.   
 
Basically, she argues for “negative freedom” which is not identical to the 
ability to make a choice, for someone could make a choice without having the 
ability to carry out that action. The “action” depends on the availability of the 
“enabling conditions”. Put differently, one may be free from external constraint 
(by others) and yet not be free to realise one’s purpose, because the 
necessary or enabling conditions or the means to activate that choice is not 
available (Gould 1990: 31-38). While it might seem as if this is a contestation 
of Berlin's notion of “negative freedom” I should emphasise that even Berlin 
recognised that liberty may be ineffective without the presence “of the 
conditions to realise it”. In this sense he refers to poverty or the lack of 
education as potential elements that might render liberty useless (Gould 1990: 
39). Birch refers to this type of freedom as an “abstract freedom”, meaning 
that freedom can only be real when one has the capacity to act on one’s 
choices. Furthermore, Gould (1990: 41) explains that part of these enabling 
conditions should be “social conditions that include cooperative forms of 
social interaction, reciprocal recognition of each other’s free agency, and 
access to training, education, and various social institutions”. The conception 
of freedom as self-development is critical when related to school governance' 
because the role-players (parents, teachers, learners and non-teaching staff) 
have acquired the authority (via the South African Schools Act) to make 
decisions in an area that is fairly new and at times unfamiliar to them. To 
presuppose that being elected to serve on a school governing body 
automatically transforms one into becoming a practicing democrat is to 
believe that democratic practices are inherent to humans. The idea of self-
development as constitutive to freedom is essential in order to promote the 
type of democracy for which I am arguing. This self-development is, however, 
not constitutive of representative democracy in a liberal sense. 
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 The other interpretation that has a direct bearing on school governance is the 
notion of cooperative forms of interaction, reciprocal recognition of each 
other’s free agency and access to training. Comprehending freedom as 
“cooperative forms of social interaction” points to what I perceive to be power 
relations, which invokes the ideal of tolerance (particularly for opposing 
interpretations and points of view) as well as transparency (giving full reign to 
one's thoughts without fear of retribution). Governors who serve their 
particular constituencies (different stakeholder groups) would invariably be in 
contestation with each other and should, therefore, have the capacity to 
invoke a conception of tolerance, failing which could potentially cause 
animosity and even the malfunctioning of the SGB. With regard to linking 
freedom to “free agency”, I deduce a movement towards autonomy, meaning 
each individual governor may choose to reach his/her own conclusions (in 
relation to my earlier argument on representation). I have raised earlier on the 
“freedom” to choose (as constitutive to democracy), but Peters posits that 
such choice is “related to norms of rationality” (in Doyle 1975: 123). He 
proposes three criteria for autonomy, including authenticity, rational reflection 
and strength of will. Authenticity refers to the individual making rules for 
him/herself, thus adopting a way of life that is distinct from one being dictated 
to by others. Rational reflection is when the individual is aware of rules and 
conventions as alterable, continually subject to change. These changes are 
effected critically and impacts on his/her construction of “a way of life”. 
Strength of will refers to the ability of the individual to stick to principles which 
was acquired through rational reflection (in Doyle 1975: 123-125).  
 
I am consequently proposing a freedom that includes both the “negative” as 
well as “positive” conceptions of freedom, where the positive include “freedom 
as capacity” and negative freedom as the “exercise of that capacity” (Gould 
1990: 45). It is when the necessary conditions prevail to act on one's choices 
that self-development occurs thus underscoring the individual’s freedom. 
Such an understanding of freedom, I argue, is critical to ensure that SGBs 
function democratically. Conversely, a lesser interpretation or a disregard for 
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freedom in the sense that I argue for would lead to weak democratic 
practices. 
                     
• Tolerance 
 
Liberal values, particularly the freedom to exercise one’s own lifestyle 
notwithstanding how strange it might be (as long as it does not interfere with 
the lifestyle of others), are undermined without tolerance. Tolerance is, 
therefore, essential for democracy for without tolerance the “foundations of 
democracy cannot be strengthened and respect for human rights cannot be 
maintained” (Kennedy in Mendus 1999: 107). 
  
Tolerance implies a commitment to particular convictions and deeply held 
views that stems from a value system that the individual holds dear. It is in 
this regard that Carey makes a link between the notion of tolerance and pain. 
He posits that if no “pain” is involved, meaning that if one does not hold an 
opinion on the specific issue (conviction), the feeling may be referred to as 
indifference. He argues that people with no convictions are not tolerant if they 
allow others their way. They are simply “indifferent or apathetic” and 
indifference is not tolerance for the reason that the individual does not feel 
“pain” (in Mendus 1999: 46). The upshot of this is that when one entertains 
convictions that underscore one's value system, and others violate those 
convictions, this results in pain, meaning one has to reconcile one's 
convictions with those who do not hold it dearly. This is the difficult process of 
tolerance, as opposed to the easier alternative referred to as indifference. 
Tolerance requires us to accept people and permit their practices even when 
we strongly disapprove of them. It involves an attitude that is intermediate 
between wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition (Scanlon 
2003: 187). Carey responds to the understanding of “unrestrained opposition” 
by claiming that “tolerant people do not attempt to impose their opinions by 
external pressure or enforce them by any means except thoughtful 
persuasion” (in Mendus 1999: 46). This understanding of tolerance does not 
satisfy me in terms of school governance, because it relates specifically to 
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“beliefs or opinions” and does not include what may be referred to as the 
unique South African context. 
 
Within school governing bodies we find people from different religious, 
cultural, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. Institutionalised apartheid fed a diet 
of emphasising difference to the extent that people harboured antagonistic 
and hostile feelings for each other, not only because of differing beliefs, but 
also essentially for what or who they are. Put differently, people are 
antagonistic or hostile simply because of the colour of one's skin, or one's 
mode of dress, or one's socio-economic position, which distinguishes an 
individual as different from other groups. In South Africa this is a reality even 
after ten years of democracy, meaning that enmity and intolerance results 
from issues beyond the control of the individual. It should be clear that one 
does not have the ability to determine one’s skin colour or ethnic origin. I am 
therefore arguing for two different levels of tolerance, with the first referring to 
beliefs, doctrines and opinions, and the second “for what people are” (their 
physical outward manifestation, including ethnicity and race). Ignattieff 
reinforces such an interpretation when he refers to Locke’s notion of 
“irrationality” (those forms of intolerance directed at what people are), claiming 
that: “individuals are blamed and condemned for being something which is not 
in their power to alter”. He refers to the South African apartheid system as an 
“intolerance expressed in terms of an extreme moral and cultural relativism” 
(in Mendus 1999: 85). This type of intolerance creates the perception that one 
group is superior to the other, and in the South African case this reinforces 
difference. A case in point is the tension between Zulus and Xhosas in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The point is that within school governing bodies these 
differences plays itself out thus strengthening my argument for tolerance at 
two levels. The question, which arises, is why and how does one deal with 
intolerance? Where intolerance has the potential to cause instability and strife 
to the extent that it threatens the day-to-day existence of communities, then a 
mechanism should be sought to minimise the differences to a degree where 
daily life can at the very least be functional. Scanlon responds to such an idea 
by claiming that there “would be cases in which persisting conflict and 
disagreement are to be expected and are … quite compatible with full respect 
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for those with whom we disagree. But while respect for each other does not 
require us to abandon our disagreement, it does place limits on how this 
conflict can be pursued” (2003: 188). Inherent in Scanlon’s call to “respect” I 
deduce a call to accepting others (those whom we differ with) as our equal. 
This type of equality allows all members of society to be entitled to define 
what the society is and equally participate in determining what it will become 
(Scanlon 2003: 190). If and when we have acquired the capacity to subscribe 
to such practices of “equality,” then we have reached the level of tolerance 
required for a plural society. 
 
However, Ignatieff proposes that the remedy for intolerance is to move away 
from “adventitious collective identities like race, colour, creed, gender or 
sexual orientation. These are minor differences, and if we hope to have a 
tolerant society we must place faith in the possibility of individuals freeing 
themselves … from the deadly dynamic of its narcissism” (in Mendus 1999: 
5). His call for “faith in the individual” seems rather idealistic for it pre-
supposes that the individual has the inherent will to effect change, conversely 
that societal influences has a minimal bearing on individual practices. I am 
consequently not convinced that this will lead us away from intolerance. My 
attraction is more towards Neuberger and Kennedy who argue the opposite in 
the sense that the affirmation of group identity (as opposed to Ignatieff's 
denial) has a better chance of leading towards a more tolerant society. They 
posit that collective identities are an irreducible part of individual identity and 
that it is only when group membership is acknowledged and accepted 
politically that we will be able to move towards a truly tolerant society (in 
Mendus 1999: 110 & 126). This conception of toleration is more in line with 
the South African government’s call for “unity in diversity”. In this sense 
diversity is the dynamic force which enhances growth and development in 
terms of our being a “moral society”. It creates the space for differences to be 
“outlived” and opportunities to share those differences with others. Put 
differently, it promotes the circumstances for an appreciation of diversity in all 
its forms. Within such a conception of tolerance the South African “plurality” 
can exist and its movement towards “building a nation” becomes more 
plausible. Kennedy is emphatic in her stance claiming that:  
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Rather than using the language of exclusion, they should be creating 
the conditions that allow all groups within society to feel a sense of 
common purpose and mutual respect (in Mendus 1999: 110-111) 
                     
This sense of “common purpose and mutual respect” should, however, not be 
seen as a recipe for peace. On the contrary within a plurality (as is a SGB) 
disagreements are bound to arise about how values might be shared or 
understood. The point is that to deny those with whom one disagrees, the 
chance to persuade the others in the group (SGB) to adopt one's 
understanding would then be regarded as intolerance. From this stems the 
idea that tolerance is a social practice that can only be sustained when a 
culture exits where human identity is seen as individual as well as civic. 
Before I give examples of actual school governing body practices, I shall 
frame the concept of tolerance in line with Nussbaum’s understanding of 
compassion. My reason for incorporating the virtue of compassion is that a 
potential critic might argue that my interpretation of tolerance borders on what 
may be referred to as “feeling sorry for”. My understanding of tolerance, 
guided by Nussbaum refutes the interpretation of tolerance as “sympathy or 
pity”.   
 
I have earlier argued that within school governing bodies (SGBs) we find 
people from different religious, cultural, racial and ethnic backgrounds. I 
further claimed that more than forty years of apartheid emphasised such 
differences causing people to harbour antagonistic and hostile feelings for 
each other, not only because of their differing beliefs, but also essentially for 
what or who they are. I argue that deliberation, as a necessary condition for 
democratic citizenship, should include the virtue of compassion.  
 
Nussbaum refer to compassion as the recognition and emotional judgement 
that there are dangerous and unpleasant things that happen to others through 
no fault of their own, and that we might experience the same problem at some 
stage (2001: 405). Waghid posits that compassion and respect for human 
dignity are virtues not necessarily associated with deliberative argumentation 
and rational persuasion. One can rationally and persuasively articulate an 
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argument with the aim of building relations of trust among participants, but this 
does not mean that one is actually compassionate towards others (2003a: 
67). The compassionate person is more concerned with those who suffer and 
are oppressed thus inhibiting his/her self-interests. It is for this reason that I 
deduce that Nussbaum raises the issue of the contribution that compassion 
can make in guiding deliberation amongst citizens. Her main argument is that 
compassion ought to be the emotion that should most frequently be cultivated 
when citizens embark upon rational deliberation and just action in public as 
well as in private life (Nussbaum 2001: 299). In other words deliberative 
citizens (a concept that explore in the next chapter) should posses the ability 
to treat others not only justly, but also humanely.  
 
South Africa’s diverse education context enhances the possibility that matters 
of public concern (violence, unemployment, alcoholism, drug-abuse, poverty 
and so on) would inevitably have to be confronted, leading to judgements 
having to be made. However, such judgements should be made from different 
perspectives, depending on how the particular issue impacts on the 
individual’s life. It is for this reason that I argue that compassion become part 
of the deliberative process because it “not only prompts in people the 
awareness of the misfortune or suffering of others, but also pushes the 
boundaries of the self outward by focussing on others’ suffering which might 
occur through no fault of their own" (Waghid 2003a: 68). Nussbaum 
understands compassion in the sense that the undeserved suffering of people 
is not trivial and she argues for a belief that the possibility exists for the 
person who witnesses the emotion to feel the same as the sufferer. In the first 
sense the undeserved injustice should not only be recognised, but also 
addressed, meaning that the person’s plight should somehow be alleviated. 
Many disadvantaged communities are not to blame for their inability to govern 
and take ownership of schools. Decades of apartheid diminished their 
chances for a good education resulting in them operating on the lower levels 
of the economy, if at all. The upshot is diminished skills and poverty. In such 
circumstances deliberation should not take the form of judging their 
shortcomings but rather to identify means of empowering them, meaning what 
could be done to ensure that they acquire such skills. But the deliberation 
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process regard all those party to the process, as equal and ill-equipped 
governors should, therefore, not receive preferential treatment. It is precisely 
because of such criticism that I suggest that one should recognise the 
undeserved suffering that the disadvantaged had to endure through no fault of 
their own. Deliberation, incorporating the virtue of compassion, lends itself to 
better opportunities to address the shortcomings of persons within the 
community.  
 
In the second sense Nussbaum suggests that to be able to feel the suffering 
of others one has to put oneself in their shoes. She posits that, “in order for 
compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering of another 
as a significant part of his/her own scheme of goals and ends. She must take 
that person’s ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make 
herself vulnerable in the person of another" (Nussbaum 2001: 319). 
Interpreting Nussbaum I deduce that only if one has an understanding and 
appreciation for the suffering of others would one be capable of dealing with 
them compassionately, meaning that it has the potential to drive one to 
alleviate such suffering. Put differently, it means that the alleviation of the 
other's undeserved suffering would effectively put one in a position to further 
your own aims. Therefore, I argue that for conversations addressing issues of 
human injustice to thrive, the moral virtue of compassion should underscore 
the deliberative process. Framing tolerance in terms of Martha Nussbaum’s 
understanding of compassion liberates it from merely being interpreted as pity 
or a sense of “feeling sorry for”. 
 
Having explored some of the constitutive features of representative 
democracy, I now give examples of actual SGB practices in order to show that 
representation as I argued for is being undermined in SGB practices. I argue 
that representative democracy has the potential to undermine and exclude the 
marginalised groups (learners and even parents). Representation as it plays 
itself out on SGBs seems to reinforce a type of non-accountability with its 
suppression or reduced emphasis on deliberation. This inevitably leads to 
weak forms of democracy. The actual practices draw on research in different 
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provinces of South Africa. The data is included together with some analysis, 
which also includes insights from other relevant literature. 
 
3.3.1. INSTANCES OF SGB PRACTICES     
 
In this section I shall refer to actual SGB practices in relation to representative 
democracy. The idea is to determine whether such practices reinforce or 
weaken the constitutive features as explored earlier. The rationale is that if on 
the one hand evidence illustrates a restricting space for representation, then it 
underscores weak democratic practices. On the other hand if practices 
enhance the explored features, they potentially deepen the democratic 
practice, and thus the likelihood for strong democracy. At this point I need to 
clarify the term “practice” as used in the above sense. A practice has different 
features; these features/meanings make the practice what it is. Following 
such an understanding I determine that “features” contradicting the features 
for which I have argued may lead to distorted practices. However, as I have 
earlier argued, representative democracy has the tendency to exclude the 
marginalised voices thus undermining their potential to influence decisions. 
The evidence that I present spans the period from 2000 to 2004 and comes 
from a diverse group of researchers who presented papers at conferences or 
published articles on SGBs in particular. I also include my own data regarding 
school governance in disadvantaged schools. I need to reiterate that the 
following are illuminative case studies that reflect the work of others who have 
done research on school governance. I reflect on there work and draw 
inferences from it (as I explained in chapter one).      
 
3.3.2. PRACTICES IN RELATION TO REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
• Case study 1 
 
Adams and Waghid constructed the following data in disadvantaged schools 
in the Grassy Park region (Western Cape Province). I quote extensively from 
their report as it appears in the South African Journal of Education (2005): 
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The study revealed that there is a break in communication between 
elected members/representatives (of the SGB) and the constituency it 
represents. This inevitably leads to decisions being taken without a 
mandate. This initially should not cause major problems as long as the 
representative is answerable to his/her electorate. The study however 
reveals that governors do not seem to be answerable to their 
constituencies.  (2005: 30). 
 
Such a break in communication has serious consequences for the electorate 
because it means that they are not informed as to the manner in which they 
are being represented. They do not have an idea of whether their aims and 
ideals are being represented. In short they do not know whether they are in 
fact being represented at all. In such a case representation loses its 
accountability foundation thus restricting one of the ideals of representation. 
Distorting representation in this manner reinforces my argument towards a 
weaker form of democracy. Adams and Waghid further posit that: 
 
Most of the respondents alluded to the problem of conducting 
meetings. Four of the chairpersons explained that parents are scared 
to attend meetings because of gangster activity in the region. Mr. 
Anderson and Mr. Smith (principals at two of the schools) argue that, “it 
is dangerous to attend meetings after dark, because you might become 
a victim of assault or robbery”. Mr. Anderson laments that, “even the 
meeting to determine school fees was poorly attended. I had three 
attempts in conducting this meeting before I had a quorum. Our parent 
representatives concluded that the parent community is not interested 
in school governance” (2005: 30). 
 
Interpreting this evidence in relation to representation I argue that governance 
practices under such conditions leads to an absence of - or at the very least, 
misrepresentation. This I deduce from the necessary conditions for 
reasonable representation not even existing. It is for this reason that Mr. 
Anderson claims that only at his third attempt could he secure a quorum. How 
could one expect to represent others when trying to do so actually become 
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life-threatening? The representative in this case is not free to fulfil his/her role 
as a representative because he/she “might become a victim of assault or 
robbery” thus distorting the feature of freedom which I argued is a constitutive 
feature of democracy. In this regard two of the constitutive features that I 
argued for are diluted thus reinforcing my argument towards a weaker form of 
democracy. The attitude of those representatives who seem to have the ability 
to attend meetings without feeling threatened is also worrying. Surely those 
parents among the electorate who feel threatened have legitimate reason to 
operate on a safety first level; acting otherwise would be to gamble with one's 
life. To overlook such difficulties faced by individuals, through no fault of their 
own, and then to conclude that they are not interested in school governance is 
to my mind a rather arrogant attitude to adopt. The representative in this 
instance does not seem to care for the wellbeing of his/her electorate thus 
putting a question mark next to the ability of such a representative to 
represent in the interest of his/her constituency. It creates the impression that 
the representative does not have the interest of his/her stakeholder group at 
heart thus distorting the meaning of tolerance that I argued for. I shall further 
address this issue (of intolerance and caring) in chapter four when I argue for 
deliberation as a means of supporting stronger democratic practices.   
 
Adams and Waghid go on to report that:  
 
At four of the schools they (the representatives) argued that, “we have 
the right to make decisions if the parent community do not respond to 
notices of meetings to discuss important issues. It is not as if we do not 
attempt to get a mandate”. When we asked them whether they tried 
any other means of communicating with the parent community, the 
overwhelming response was that the “minutes of the meetings are 
available”. We then put it to them that they earlier reported that most 
parents couldn’t read. Most of the parent representatives responded by 
claiming, ”then they should show more interest in their children and 
make an effort to find out what is happening with their governing body” 
(Adams & Waghid 2005: 30). 
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Again the intolerance of representatives is highlighted restricting the chances 
of the stakeholder group being fairly represented. Overall this study not only 
reveals problems with representation but also exposes a “battle” to secure 
individuals (particularly from the parent community) to serve as 
representatives on SGBs. This, the authors claim is directly linked to causes 
such as unemployment, poverty and utilising most of their time in a struggle to 
make ends meet. One may reasonably argue that such unemployment could 
possibly be linked to the “fall-out” of globalisation that influenced the 
movement from Keynesian ideals to more market/capital related ideals, which 
have the effect of shedding jobs in its race to become more competitive in the 
global capital market. If such reasoning is plausible (and I tend to believe that 
it is), one may conclude that representation or the lack thereof (as the 
evidence point out) is directly linked to my earlier argument in relation to the 
influence of globalisation. The issue relating to poverty can also be directly 
linked to the notion of freedom or the lack thereof. I shall return to this 
conception of freedom when I argue for a more deliberative conception of 
liberal democracy. 
 
• Case Study 2 
 
Karlsson reports on the case studies data that she constructed at schools in 
Durban (Kwa-Zulu Natal Province). Her inquiry investigated participation 
levels at SGB meetings. She found that in almost every SGB, principals 
played a dominant role in meetings and decision-making. This is a significant 
point because it underscores my own findings in the Western Cape Province. 
In my interaction at schools in the Lotus River region the majority of parents 
alluded to the notion that “the principal knows best”.  
 
Karlsson further reports that following the principal; educators were also 
greater participants in decision-making than members representing non-
educator staff, parents and learners. As one respondent stated:  
 
The community regard (teachers) as leaders who are clear about 
school issues. Despite being the majority … parents were reticent, 
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relying on the principal and educators for leadership and guidance in 
decision-making (Karlsson 2002b: 332).  
 
Her evidence shows that representatives of particular stakeholder groups 
(parents, learners and non-teaching staff) may not have acquired the 
necessary skills to participate effectively, or alternatively that the space within 
which they are supposed to participate is severely restricted by the 
dominating groups (including the principal and teacher representative). Her 
evidence further illustrates that the marginalised stakeholder groups (parents, 
learners and non-teaching staff), although being physically represented had 
scant voice, supporting the idea that they are still marginalised. This goes to 
the heart of power relations within the SGB. It seems to me that power is still 
vested in the principal who not only influence decisions but also actually make 
them. The evidence is clear in the sense that although SGBs were instituted 
to enhance democracy, current practices reveal that the voices of the principal 
and the educators reign supreme thus reinforcing my claim of a weaker type 
of democracy.  
 
The principal might argue that effective implementation of outcomes carries 
more weight than how the outcome is realised. Such an argument is in 
consonance with the neo-liberal claim for effectiveness. This line of reasoning 
shows that globalisation’s influence again filters through. What is also clear 
from Karlsson’s investigation in relation to representation is that one may 
reasonably argue that the stakeholder groups (with reference to parents, 
learners and the non-teaching staff) whose voices should be heard via their 
representatives are being marginalised. These stakeholder groups thus do not 
have a fair chance of being represented for the reason that their 
representatives does not seem to have the skills (according to her case study 
findings) to counter the power of particularly the principle and teacher 
representatives. She reports that her case study findings (from longitudinal 
research in 27 schools throughout South Africa) included the following: 
 
Parents’ low levels of participation were also attributed to a weak 
understanding of their role, a capacity deficit in the range of skills 
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needed to perform all the governance functions, and contextual 
communication and transport difficulties. Many of these factors are 
directly related to poverty and the under-development and 
discrimination accumulated during the apartheid era (Karlsson 2002b: 
332).  
 
It is my view that such conditions (weak understanding, poor skills and 
poverty) marginalises this stakeholder group and leads to restricting the 
chances of fair representation thus weakening the stakeholder-group’s 
chances of influencing decisions. These findings also correspond with the 
data of Adams and Waghid. Besides the skills deficit and poverty issues, the 
power of the principal and teacher representatives also restricts the ability of 
the marginalised groups’ power to be represented. The upshot of this again 
slant towards weak democratic practices for the reason that all the voices that 
are supposed to be heard and consequently impact on outcomes are either 
stifled or at times disregarded. Karlsson in her data refer to this as 
“marginalised stakeholder representatives having to operate within a 
restricted space”. I read Karlsson to mean that the opportunity for the 
marginalised governors to have their voices heard is scant. The hegemonic 
power of the principal and the other dominant stakeholder representatives 
undermines the possibility of the marginalised to influence decisions. In other 
words it contradicts the features that I have argued for thus distorting 
representation and consequently the governance practice.   
 
• Case Study 3 
 
Bush and Heystek report on their research findings from six schools in the 
Pretoria region. Their research shows that most governing bodies are not 
fulfilling their policy-making role but are relying on the principal to do so (2003: 
136). They report that: 
 
The principal of the English-medium city school says that many parents 
feel “out of depth” on the governing body, while the head teacher of the 
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dual medium city school in a poor part of Pretoria adds that parent 
governors show “insufficient interest” in the school (2003: 236). 
 
Two issues in their data relate to the findings of Karlsson as well as that of 
Adams and Waghid; with reference to “out of depth” and “insufficient interest 
linked to poverty”. I have earlier argued that a lack of skills as well as poverty 
impacts on the governor’s ability to represent their stakeholder groupings. 
This evidence again supports such a view. Bush and Heystek further found 
that “training or capacity building is essential … but the Gauteng evidence … 
is that parent governors are reluctant to undergo training” (2003:136).    
 
• Case Study 4 
 
As part of the “Education Policy Consortium Governance and Equity Project” 
Mbokazi constructed her data in six schools across three provinces to 
appraise the participation of parents, learners and educators in decision-
making at school level. She reports that: “While it appears that the vast 
majority of schools have complied with the legal requirements for the election 
of various stakeholders onto SGBs, concerns were raised over the 
representivity and participation of school governors” (2004: 4). According to 
her findings evidence suggest that:  
 
… the voices of the marginalised have continuously gone unheard. The 
principals’ and educators’ voice remain dominant and privileged over 
the voices of parents and learners (2004: 4).  
 
She further reports that: 
 
Voices of stakeholders in the SGB were seriously undermined by lack 
of communication between the representatives in the SGB and their 
constituents. In all schools very little communication strategies or 
mechanisms were in place to either take concerns from their 
constituents or to report back to them. As a result it was not clear 
whether voices that were heard were voices of individual members of 
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the SGB or the voices of the stakeholders represented. This practice 
challenges the extent to which representatives were in fact accountable 
to the school community …” (2004: 5).  
 
She also claims that “in all meetings observed, there was no time when the 
principal’s views were openly challenged and questioned” (Mbokazi 2004: 5). 
Her findings include the following: 
 
(The) principals voice appears to be the strongest or paramount in KZB 
(a school in Kwazulu-Natal). In this school, the principal said that 
parents were illiterate and were not informed about the education 
system, especially with regard to issues pertaining to governance. He 
said that they still needed intensive training on their roles and 
responsibilities in the SGB (2004: 5).  
 
As in the findings of Adams and Waghid, this data again exposes the power of 
the principal that seemingly overwhelm the voices of other stakeholders. The 
lack of training as well as communication between representatives and their 
stakeholder groups challenges the notion of accountability and also restricts 
the opportunity for stakeholder groups to participate, leading to the idea of a 
distorted form of representation. In this sense one may conceivably argue that 
this could be interpreted as sustaining a weak form of democracy. 
   
The empirical evidence confirms that representative democracy has not only 
the potential but also the tendency to restrict and at times even exclude what I 
referred to as the marginalised voices. This tendency to curb the voices of the 
marginalised is not related to disagreement or offering a contesting point of 
view. On the contrary this tendency is related to restricting the space for 
contesting views thus curtailing the chances of the marginalised to participate 
in dialogue in order to influence decisions. It is my understanding that 
dialogue and the contestation of opposing points of view is necessary to 
sustain democracy. Representation as practiced within the sphere of school 
governance emphasises a type of non-accountability by reducing or at times 
ignoring deliberation. This tendency seems to arise in most disadvantaged 
 131
communities, across different provinces. This informs the idea that 
representation or the lack of it seems to be linked to poverty which 
undermines the type of freedom that I have been arguing for. This in turn 
retards the self-development of SGBs, a feature that is constitutive to 
freedom. The education transformation agenda that included democratically 
functioning SGBs is to my mind curtailed by a distorted form of representation 
thus leading to weak democratic practices.       
 
3.4. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I expounded on the notion that South Africa was unique in the 
sense that we constructed the RDP notwithstanding developments in the 
international arena. I then went on to expose that this claim to uniqueness 
could not be sustained and that it was overtaken by international procedures 
particularly that of globalisation. I argued that decentralisation was an 
international phenomenon that influenced school governance policy. Put 
differently, decentralisation though having a particular national socio-political 
context also had to contend with its international context. I argued that this 
international context via the liberal conception of globalisation impacted upon 
the themes and overall outcomes of new education legislation in South Africa.    
Furthermore, I argued that specific proposals of the liberal conception of 
democracy with particular reference to its market driven agenda found space 
within the South African Schools Act. The consequence of this is the 
institution of compulsory payment of school fees thus transforming education 
into a commodity which clients should purchase.  This I argued further 
marginalised the millions of poor who is forced to access this education 
system. I then went on to explore how the liberal notion of representation 
sought to include these marginalised. However, I exposed that instead of 
including, this form of representation tends to exclude, further reducing the 
space for the previously marginalised to participate in the structures that 
should enhance democracy. My next step was to explore particular 
constitutive features of liberal democracy and argued that interpreting these 
features in a specific way might lay the foundation for inclusion as opposed to 
exclusion. However, I concluded that the representative form of democracy as 
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espoused by the liberal notion of marketisation has the tendency to 
undermine and exclude the marginalised stakeholders (learners, non-teaching 
staff and parents). Finally I produced empirical evidence relating to actual 
school governing body practices in order to expose the inconsistencies it 
presents to representative democracy. 
 
In the following chapter I shall concentrate on a specific strand of liberal 
democracy, that being the deliberative strand. It is my understanding that the 
deliberative ideal has a better chance of enhancing strong democracy. The 
upshot of this is that the classic liberal ideal with its emphasis on the individual 
relates to a weaker conception of democracy. I consequently draw attention to 
a contrast between a classic liberal and deliberative strand of democracy. The 
reason for this is to inform on my choice of deliberative as opposed to the 
liberal ideal of democracy. I shall then link this deliberative ideal to the notion 
of citizenship thus developing an argument for democratic citizenship. It is my 
view that the deliberative ideals have the inherent potential to make citizens 
more critical. My aim is to provide a basis for a more sustainable “stronger 
democracy” via democratic citizenship. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DELIBERATION TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP – MAKING AN 
ARGUMENT FOR A STRONGER FORM OF DEMOCRACY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I shall explore two strands of liberal democracy and settle for 
one of the two, that being the deliberative conception. I further draw attention 
to my reasoning for preferring the deliberative/communitarian as opposed to 
the classic liberal/libertarian conception of democracy. I then attempt to link 
this deliberative model to citizenship thus producing an argument for 
democratic citizenship.  My reasoning is to produce a defence for strong 
democracy by emphasising deliberation in order to minimise/overcome the 
limitations of this liberal conception (ie that representation as currently 
practiced does not fulfil in the requirements for school governance) which I 
argued is not broad enough (thus reinforcing a notion of weak democracy). I 
further explore the implications of the deliberative ideal (to show that the 
marginalised stand a better chance of inclusion) and argue that it can 
engender a more critical and thus democratic citizen.       
 
Liberalism in South Africa has its roots in what Simhony and Weinstein (2001: 
1) refer to as “a family of liberalism”, meaning that liberalism has different 
strands. These strands may be associated with evolutionary adaptations from 
classic liberalism to utilitarianism to libertarianism to communitarianism. 
Waghid posits that: “These strands of liberalism also provide philosophical 
spectacles through which notions of individualism and community are framed 
which in turn have important implications for liberal democracy in South 
Africa” (2003b: 33). My aim is to first explore a strand of liberalism that 
accentuates excessive individualism thus minimising the various ways in 
which individuals are situated in different political, cultural and social 
relationships. However, Mulhall and Swift argue that identifying what 
liberalism and communitarianism are is not easy for the reason that there is “a 
great deal of disagreement about what exactly one has to believe in order to 
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qualify either as a liberal or as a communitarian. The point is that in ordinary 
usage the term “liberalism” tends to refer to a package of beliefs or policies 
which can be analytically separated from one another … the fact that the 
communitarian critique … is primarily concerned with some of these and not 
others” (1992: viii).  It is not unreasonable to suggest that classical liberalism 
(as conceived by John Locke and later by Thomas Hobbs and Rousseau) 
promotes abstract individualism and is sceptical of the good life. Lukes (1973: 
73) argues that abstract individualism portray individuals as “given” with 
interests, wants, purposes and needs, that is, “given” autonomously of a 
social context, while society and the state are described as sets of actual or 
possible arrangements which respond more or less adequately to individuals’ 
requirements. Jagger (1983: 40) is even more explicit when she claims that: 
 
The liberal assumption is that human individuals are essentially 
solitary, with needs and interests that are separate from if not in 
opposition to those of other individuals. This assumption is the starting 
point of liberal theory. It generates what liberals take to be the 
fundamental questions of political philosophy: what are the 
circumstances in which essentially solitary individuals might agree to 
come together in civil society, what would justify them in doing so and 
how might conflict be prevented when they do so? (1983: 40) 
 
Jagger’s critique that individuals are “essentially solitary” and “separate from” 
other individuals validate classical liberalisms affection for “abstract 
individualism” that tends to disregard the social.  In this view individual 
liberty/freedom is at its utmost, meaning that an individual’s freedom to 
choose his/her own form of life is paramount. Mill posits that it is the right and 
prerogative of each individual to interpret for him/herself the meaning and 
value of their experiences, meaning the right to self-determination regarding 
major decisions in life. According to Mill the individual right to make such 
decisions must be “inviolable” (1982: 123). However, in fairness to Mill I must 
state that he is adamant that his appeal for individual liberty is not to promote 
selfishness on the contrary he argues for a promotion of a sense of 
community. In this regard Mill transcends classical liberalism in his movement 
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towards utilitarianism. One may reasonably argue that Mill paved the way for 
the new liberal strand of libertarianism. To clarify my point in terms of Mill’s 
support for a sense of community I turn to On Liberty where he posits that: 
 
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine (utilitarianism) to 
suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that 
human beings have no business with each other’s conduct in life, and 
that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-
being of one another … there is a need of great increase of 
disinterested exertion to promote the good of others (Mill 1998: 84).      
 
Having said that, the point is that critics of classic liberalism expose the 
“individualism” of this strand of liberal democracy asserting that the primary 
motive for the rise of liberal democracies is the individual’s desire and struggle 
for recognition. But this emphasis on individual liberty is precisely the 
foundation of the new libertarians. I now explore this strand of liberal 
democracy. 
 
4.2. NEW LIBERTARIANISM 
 
The international economic crisis of the 1970s with its concomitant erosion of 
welfare state policies gave rise to a different strand of liberalism called 
libertarianism. The two major proponents of this strand are the economic 
Nobel Laureates F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman. Libertarians argue against 
the welfare state and in its place promotes a more “laissez faire” approach. 
Friedman argues that laissez faire had not been given a fair chance and, 
therefore, he advocates a society in which the primary mechanism of 
integration is the market. He proposes that it is through market capitalism that 
the disadvantaged groupings of society stand a chance of rescuing their 
position; something, he argues, that the welfare state was incapable of 
because it reinforced dependency. Friedman posits that:  
 
The widespread use of the market reduces the strain on the social 
fabric by rendering conformity unnecessary with respect to any 
 136
activities it encompasses. The wider the range of activities covered by 
the market, the fewer are the issues on which explicitly political 
decisions are required and hence on which it is necessary to achieve 
agreement. In turn, the fewer the issues on which agreement is 
necessary, the greater is the likelihood of getting agreement while 
maintaining free society (1962: 24). 
 
In terms of this understanding the logic of integrating the market would stand 
in stark contrast to the logic of state intervention. The argument is, therefore,  
opposed to welfare statism. It is for this reason that libertarians call for a 
removal of agricultural subsidies and tax on imports as well as a reduction in 
social security and pensions. In short libertarians argue for minimal state 
intervention. Brugger (in Wintrop 1983: 39) posits that: “Indeed for Friedman, 
control over the money supply appears as a key to the solution of most of 
society’s ills”. He further argues that in such a democracy the general interest 
becomes forgotten and may only be rescued by taking the decision making 
process out of the hands of the state and regulating it through the market (in 
Wintrop1983: 40). Hayek supports the views of Friedman but emphasises the 
right to property or ownership. He posits that: 
 
What our generation has forgotten is that the system of private property 
is the most important guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own 
property, but scarcely less for those who do not. It is only because the 
control of the means of production is divided among people acting 
independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as 
individuals can decide what to do with ourselves (1944: 78).   
 
In my interpretation of the fathers of libertarianism I conclude that they take us 
back to the classic liberal tradition, however, they seem “to select all that is 
cruel in the classical liberal tradition whilst ignoring all that is humane” 
(Brugger in Wintrop 1983: 44). Libertarians justify their restriction of public 
goods and services on utilitarian grounds whilst ignoring the redistributive 
implications. It emphasises negative liberty but ignores Mill’s call for a sense 
of community and the increased role of the state. While one may reasonably 
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argue that modern democracies (in the major industrialised countries of the 
world) are increasingly moving towards implementing some of the principles 
that libertarians call for, there is not a single government that completely 
endorse their views. On the other hand the critique against libertarians are 
growing particularly from the realms of communitarians.  
 
Fukuyama in his critique argues that individuals exert themselves in pursuit of 
recognition which involves securing private freedoms indifferent to the “things 
of the world” – beginning with private property and ending with their own 
happiness – in the face of limited state intervention (1992: 162-172). For 
Fukuyama such a libertarian view negatively characterises the individual as 
“narrowly consumed with his/her own immediate self-preservation and 
material well-being interested in the community around him/her only to the 
extent that it fosters a means of achieving his/her private good” (1992: 160). 
Kymlicka argues that; “the problem with this strand of liberalism is not its 
emphasis on justice, nor its universalism, but rather its individualism” (2002: 
212). The point is that transformation in the South African education system 
with particular reference to school governance cannot rely on an individualistic 
conception of liberal democracy at the expense of a more communitarian 
understanding. Democratic school governance affects most South Africans 
meaning that each person’s individual concern is a matter of common 
concern. Put differently, educational transformation has implications for most 
South Africans and decision-making, which is premised on individual gains, 
has the possibility of reinforcing the status quo thus keeping the marginalised 
in their precarious position. The aim of democratic governance (in schools) is 
precisely to address the issues relating to the previously marginalised groups 
thus instituting notions of equality and equity. The upshot of this is that 
educational governance has to contend with a pluralist South African society 
acknowledging religious, cultural, political and socio-economic differences 
which was shaped by a particular history. To favour an individualistic view of 
democracy thus has the potential to again exclude the previously excluded. A 
non-communitarian understanding of self-fulfilment negates the requirement 
for collective intervention that is necessary to address the historical 
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imbalances in South African society. It is for this reason that I argue for a 
more communitarian conception of democracy.  
 
4.3. LIBERAL COMMUNITARIANISM 
 
Communitarianism might be expressed as a theory about how the individual is 
socially constructed meaning that the “self” cannot be understood apart from 
the social relations in which it is entrenched (Miller 2000: 99). For 
communitarians, individuals form social practices and institutions in which 
they pursue their aims in collaboration with one another. Put differently, 
humans are by their nature social beings with a need for communication. 
Such communication invariably involves others within a social context thus 
leading communitarians to claim that it is within this social context that 
individuals come into their own. Communitarians stress that community does 
not merely imply an aggregation of individuals. People constituting a 
community have common public ends, and not merely congruent private 
ends. In other words people form a community with the aim of sharing goals 
and values with other like-minded individuals who envision themselves as part 
of or members of the group (Waghid 2003b: 57). In contrast, an aggregation 
consists of individuals who consider of their interests as private, independent 
and potentially opposed (Buchanan in Waghid 2003b: 57).   Although Miller 
distinguishes between three variants of communitarianism (those being liberal 
communitarianism, conservative/right communitarianism and left 
communitarianism), I am attracted to his communitarianism to the left for the 
reason that it seeks to establish a community on the basis of equality where 
the community is collectively self-determining rather than subjected to 
“authority and tradition” (Miller 2000: 105). However, I give a brief 
interpretation of the other two that I claim I do not necessarily favour for 
school governance.  
 
Liberal communitarianism claims that people may choose to pursue an 
autonomous way of life after reflecting on alternative understandings of the 
good life. Kymlicka (2002: 240) posits that,  “ … if we truly wish to 
accommodate communitarian conceptions of the self, then we must be willing 
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to provide some exemption for communitarian groups from the rigorous 
enforcement of individual liberties”. He argues that the availability of various 
ways of life and the capacity for autonomous choice depend upon a 
communal background where certain individual rights are restricted. My 
interpretation is that people/individuals cannot simply engage in social life or 
political institutions (voting on SGBs), unless there are groups of people in 
society who engage in such a life/institutions. What liberals in this sense 
wants is that the individual’s right of freedom be subordinated to the group’s 
right to maintain a conception of the good life. For example if the norm in 
terms of group practices in a school is that girls should not wear scarves in 
school then Muslim individuals who profess that wearing a scarf is part of their 
religious mode of dress cannot be accommodated. In this way the group right 
is superior to the right of the individual. Liberal communitarians want to limit 
civil liberties of individual members, including the right of individuals to hold 
different views than those of the group (Waghid 2003b: 52).       
 
Conservative communitarianism argues that we have to feel that we belong 
together in a common society before we can consolidate the political 
institutions that will govern us (Miller 2000: 104). In such a conception of 
communitarianism the emphasis is on the community as a source of authority, 
meaning that a common culture or religion or language makes it difficult for 
individuals to leave that community. Conversely those who do not share in the 
common culture or language would find it difficult to access or fit into that 
community.    
 
Communitarianism to the left seeks to establish a community on the basis of 
equality and that the community should be actively and collectively self-
determining rather than subjected to “authority and tradition” while at the 
same time each member of such a community enjoys equality of status (Miller 
2000: 105). It is the call for equality of status that interests me with reference 
to school governance. It leads me to an understanding that learners, parents 
and even the principal are equal in the sense that they all have the same right 
to initiate speech and argue their point of view. Put differently they are all 
equal in the opportunities created to influence decisions. This is not to argue 
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that they are equal in terms of their abilities, however, members of the SGB 
“deliberate collectively about their aims and purposes in a self-determining 
way” (Waghid 2003b: 53). The point is that members of the political 
community (SGB) are equal and they engage in collective deliberation. 
Communitarianism includes practices based on “reasoning together with 
others” via deliberative engagement to reinforce social relationships. For 
MacIntyre this form of social engagement can be sustained through 
“reasoning together”, that is, to give to others an intelligible account of one’s 
reasoning. However, one needs to show “the ability and willingness to 
evaluate the reasons for actions advanced by others, so that one makes 
oneself accountable for one’s endorsements of practical conclusions of others 
as well as for one’s own conclusions” (1999: 105). This means that before 
decisions are made at SGB level, individual governors have the opportunity to 
evaluate the reasoned opinions of others which in turn inform and even 
influence their own conclusions. It is in this sense that MacIntyre argues that 
the action performed by an individual comprise part of “some whole, so that 
by their performance the whole is brought into being” (1999: 106). Having 
given some insight into different strands of liberal democracy as well as 
determining to favour the communitarian conception, I now return to the 
problem of representation that I framed in the previous chapter. 
     
4.4.1. A PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES FOR 
          REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
In chapter three I introduced the notion of aggregation as a means of 
determining the position to be taken by a representative. I introduced the 
notion for the reason that individuals within a stakeholder group (be they the 
teachers, parents, learners or non-teaching staff) have different expectations 
and preferences. However, the representative may only employ an overall 
choice, meaning individual preferences give way to an aggregated choice. 
The problem which arises (as I mentioned in chapter three) is how to 
determine such an aggregation? I now tease out this dilemma in order to 
show that a liberal notion of democracy that favours individual interests 
creates more problems when trying to aggregate preferences than the 
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communitarian/deliberative ideal. Conversely, the deliberative ideal, whilst 
also starting from the premise that political preferences will conflict, the 
emphasis is on how this conflict is resolved. I now employ the notion of “social 
choice” as explicated by Miller in his work on “Citizenship and National 
Identity” in order to clarify my preference for deliberation.  
 
Social choice theorists concede that preferences may vary according to social 
influences but for any particular issue or set of issues they are taken as fixed 
and identifiable. Miller reverses the common opinion of social choice which he 
claims, compel us to dispose of “populist” models of democracy in which 
decisions are represented as expressions of “people’s choice” or the “popular 
will” in support of liberal models in which democratic elections are interpreted 
merely as a safeguard against the emergence of tyrannical rulers (2000: 11). 
Instituting this liberal view would mean that democracy is reduced to voters 
having the right to remove from office those whom they come to dislike 
without having the opportunity to influence policy. The point is that the office-
bearers (who have been removed) might have been true to policy. In other 
words it is not the office-bearer, but the policy that should come under 
scrutiny. The upshot of this is that the removal of a representative via 
“democratic elections” would not have the desired effect for the reason that 
the problem lies within the policy and not with the particular representative. 
However, following the argument, it seems as if voters are not afforded the 
opportunity to participate in determining public policy. The idea that 
democratic decisions are not a matter of aggregating preferences but of 
reaching agreed judgements does not follow for the reason that one cannot 
agree on an outcome/judgement if one has no idea of what influenced the 
preferences that informed the outcome. Put differently, without having a 
sound understanding of what influenced the preferences the idea of 
aggregating them to conclude a particular outcome becomes meaningless. 
Pro-liberals (including Schumpeter and Dahl but particularly William Riker) 
respond to this by arguing that it is only to safeguard against the possibility of 
“tyranny”. It is, however, from the base that aggregating preferences become 
meaningless that Miller posits that social choice can be reduced to two basic 
claims: 
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• That there is no rule for aggregating individual preferences that is   
obviously fair and rational and thus superior to other possible rules 
and; 
• that virtually every rule is subject to strategic manipulation, so that 
even if it would produce a plausible outcome for a given set of 
preferences if everyone voted sincerely, the actual outcome is liable 
to be distorted by strategic voting (2000: 14).  
 
Following the argument of social choice it seems that this theory “undermines 
the liberal view of democracy … regardless of the precise function that is 
assigned to the act of voting” (Miller 2000: 14). Put differently, individuals who 
comprise a stakeholder group is not given a fair opportunity to have their 
voices influence policy. Voting in this sense is to my mind creating an illusion 
of democracy for it creates the impression that individuals do participate; 
however, the level of participation precludes influence on policy. In essence it 
only relates to the person representative who carries the responsibility of 
representing the stakeholder group. The case study evidence that was 
produced in chapter three underscores this understanding. It clearly presents 
the current practices with regard to school governance (in disadvantaged 
communities) which reveals that marginalised groups have scant opportunity 
to influence decisions at governance level. The question that remains is how 
does the deliberative model of democracy avoid the problems of “social 
choice” that seem to occur with a classical liberal/libertarian ideal of 
democracy?  
 
4.4.2. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT OF SOCIAL CHOICE BY MEANS OF 
          DELIBERATION 
 
Before I respond to this question it seems prudent to first briefly analyse what 
deliberative democracy means. As a starting point I turn to Benhabib who 
posits that the task of modern democratic societies is to secure three public 
goods, those being legitimacy, economic welfare and a viable sense of 
collective identity. When such a democratic society functions well, these 
 143
public goods ideally exist in some form of equilibrium (1996: 67-68). The 
understanding is that legitimacy should result from the “free and 
unconstrained public deliberation about all matters of common concern” 
(Benhabib 1996: 68). My interpretation of this is that if the “public” (political 
community) is not free to actively engage in decision making on the matters 
that concern them, such decisions does not comply with the legitimacy rule 
thus rendering the decision illegitimate or weak in a democratic sense. To be 
considered legitimate, the space for deliberation among members of a 
particular stakeholder group (like parents, learners or non-teaching staff) prior 
to them being represented at SGB level should be available. The 
representative then has a realistic understanding of the preference of his/her 
constituents not because of their individual needs but for the reason that they 
produced convincing arguments to support such preferences.  Earlier in this 
chapter I argued that the classical view of liberal democracy that enhances 
individualism as well as deliberative democracy starts from the premise that 
political preferences will conflict and that the emphasis should be on how this 
conflict is resolved. The deliberative ideal suggests that the conflict should be 
approached through open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with 
the aim of arriving at an agreed outcome. Benhabib further claims that: 
 
Democracy is best understood as a model for organising the collective 
and public exercise of power … on the basis of the principle that 
decisions affecting the well-being of the collectivity can be viewed as 
the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among 
individuals considered as moral and political equals (Benhabib 1996: 
68). 
 
I am particularly attracted to her call for “decisions that affect the well-being of 
a collectivity” for the reason that it compels participants to engage each other 
and more importantly to supply reasons for their particular point of view. The 
idea of presenting reasons also includes the understanding that one is obliged 
to reciprocate, meaning that one is open to the reasoning of others. Such a 
reciprocal exchange of reasons has the potential to sway participants from 
their original preference, thus enabling all concerned to take a wider view. In 
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this way new information is gained for the reason that “no single individual can 
anticipate and foresee all the variety of perspectives through which matters of 
ethics and politics would be perceived; and no single individual can possess 
all the information deemed relevant to a certain decision affecting all” 
(Benhabib 1996: 71). Deliberation is consequently a procedure that invites 
critical reflection on one's already held views or opinions with the distinct 
advantage of providing and accepting rational arguments even while critically 
reflecting. Put differently, one cannot produce a reasoned counter argument 
without first digesting the argument of one’s co-deliberator and through critical 
reflection formulate a rational counter argument. Furthermore the deliberative 
model allows all affected participants an “equal chance to initiate speech” and 
also suggests that no outcome is “prima facie fixed, meaning that it can be 
revised and be subjected to re-examination” (Benhabib 1996: 72). 
Consequently I could, therefore, argue that no agreed-to outcome would 
forever remain rigid or permanent. On the contrary it should always remain 
open for reflection, revision or re-examination.  It seems clear that the 
deliberative conception emphasises the way in which a “process” of open 
discussion, where all points of view is considered to determine a legitimate 
outcome is instituted, as opposed to a procedure to search for the “correct 
answer”. In relation to school governance “the well-being of the collective is 
crucial for the reason that decisions taken at School Governing Body (SGB) 
level are done by individual representatives who are obliged to serve their 
respective interest groups. The outcome of decisions impact on the whole 
school community (and not only on one stakeholder group) and should 
according to the deliberative view only be considered when all individual 
representatives are considered as moral and political equals. All stakeholder 
representatives should be afforded the opportunity to actively participate 
“freely and through reasoned deliberation”. Through this process the learner 
representative has the same opportunity to influence decisions as the teacher 
representative or even the principal for the reason that they are considered 
“equals”. Engaging such a procedure I argue could lead to stronger 
democratic practices.             
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Returning to the original question posed in relation to “social choice”, it now 
seems clear that the deliberative model clearly rests on a different conception 
of “human nature in politics” than the classic liberal/libertarian view. This 
liberal view emphasises the importance of giving due weight to each 
individual’s distinct preferences whereas the deliberative model relies upon a 
person’s capacity to be swayed by rational arguments and to lay aside 
particular interests and opinions in regard to overall fairness and the common 
interest of the collectivity. School governance is based upon decision-making 
that impacts upon the collectivity, however, a particular process that informed 
the outcome binds such decisions. This process makes the outcome more 
acceptable to all who participated in the deliberation for the reason that the 
outcome was informed by opposing views and underpinned by rational 
arguments. The SGB as a whole may then legitimately claim that the outcome 
itself is rational. With reference to this process Benhabib posits that: “an 
agreement should follow the general rules and can only be morally binding if 
such agreement was achieved through the process of deliberation”. The 
following features inform this process: 
 
• Participation in deliberation is governed by norms of equality and 
symmetry where all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, 
to question, and to open debate; 
• all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; 
and 
• all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules 
of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or 
carried out (Benhabib 1996: 70). 
 
In school governance terms, conforming to the assigned rules translates into 
every representative within the SGB operating on the same level as every 
other. Put differently, they are equal in terms of their ability to influence 
decisions. It seems clear that in terms of the “social choice theory” the 
deliberative model of democracy finds more resonance than the liberal view 
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that favours the individual. To further reinforce my reasoning I turn to Geoffrey 
Stokes who posits that: 
 
Deliberative democracy is applicable in all sorts of political situations 
and allows for incremental institutional changes as well as more far-
reaching one’s. For these reasons, deliberative democracy seems to 
have a greater potential to respond, not only to the issues associated 
with democratic disenchantment in liberal democracy, but also to the 
challenges of identity politics and the new social movements. Despite 
its shortcomings, there are good grounds for proposing that 
deliberative democratic theory offers the greater promise of renovating 
both the practice of democratic citizenship and democratic institutions 
(in Carter & Stokes 2002: 45-46).    
 
My argument thus far shows that I am swayed towards the deliberative 
conception of democracy (to drive school governance practices) for the 
reason that it accommodates the different stakeholder groups more fairly. I 
have earlier argued for space for the marginalised voices seemingly not 
afforded by the classic liberal/libertarian view. I consequently agree with 
Stokes when he claims that despite its shortcomings, the deliberative theory 
offers greater promise for broadening the practice of democratic institutions 
such as school governing bodies.  I thus rely on the deliberative conception of 
democracy to inform my movement towards democratic citizenship. To further 
clarify this point I refer to an earlier argument where I claimed that the liberal 
ideology of a free market system tends to separate politics from the economy 
and is based on the liberal view (in the South African context) that Blacks 
would shortly, with their growing politicisation, demand massive state 
intervention. Consequently, this liberal influence (separating politics from the 
economy) resulted in entrenching the exclusion of the majority of the 
disadvantaged masses and socio-economic inequality (Waghid 2003b: 16). It 
is the tendency to such exclusion that I refer to as weak democracy; or 
alternatively a process that potentially secures more inclusion would be 
framed as a stronger form of democracy. It seems clear that the liberal 
interpretation that is averse to communitarianism has much more potential to 
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exclude the marginalised than the deliberative conception, hence my 
preference for deliberative democracy. 
       
Having explained my reason for instituting a specific conception of liberal 
democracy, I now proceed to briefly explain what I mean by strong 
democracy. 
 
4.4.3. STRONG DEMOCRACY 
 
In the previous chapter I argued how globalisation and the neo-liberal ideal of 
free markets impact on society (particularly in relation to how it influenced 
education policy in South Africa), and how this has the potential to lead to 
what I referred to as weak democracy. I now proceed to chart a possible way 
out by utilising a particular conception of democratic citizenship. For this 
purpose I shall in the main rely on Benjamin Barber’s understanding of how to 
strengthen civil society/citizenship and at the same time reinforce the ideal of 
strong democracy.  
 
South Africa can be said to be characterised by a market-oriented system 
where economic competition drives most of the daily existence of its 
population. The switch of government from the ideals of the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP – welfare oriented programme) to the 
Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR – market driven programme) 
policy particularly reinforces this interpretation. The upshot of this is the 
erosion of traditional work (hand labour as opposed to mechanisation of the 
labour market), unemployment, poverty, alienation (that becomes the 
breeding ground for other social ills such as violence, drug-abuse and other 
criminal activities) and a dependency on relief agencies. I do realise that a 
potential critic may reasonably argue that much of this may be ascribed to the 
legacy of apartheid, and am, therefore, not arguing that this is as a result of 
the GEAR policy. I am suggesting that the GEAR policy reinforced the market 
principle (at the expense of the RDP's Keynesian agenda) thus 
institutionalising the ills/fallout of the global market economy. A liberal 
neocapital agenda seems to drive the South African economy and the 
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resultant impact on democracy I earlier argued becomes weak. The point is 
that the space where we (individuals and communities) interact with others on 
a daily basis has become a space of strife and struggle in order to meet the 
demands for existence. It has become a space dominated by economic 
considerations. This is the space of civil society, the domain where we interact 
freely; “where neither government nor private markets are sovereign” (Barber 
1998: 4). It is within this space that the potential for strong democracy may be 
realised.  
 
I have earlier made reference to an understanding that libertarians favour 
individual freedom and constantly call for minimal state interference. This 
however, has the effect of private market-sector domination, putting those 
most in need most at risk, meaning that the market comes to dominate this 
space under the pretext that it is better suited to cure the ills (unemployment, 
poverty etc.) of society. The reality, I earlier argued seems to be the opposite, 
meaning that instead of creating employment, jobs are shed. Big government 
on the other hand has always been the ally/protector of the 
disadvantaged/those most at risk (Barber 1998: 5). However, in the case of 
South Africa the movement is towards privatisation thus thinning government 
opting for more effectiveness and efficiency. This might be interpreted as “big 
government” not being effective or efficient enough to deal with the problems 
that were mentioned above. So if big government is not the answer and 
neocapitalism results in too many ills then it seems that what is needed is a 
middle course, a sort of balance between the two. Barber suggests (and I am 
inclined to side with his view), that civil society occupies a space between the 
private (supposed area for free association but where commercial markets 
that are driven by a capitalist mode of economics dominate) and the public 
(government/politics including voting, paying taxes, receiving services based 
on the idea of justice such as policing, healthcare, sanitation, water and 
electricity supply etc.) sector. Civil society is, therefore, not an alternative to 
the private market (but may be utilised as an antidote to commercial 
selfishness or market incivility), neither is it an alternative to big government, 
but rather a “free space in which democratic attitudes are cultivated” (Barber 
1998: 6).  
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Such attitudes inform our interdependence where we accept that we are 
individuals and that we are partners of communities, meaning that we have 
individual as well as communitarian needs. It is within this arena that we 
interact as individuals, as communities, in all our diversity with the distinct aim 
of creating opportunities within this “free space” making it as reasonably 
harmonious as possible for all who occupy this space. Put differently the aim 
of our interaction should be to, at the least, result in a fair degree of 
contentment for those who prefer to interact in this space. This 
interdependence reinforces our need to cooperate, to work and live together 
thus facilitating the requirement to make this space as deliberative as 
possible. The space of civil society is consequently a space for all 
notwithstanding our ethnicity, race, culture, economic status, religious 
orientation and so forth. It is a space where plurality is at its maximum, 
meaning that the manner in which we occupy that space would determine the 
level of harmony which should exist in civil society.  
 
Deliberation within civil society creates the opportunity where government can 
potentially be restricted (of utilising its coercive powers) and where market 
forces can be tempered to become more humane. The space where civil 
society interacts is consequently a commercial/economic, as well as a political 
space. Barber posits that a strong democratic conception of civil society 
explicitly ties civil society with citizenship, rejecting the contradicting 
opposition between the “public” and the “private” sectors. He proposes a third 
arena (other than private or public) as the space for actual social engagement 
– “a normative ideal for citizens … that is not as thin as market liberalism” 
(1998: 34). The dominant characteristic of this civic domain is that it is a public 
space that is voluntary and non-coercive, as well as private in the sense that 
individuals freely choose to occupy and participate within this space. This civic 
space is thus home to many diverse individuals and diverse communities who 
interact not because they are equally egalitarian/classless, but rather because 
they are plural. The groups within this space may be sectarian and 
exclusionary, but together these groups form a whole textured by their variety 
of difference. Following Barber, it is my view that to create a fair or reasonable 
amount of contentment such a plurality can only flourish in an atmosphere of 
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deliberation. As I have argued earlier, deliberative democracy has a much 
better potential to include than the liberal conception that emphasises 
individual freedom. It is thus my claim that strong democracy could and 
should be reinforced by a process of deliberation.  
 
I argue that the limitations related to the liberal conception of representation 
(that representation does not fulfil in the requirements of school governance 
for its tendency to exclude), may possibly be bridged by instituting a 
deliberative conception of democracy. In relation to my earlier argument 
regarding civil space, school governing bodies (SGBs) and their practices can 
be interpreted to be private (other than direct government – its functions were 
decentralised thus becoming part of the work of civil society) as well as public. 
Government determines the parameters within which private citizens may act, 
thus making the deliberative process even more crucial. I have hinted that a 
strong democratic conception of civil society (in the sense that I argued for) is 
explicitly linked to citizenship. It is my understanding that democratic 
citizenship incorporating the rules of deliberation affords us the better 
opportunity to realise the notion of strong democracy. The question that 
remains is what type of citizen can reinforce the notion of strong democracy? 
Alternatively, what is expected of the citizen who resides within a democracy 
where deliberation is its driving force? 
 
4.5.1. A CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP (IN PLURALIST SOCIETIES) – 
          TOWARDS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 
 
The scope of a theory of citizenship is potentially limitless – almost every 
problem in political philosophy involves relations among citizens or between 
citizens and the state (Kymlicka & Norman 1994: 353). To avoid being 
trapped in such a “limitless” debate, I shall rather emphasise two general 
issues relating to citizenship, those being civic virtues and identity. My use of 
the concept citizenship is not meant to suggest merely those rights possessed 
by a passive subject, because he/she resides within a specific territorial 
jurisdiction. Citizenship also does not mean patriotism and unwavering loyalty 
to the dictates of a nation state. To me citizenship implies active involvement 
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in the political and social life of the domain occupied by those who have the 
right to claim citizenship. “Democratic” is added to “citizenship” to indicate that 
citizenship is one feature of a democratic system thus illustrating that there 
are other features that are also associated with democracy (Thompson 1970: 
2-3). However, citizenship has become a problem for democracies in the 
sense that many groups (such as ethnic and racial minorities, gays, the 
disabled, women, the homeless), having suffered some form of discrimination, 
are calling for their “citizenship rights”. South Africa’s young democracy is no 
exception. On the contrary the majority of its peoples feel the right to claim 
citizenship on the foundation that during the era of apartheid they were merely 
subjects. The transition from apartheid to democratic rule thus reinforced an 
understanding that all those born in South Africa shall have the right to 
citizenship. There is much consensus that a post-apartheid citizenship needs 
an unwavering endeavour to overcome the racial and ethnic divisions that 
apartheid institutionalised. In the words of Mkhatshwa: “… a democracy such 
as ours, which has emerged from the apartheid ashes, should be founded on 
sound moral values that will inculcate in each of us a sense of national pride, 
oneness and commitment to the common good" (DoE 2000:2).  
 
But what is citizenship? Claiming that citizenship is a legal status conferred by 
a State holds true, but it is not enough. It is thus not an issue of determining a 
simple definition. Conversely the notion of citizenship is a contested notion, 
meaning that it means different things to different people/groups. T. H. 
Marshall, in his significant text, Citizenship and Social Class (in Kymlicka & 
Norman 1994: 354) determines that for citizenship’s fullest expression a 
liberal democratic welfare state is required. Marshall further posits that 
citizenship is “the body of rights and duties – the status that goes with full 
membership of a society” (in Steenbergen 1994: 13). He divides citizenship 
rights into three categories – those being political rights, civil rights and social 
rights. This understanding of “rights and duties” invokes the idea of provisions 
and entitlements as the core to defining citizenship. Provisions in this sense 
refer to broadening the range and variety of choices available, while 
entitlements refer to the degree to which these choices are accessible. 
Dahrendorf posits that citizenship should tilt towards the side of “entitlement”. 
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He argues that prior to the 1980s when the “welfare state” with its emphasis 
on “entitlements” flourished, the notion of citizenship was fairly dormant. 
However, as the welfare state came under increasing pressure from market 
capital, the entitlements diminished and provisions (a greater variety of 
choices that became less accessible, as it was transformed into commodities 
that should be paid for) were in demand (in Steenbergen 1994: 12). It is at this 
stage (1980s) that the notion of citizenship became an issue for renewed 
debate, a debate that is still raging, albeit in the context of globalisation and a 
movement towards a “global citizen”. One may reasonably deduce that the 
debate was renewed because the “entitlements” started to evaporate under 
the onslaught of market capitalism. Put differently, had the entitlements so 
generously catered for by the “welfare state” remained, the notion of 
citizenship would arguably have remained dormant. It is following such a line 
of reasoning that I deduce that Dahrendorf calls for citizenship to fall within 
the realms of “entitlements” rather than provisions. This is also in line with 
Marshall’s reasoning that in a “welfare state” the fullest expression of 
citizenship would be realised. 
 
Besides rights and obligations, there remain different conceptions of 
citizenship – some understanding this primarily in terms of a liberal notion of 
civic rights (individual and private freedom), while others prefer a more 
communitarian interpretation with reference to entailing responsibilities to 
promote the common good through participation in community life. Marshall’s 
liberal conception sees citizenship as a set of rights (including civil rights, 
political rights and social rights) enjoyed equally by every member of society 
based on the idea of social justice. However, his conception of citizenship did 
not keep track with the onslaught of market capitalism, neither with the 
development of modern pluralist societies and hence his idea of social justice 
becomes problematic. Whereas Marshall argued that social rights enabled the 
marginalised/disadvantaged to better exercise their civil and political rights, 
the New Right (Libertarians during the Thatcher/Reagan era) argues that the 
welfare state has promoted a culture of dependency. They called for reforms 
to extend the scope of markets and a cut in welfare benefits. In short they 
argue that to become responsible citizens, the disadvantaged had to focus on 
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earning a living thus becoming self-reliant. However, Kymlicka and Norman 
(1994: 357) argues that cutting welfare benefits, far from getting the 
disadvantaged back on their feet, has inflated the underclass; class 
inequalities expanded and the working poor and unemployed have been 
disenfranchised (unable to participate in the economy of the New Right). So, 
there seems to be a tension between citizenship based on social principles 
and citizenship based on market principles. Kymlicka and Norman suggest 
that an “adequate conception of citizenship seems to require a balance 
between rights and responsibilities” which incorporates the notion of virtues 
(1994: 360).  
 
Rawls (another liberal theorist) addresses the problem of pluralism and posits 
that “the diversity of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral 
doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere historical 
condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public 
culture of democracy” (1993: 216-217). It is my interpretation that South Africa 
is such a pluralist society, but more importantly a society struggling to come to 
terms with its past and trying to build a nation/national identity (I return to the 
issue of national identity later on in this chapter). This in itself puts a strain on 
citizenship in the sense that “what is a good citizen” becomes contested. In 
other words “the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not 
only on the justice of its ‘basic structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes 
of its citizens" (Kymlicka & Norman 1994: 352). Put differently, the norms and 
values that citizens should incorporate cannot simply be enforced, but should 
rather be negotiated. Cairns and Williams support this view when they posit 
that “what the state needs from the citizenry cannot be secured by coercion, 
but only through cooperation and self-restraint … “ (1985: 43). It is at this level 
of “negotiation” that I argue for a deliberative model of democracy to 
determine the nature and extent of citizenship. In relation to values one may 
refer to, for example, values relating to a sense of identity and how competing 
forms of national, ethnic, or religious identities are reconciled; their ability to 
tolerate and work together with others who are different; their desire to 
participate in the political process in order to promote the public good 
(Kymlicka & Norman 1994: 353). It seems as if “virtues” may possibly relieve 
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the tension and create some balance between rights and obligations, and that 
such virtues should rather be negotiated than enforced. I therefore reiterate 
my preference for deliberation to determine the nature and extent of 
citizenship. However, before I further explore this deliberative model I give 
some insight into how the minimal and maximal interpretation of citizenship 
deals with the ambiguities and tensions of the concept. 
  
4.5.2. A MINIMAL – MAXIMAL CLASSIFICATION OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
The minimal/maximal characterisation is not mutually exclusive, but rather two 
contrasting interpretations that exist in a continuum of identities, virtues, 
political involvement and social prerequisites necessary for effective 
democratic citizenship (McLaughlin 1992: 236). The suggestion of a 
continuum relates to the idea of the possibility that interpretations may neither 
be entirely minimal nor maximal, but could have elements of both. On another 
level “continuum” allows space for vigorous and differing interpretations, 
which is suited to differing historical contexts. To refine this point I refer to the 
differing meanings of citizenship during apartheid and citizenship under our 
new democracy. It should be evident that the concept would have different 
meanings in relation to the differing historical frameworks which potentially 
shaped the term in the South African sense. Citizenship under apartheid was 
synonymous with a particular skin colour, whilst citizenship today is framed by 
political beliefs and contrasting interpretations of democracy.  
 
On the minimalist side of this continuum citizenship involves the proceduralist 
formal and legal status defined in juridical terms. The individual is a recipient 
and an executor of formal rights for his/her self-protection and personal 
benefit based on the rule of law (McLaughlin 1992: 236). This understanding 
is in line with Berlin’s (in Birch 1993: 96) notion of negative liberty. Minimal 
citizenship is concerned with local and immediate loyalties and responsibilities 
where the individual has his/her focus on immediate ends and personal 
benefits (McLaughlin 1992: 236). This transforms citizenship into a means – 
ends model thus undermining an obligation towards the “public” except when 
the individual chooses to or when there is personal gain. The upshot is that 
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the individual becomes law abiding simply for the acquisition and protection of 
such personal benefits. Public engagement or widespread involvement in civic 
affairs (such as serving on SGBs) are viewed with suspicion for the reason 
that the citizen is primarily a private individual, content with having the right to 
vote “wisely” for representatives. In relation to the social prerequisites for 
citizenship the minimal view is that the individual is more concerned with 
private matters than with those matters that are public. It regard formal 
equality as its foundation, emphasising individual privacy and the right to vote 
(McLaughlin 1992: 236). Interpreting McLaughlin I deduce that the minimalist 
conception diminishes a collective perspective thus undermining social 
interaction and potentially reinforcing existing identities and subsequently the 
status quo. At this end citizenship can be interpreted as passive. This view 
sees citizenship as only a part of the many private roles of a person with little 
need for civic responsibilities, because democratic vigilance is assured via 
democratic institutions, such as a legal opposition, free press and an 
independent judiciary. In this sense the democratic state machinery replaces 
civic virtues (Enslin & White in Blake et al 2003: 113). Does this mean that a 
virtue-free population/society can sustain democracy? I shall return to this 
question later on.   
 
At the other end of the continuum citizenship manoeuvres the individual 
beyond the formal and legal mode, encouraging him/her into mutual social 
collaboration in quest of a common good. McLaughlin posits that at this 
maximalist end the individual forms a community consciousness with a shared 
democratic culture of rights and obligations/responsibilities (1992: 236). Such 
a shared democratic culture implies negotiation, or alternatively debate and 
contestation as a means of arriving at the common good. It also presupposes 
that this common good is not static, but rather open to reflection and 
reinterpretation making the maximalist view of citizenship critical and dynamic 
by creating space for continual change. At this end loyalties and 
responsibilities extend beyond the immediate and local while encompassing a 
more substantial identity incorporating fuller, more significant public 
participation. It insists that social disadvantages of various kinds be 
considered as part of the individual's quest for justice (McLaughlin 1992: 237). 
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Issues with a broader public connotation, such as justice, recognition of social 
and economic inequalities, racial and ethnic discrimination, marginalisation of 
minority groups and so forth, become the concern of the citizen in the 
maximalist sense. This view of citizenship thus leads towards a more active 
citizen.  
 
The continuum developed creates the impression that minimal/passive 
citizenship is individualistic, static and would potentially reinforce the status 
quo while the maximal/active citizen is communitarian, critical and dynamic 
with the potential to challenge and transform the status quo. However, I earlier 
alluded to the idea that the concepts are not mutually exclusive and that 
elements of the one can be found in the other. My interpretation is that neither 
end is preferable, meaning that the minimalist end seems too weak while the 
maximalist end seems too strong/utopian. My view is consequently that 
democratic citizenship should fall between these two extremes where the 
individual would at times operate according to the minimalist notion, and at 
other times institute ideals of the maximalist notion.  
 
Having given some insight into the minimalist/maximalist debate I now return 
to the question that I posed earlier relating to what is expected of a citizen 
who resides in a democracy; or alternatively, can a virtue-free population 
sustain democracy?  
        
It is my view that civic virtues underpin democracy for the reason that the 
democratic machinery (legislated laws, independent judiciary, free press and 
a legal opposition) can potentially lead to abuse in the absence of such 
virtues. For example, in the case of South Africa, judges serving on the 
judiciary might for instance have a racial or ethnic bias that might possibly 
influence the decisions they make in favour or against a particular 
racial/ethnic group. Laws favouring the economic and social elite might be 
bulldozed through parliament on the strength of the elite’s influence/power via 
remunerated lobbyists or the ANC’s two-thirds majority, favouring neo-liberal 
policies that support market capital. White reinforces my view when she posits 
that: 
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Free speech, for instance, will not flourish in a society whose citizens 
do not want to give a hearing to unpopular views. Not only legal bans 
but also self-censorship and public indifference can inhibit free speech. 
Thus even in a society with well-developed political machinery citizens 
will need basic political virtues like trust and distrust and a sense of 
fairness (1996: 52-65).                         
 
Furthermore, Waghid posits that “… democracies depends not only on the 
justice of their institutions – for instance, in the case of South Africa on its 
Constitution, Bill of Rights, Constitutional Court and multi-party democratic 
system – but also on the quality and attitude of its citizens …” (2003a: 75). I 
interpret Waghid’s reference to “quality and attitude” as the link to civic 
virtues/values that might include tolerance, accountability, equity, trust and a 
sense of justice. Galston (1991:217) and Macedo (1990: 138) refer to a 
requirement of some level of civic virtue and “public-spiritedness” to engender 
a type of responsible citizenship. Furthermore Galston refers to four 
categories of virtues that include: 
 
• general virtues – such as law abidingness and loyalty; 
• social virtues – such as open-mindedness and independence; 
• economic virtues – such as work ethic, controlling self-gratification 
and adaptability to economic and technological change; and 
• political virtues – such as to determine and respect the rights of 
others, to evaluate the performance of representatives and a 
willingness to engage in public discourse (1991: 221-224). 
 
I am more interested in the virtues pertaining to a willingness to engage in 
public debate and the ability to question authority for the reason that it relates 
directly to school governance. This is not to say that the other virtues are less 
important. On the contrary without citizens being law abiding, democracy 
stands the chance of becoming ungovernable. The point is that school 
governance is based on a representative style of democracy and 
consequently citizens should have the capacity to question and keep 
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accountable those who govern in their name. Without this virtue 
representatives might represent their conscience at the expense of their 
stakeholder group. Relating to public discourse Galston argues that besides 
the willingness to participate, this virtue should include “the willingness to 
listen seriously to a range of views which, given the diversity of liberal 
societies, will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even 
obnoxious” (1991: 227). Together with Macedo he argues that citizens should 
give reasons that other citizens find agreeable for their political demands, 
meaning they need to persuade others of the “public good” of their demands. 
This, I argue, goes to the foundation of deliberation. Clearly then, even in an 
established democracy with a developed political machinery, citizens do need 
virtues. This relates to the “attitude” to which Waghid (2003a: 75) refers, 
which might include the ability to tolerate and work with others who are 
different (in terms of religion, culture, ethnicity, race, socio-economic standing 
etc.), the desire to participate in social and political processes and be 
accountable or keep those in authority accountable, the capacity to be vigilant 
and responsible when making environmental choices and generally make 
choices in such a way that it does not harm or negatively influence others. 
Kymlicka and Norman are emphatic when they claim that: “Without citizens 
who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even 
unstable (1994: 353). Having made my point clear with regard to the question 
I posed on virtues, I now address the issue of nation-building/national identity 
that I earlier referred to after which I shall further explore the model of 
deliberation. 
 
4.5.3. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP: SOUTH AFRICA’S 
          NATION-BUILDING EXPERIENCE  
 
Since the launch of South Africa’s democratic system of government in April 
1994 all policy initiatives was founded upon democratic principles contained 
within the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In the spirit of democracy such 
policies echoed human rights, freedom, justice, reconciliation and nation 
building. Put differently, it is a programme directed towards dealing with the 
past and at the same time developing the future. High on this agenda is nation 
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building. In fact it is difficult to find any of the top politicians of South Africa 
speaking to the public without reference to nation building. But nation building 
is nothing other than the cultivation of a South African national identity, or 
alternatively a responsible or democratic South African citizen.  
 
National identity in the sense called for by the ruling government in this 
country should be separated from those expressed by racial differentiation, 
ethnocentricity, and aggression towards non-members of the national 
community. National identity thus entails a basis for a shared sense of 
community in order to enhance social unity that should underpin our 
conception of citizenship. My reasoning for this separation stems from the 
painful history of the social and political “lived experience” that we are trying to 
overcome in South Africa. Besides more than forty years of institutionalised 
racism, ethic violence – particularly between Zulus and Xhosas5 
(predominantly in KwaZulu Natal but also in the Western Cape between the 
“vigilantes” and the “witdoeke”6) – was prominent until a few days before the 
first democratic elections in 1994. Since then the ANC government together 
with the Inkatha Freedom Party7 (IFP) worked relentlessly to foster an 
environment where these two communities can go about their daily activities 
in relative peace. The first President of the democratic South Africa made the 
Zulu political leader a cabinet minister, even though the IFP did not qualify for 
a ministerial post. It is my understanding that this was a gesture of goodwill 
towards what was then a rival ethnic group in order to give practical 
manifestation to the ideal of living and working with those who are different.  
 
Perceived from such a basis citizenship and national identity complement 
each other. Miller posits that; “… citizens need a shared identity to hold them 
together and provide them with a sense of community. It is claimed that such 
a conception of nationality can be rationally believed and can be separated 
from the forms of aggression that have given nationalism a bad name (1992: 
                                                          
5 The Zulus and Xhosas are two distinct ethnic groups within South Africa.  
6 The “vigilantes and the witdoeke” were local groups of the same ethnic divisions as mentioned 
earlier. 
7 A political party that predominantly attracted Zulu support – with its strongest base in KwaZulu 
Natal. 
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86). To further enhance this point I turn to Tamir who argues that national 
identity is not necessarily “ethnocentric but rather polycentric”, meaning a 
recognition of the possibility of a “plurality of nations” within the same political 
community (1993: 79). This is not to say that national identity does not include 
the potential to become aggressive towards those who do not share the same 
national values or have different interpretations of what is morally worthwhile. 
Recent atrocities in Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda on the African continent and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkans are reminders of how national identity can 
become so organic that it can drive the form of ethnic/religious cleansing 
witnessed in the mentioned countries. What I am arguing is that national 
identity can be a unifying force if the occupants of the nation state are 
prepared to accept that a plurality of people may exist peacefully within the 
same boundaries. Such a peaceful existence, however, needs to be nurtured, 
for the possibility to explode would remain inherent in the plural society. A 
case in point is Rwanda, where different ethnic groups (Hutus and Tutsis) 
lived peacefully for decades while under the surface a hatred for the “other” 
lurked, to spring to the surface when no one expected it. This is an object 
lesson for a country like South Africa calling for nation-building within a 
context of many cultures, religious orientations, ethnic as well as racial 
groups. So then, while national identity can potentially be the binding material 
within a plurality, it also inherently has the potential to explode that plurality 
into their smaller communities hell-bent on preserving their status even at the 
expense (death/murder/genocide) of others. It is thus my contention that for 
national identity to be the binding material of a plurality, it needs constant 
nurturing by all those citizens who occupy the plural space. It is at this level 
where I posit that deliberation among this country’s citizens has a role to play; 
it has the potential to foster the nurturing required to sustain a national identity 
within a plurality. I now further explore the deliberative model. 
                              
4.5.4. CITIZENSHIP AND DELIBERATION 
 
In my understanding of democracy two essential complementary principles 
underscore its practice. Firstly, it involves the equal distribution of power to 
make collective decisions and secondly it involves the equal participation for 
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collective judgments. The essential power apparatus is voting which may be 
deemed democratic when every individual who is affected by the collective 
decision has an equal right to shape the outcome via his/her vote. Such a 
vote then produces a decision. However, there does not seem to be a 
connection between the decision and what the individual wants, either for 
himself or for the collectivity. Democratic institutions should consequently not 
only distribute power through voting, but they should somehow secure a 
connection between the power to make decisions and equal participation in 
collective judgements. It is in this regard that Warren argues (and I tend to 
support his view) that communication which may include argumentation, 
contestation, demonstration, and bargaining is as central to democracy as 
voting (in Carter & Stokes 2002: 173). Communication in this sense involves 
the formation of opinions, developing reasons and justifications for one's point 
of view, “so that in one way or another voting as an exercise of power also 
expresses an act of judgement” (Warren in Carter & Stokes 2002: 173). I 
contend that deliberation as a means of communication is best suited to 
developing such collective judgements.  
 
To make a judgement the individual has to be clear as to what it is that he/she 
wants, but more importantly have an understanding of what others want. Put 
differently, the individual should be convinced of his/her stand and be able to 
reasonably explain his preference convincingly to others. Warren argues that 
deliberative democracy requires not only equality of votes, but also equal and 
effective opportunity to participate in processes of collective judgements. He 
further claims that: 
 
Deliberation about matters of common concern should not be restricted 
to political representatives, judges, media pundits, technocrats and 
other elites, but should infuse a society so structured that it underwrites 
ongoing processes of public opinion-formation and judgement (2002:  
174).  
 
This model of democracy takes as its starting point deliberation among free 
and equal citizens, committed to collective decision-making. In such a view 
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citizens share an obligation to propose reasons for settling differences 
through persuasive argumentation in the hope that others would accept their 
view as compelling. It is my contention that citizenship based on deliberation 
should be viewed as a citizenship that asserts that if individuals are to be 
subject to decisions, the requirement is that it ought to be justified in terms 
that all who are party to the deliberative process could be reasonably 
expected to accept. A deliberative conception of democracy opens the space 
for a more inclusive citizenship where individuals have equal opportunity to 
initiate speech acts. I have earlier argued towards a form of collective 
identity/democratic citizenship (nation building) within the diverse South 
African society. I now claim that such an identity may best be realised through 
a conception of citizenship based on the principles of deliberation. 
Deliberative citizens operate on the principle that “decisions affecting the well-
being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free 
and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and 
political equals” (Benhabib 1996: 68). Interpreting Benhabib I deduce that 
what is considered to be in the interest of all citizens (within a given 
community) would result from a process of collective (those citizens who 
would be affected by the outcome) deliberation “conducted rationally and 
fairly” where citizens have claims to the same level of equality and freedom 
(1996: 69).  
 
Citizenship conceptualised in line with deliberation affords the individual with 
the opportunity to become more informed on matters involving the collectivity. 
This is crucial if one of the ideals of citizenship is to become more critical. The 
deliberative process allows space for imparting new information because: 
 
• no single individual can anticipate and foresee all the variety of 
perspectives through which matters … would be perceived by 
different individuals and; 
• no single individual can posses all the information deemed relevant 
to a certain decision affecting all (Benhabib 1996: 71).  
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Deliberation is consequently a procedure through which citizens can become 
informed, leading the individual/citizen to critically reflect on his/her already 
held views and opinions. Put differently (as stated earlier), one cannot 
convince others of one's point of view without critically reflecting on their 
arguments which they produce to convince one of their position. In order to 
contest their argument one is compelled to sift through it in order to identify 
shortcomings that will form a basis for one's counter argument. Such 
contestation of opposing points of view would inevitably involve critical 
reflection. In this regard Benhabib posits that; “nobody can convince others in 
public of his/her point of view without being able to state why what appears 
good, and plausible, just, and expedient to him/her can also be considered so 
from the standpoint of all involved (1996: 72). Deliberation consequently 
induces critical reflection thus making the individual more critical. The citizen 
is not only more critical, but he/she also stands a better chance of inclusion 
because the communicative aspect of deliberation affords citizenship with the 
possibilities to become more inclusive (a shortcoming exposed earlier with 
regard to representation); an ideal that I earlier argued is essential in our 
movement towards a stronger form of democracy. It is thus my contention that 
citizenship as deliberation has the potential to reinforce the “cement” required 
to avoid national identity to lapse into its organic state thereby reinforcing the 
practices that give nationality a bad name. It is interpreting citizenship as 
deliberation that creates the possibilities for nurturing a national identity; the 
identity that the new democratic South Africa is striving to develop. This 
citizen is in terms of my argument and understanding a democratic citizen. 
 
From the discussion thus far it might seem as if I create the impression that 
deliberation is the panacea for modern pluralist democracies. This is not 
necessarily the case, for critics of deliberation, including Young (who can be 
described as being a deliberative democrat), argue that the emphasis on the 
importance of presenting rational arguments based on critical reasoning 
where the most convincing argument holds sway, has the potential to exclude 
rather than include (in Benhabib 1996: 122-123). She posits that: 
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… the norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as 
forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of some people. 
Deliberation is competition. Parties to dispute aim to win the argument, 
not to achieve mutual understanding. Consenting because of the “force 
of the better argument” means being unable to think of further counter 
argument, that is, to concede defeat (Young in Benhabib 1996: 123). 
 
I might to a certain extent agree with Young when she argues that deliberation 
might favour specific individuals or groups under specific circumstances. 
However, to claim that deliberation is “not to find consensus” or “to achieve 
mutual understanding” is to have the ability to predict outcomes. I do not think 
that Young has the capacity to determine beforehand that deliberation about a 
particular issue would always be governed by rules of competition and 
consequently this generalisation is prejudiced against the goal of mutual 
understanding. In fact those party to the deliberation process might agree 
(beforehand) that the aim of their exercise is to find a common understanding 
about addressing the challenge at hand, meaning their quest is towards 
understanding/consensus; towards finding the best possible route to address 
the challenge. When such deliberation provides the desired outcome (all are 
reasonably contented with the result) then the argument for “competition” 
does not hold. The first part of her argument might have merit in the sense 
that deliberation is premised on the ability to manipulate language or acts of 
speech. It consequently might follow that those with the best skills regarding 
language usage has the better chance of manipulating the proceedings of 
deliberation. I contend that this should not necessarily be the case. One might 
not posses articulation skills, but that does not mean that one is incapable of 
producing a rational argument. The point is that one only needs to be able to 
get one’s point across in such a manner that others, (party to the deliberation 
process), grasp the context of what is being argued for. It is my contention 
that for this to materialise, language inefficiency should not be an 
insurmountable barrier. To clarify my stand in terms of insufficient language 
skills and its potential impact on deliberation, I turn to Miller who posits that: 
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It seems to me, in fact rather insulting to disadvantaged groups to 
suggest that norms of argumentative rationality are loaded against 
them, because it implies that they cannot give coherent arguments for 
the changes they want to bring about (2000: 153). 
  
Following my own reasoning and with due consideration to Miller’s 
understanding, I argue that diminished language proficiency does not 
automatically translate into an incapacity to formulate coherent arguments. 
Individuals from marginalised groups might not perform with the same degree 
of dexterity when utilising language as a tool to lead to more informed, rational 
outcomes. However, to claim that this would disadvantage them to the degree 
that they would not be able to convince others of their point of view is to 
conclude that they are irrational simply because they do not have the skill 
levels of others regarding language manipulation. Such a conclusion is 
obviously an oversimplification and, therefore, an issue that does not 
necessarily impoverish the deliberation process. On another level Young 
herself proposes a route out of this supposed shortcoming when she suggests 
“greeting and narrative/story-telling” (Young 2000: 57-70).  
 
The other issue that I deem necessary to address relates to a claim that 
democracy, as I argue for, can only be practiced in an environment that is 
conducive to such practice. Put differently, low levels of education and 
illiteracy undermines the democratic ideal. The upshot of this is that school 
governance in disadvantaged communities is destined to less-democratic 
practices by virtue of the levels of illiteracy found in such communities. This is 
much the same argument as Young’s claim of “language”. Again I refute such 
a claim on the basis that democracy (as a theory) cannot be de-linked from its 
practices. In other words, inherent in democratic practices is its dynamism 
which may translate into learning, reflecting, critical understanding and 
reinterpretation. Being illiterate does not transform the democratic citizen into 
a moron who shall never have the ability to be critical, to think rationally or to 
learn. I have earlier argued for a call to “each one teaches one”. Such a call in 
itself has the potential to demonstrate, in a practical sense that democracy 
cannot, and I would argue should not, be divorced from its daily practices. 
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Democracy in practice affords the individual with the opportunity to improve 
his/her plight thus eliciting his/her inherent potential to overcome his/her 
seemingly lesser position. The claim that democracy can only thrive when 
conditions are favourable is therefore to my mind fallacious. 
       
My argument thus far shows that I do not suggest that deliberation is the 
answer to the many challenges presented by democracy. However, the thrust 
of my line of reasoning suggests that I am of the opinion that deliberation and 
a conception of democratic citizenship (as argued for) has a better chance of 
including the marginalised of society. I further suggest that this affinity to 
inclusion enhances the democratic ideal thus reinforcing a stronger form of 
democracy.  
 
4.6. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter I explored two strands of liberal democracy, claiming that the 
deliberative model is better suited to “include” as opposed to the liberal 
conception that favours individualism, which I argued has more potential to 
exclude. I explained that “excluding” reinforces a weaker form of democracy; 
conversely that “inclusion” leads to a stronger form of democracy. In my 
elucidation I linked deliberative democracy to the notion of national identity 
and citizenship. By framing citizenship as deliberation, I developed a citizen 
that I claim has the potential to reflect and reconsider his/her views in relation 
to the views of others thus becoming more critical. In this way I created a 
course to minimise and hopefully overcome the limitations of a liberal 
conception of democracy that emphasises the freedom of the individual. I then 
argued that representation framed along the lines of a deliberative conception 
of democracy has a better chance of including those who are party to the 
deliberation process. In this way the link between the representative and 
his/her stakeholder group is strengthened, thus reinforcing the legitimacy rule. 
This stronger bond I claim makes the stakeholders more inclusive thus 
producing a stronger form of democracy. While developing my argument I 
made reference to the minimalist/maximalist debate with reference to 
citizenship and explored virtues of a “good” citizen. I concluded that reasoning 
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along this continuum creates the space for a deliberative democratic citizen 
who would be more critical and, therefore, better suited to sustain a stronger 
form of democracy.  
            
In the following chapter I shall argue for the implications of a deliberative 
understanding of liberal democracy, or alternatively critical deliberative 
citizenship on school governance. I shall argue that the necessary conditions 
in disadvantaged schools seem to be minimal. I further argue that deliberation 
has major implications for school governance on at least three levels, those 
being the educative level, the community generating level and that 
deliberation is most congruent with “who we are”. I hold that by creating the 
conditions for deliberation leads to empowerment at the mentioned levels thus 
reinforcing more critical governance. In conclusion I shall argue that shaping a 
critical democratic citizen (responsible/virtuous citizen) has the potential to 
lead to a stronger democracy thus making school governance more 
sustainable. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF DELIBERATION ON SCHOOL GOVERNING BODY 
PRACTICES IN DISADVANTAGED SCHOOLS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I shall explore the implications of a deliberative understanding 
of liberal democracy on school governance in this country. However, I firstly 
argue for certain minimum realisable conditions, which I claim constitute 
democratic governance. Thereafter I shall explore deliberative governance 
and its implications for school governance practices at three levels. I then 
proceed to explain the marginalised, being those stakeholders with scant 
voice on governing bodies, as the “other” with the intention of arguing for their 
inclusion. I hold that a particular approach towards the “other” allows us to 
frame our practices and thus the manner in which we relate to one another on 
school governing bodies. 
 
With reference to the minimal realisable conditions I hold that deliberation or 
any form of serious debate cannot occur under conditions that are threatening 
to those who participate in this activity, meaning that governors cannot be 
expected to attend meetings when their lives are not secure. One may argue 
that our modern environment is of such a nature that there would always be 
an element of risk or injury, but when such risk is proportionally greater than 
what might reasonably be expected, then the impact on governance is such 
that it inhibits the democratic practice/ideal. The case studies dealt with in 
chapter 3, reveal that the areas where SGB meetings are supposed to be held 
are not secure. The socio-economic conditions within disadvantaged areas 
transform into these regions becoming fertile to robberies and other forms of 
physical attack, which in turn inhibits the governors from attending SGB 
meetings. The response of governors under such threatening conditions 
should not be faulted. In other words the minimum condition to attend 
meetings without feeling threatened is a precondition for any form of 
governance, including democratic school governance. It is my contention that 
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the responsibility to ensure a safe meeting place rests with the Department of 
Education. In as much as “The Safer Schools Project”8 is aimed at securing 
school environments whereby learners may receive their education in 
conditions of relative safety, the Department of Education ought to ensure that 
the place where SGB meetings are to take place should be safe and secure. 
This is not to argue that the Department is responsible for decadent behaviour 
in disadvantaged communities, but it would be unreasonable to expect that 
elected school governors should participate in a departmental initiative when 
the education authorities do not reasonably ensure the safety of such 
participants. I am not suggesting that the Department has the capacity to 
guarantee the safety of all participants. This might be impossible given the 
overall crime levels in this country, but I maintain that a minimum degree of 
safety should exist before deliberation or any other form of meeting can occur. 
I can consequently appreciate the reluctance of individuals to make 
themselves available to serve on SGBs. This does not mean that the 
Education Department should shoulder the blame for all parents who choose 
not to participate in the system of school governance. There might possibly be 
a reluctance to serve on SGBs for other reasons of which a perceived 
ineptitude may be one. The point is that the case studies reveal that safety is 
a consideration and the Education Department cannot expect that prospective 
governors should shoulder such responsibility on their own. Therefore, I argue 
that the Department, in collaboration with the particular school community, 
should put mechanisms in place to address the safety issue. To enhance this 
issue I refer to a principal in a school servicing a disadvantaged community.  
 
This school is situated on the border of an informal/squatter settlement where 
gangsterism is rife and unemployment is more than 50% (so I was told). 
Shebeens are littered across the area where drug-merchants are seen as role 
models because of their seemingly affluent lifestyle. Mr Anderson (fictitious 
name to retain anonymity of the principal) explains that it is extremely difficult 
                                                          
8 The safer schools project is an initiative by the Western Cape Education Department to counter 
violence and intimidation in schools during school hours. This initiative has its origins within the spate 
of violence and gang-activity that plagued Western Cape schools to the extent where teaching and 
learning was under threat from forces beyond the school parameters.  
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to convince particularly parents to avail themselves to serve on the SGB. 
According to him: 
 
The only way of securing a parent to serve on the SGB is when I have 
a personal meeting with that parent. I then have to convince the person 
that it is not that demanding, and that they don’t have to have degrees 
in order to be able to be a governor (sic). I think they try to avoid 
serving on the governing body because it is dangerous to attend 
meetings. I assure them that in the school they are safe but the 
problem is getting here. Most parents, I think, are scared to venture 
outside after sunset. Do you know that two days ago a mother of one of 
our learners was raped? It is such incidents that scare potential parent 
governors. 
 
In my informal discussions with individual community members whose 
children attend this school the response was almost identical to that of the 
principal. The general feeling was that it is too dangerous to venture outdoors 
after dark, particularly if one does not have one's own transport. 
 
From this report I deduce that without secure conditions for meetings to 
materialise the chances of conducting democratic governance, as the Schools 
Act demands, becomes problematic. It is for this reason that I argue for the 
achievement of minimum realisable conditions prior to the implementation of 
the School Governing Body’s Act. There is thus a need to improve and secure 
organised public spaces or shared forums that provide governors with the 
opportunity for collective inquiry. Organised public spaces, according to 
Crowley, refer to the spatial locations below the level of the state in which 
school governors share experiences and where they “… can discover and test 
their values through the essentially political (and non-politicised) activities of 
discussion, criticism, and emulation … (where they) come to understand a 
part of who they are” (1987: 282). The point is that democratic school 
governance cannot be taken for granted to naturally develop and sustain itself 
via SGBs. Instead, its occurrence in SGBs requires secured and organised 
public spaces in which school governors come to understand and pursue 
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collective inquiry and autonomous individual choices (Adams & Waghid 2003: 
22).      
 
The case studies conducted by Karlsson (in Kwa-Zulu Natal), Mbokazi (in 
three provinces across South Africa) and Adams and Waghid (in the Western 
Cape) reveal that the skills level of governor representatives, particularly the 
parent and non-teaching staff, are of such a nature that they cannot effectively 
represent their stakeholder groups. This is a serious shortcoming when one 
considers that the Schools Act is explicit on this issue. Put differently, the 
Schools Act states that the training of SGB members is a requirement by law. 
Under the heading Enhancement of capacity of governing bodies, the Act 
states:  
 
Out of funds appropriated for this purpose by the provincial legislature 
the Head of Department (HOD) must establish a programme to: 
 
(a) provide introductory training for newly elected governing bodies to 
enable them to perform their functions; and  
(b) provide continuing training to governing bodies to promote the 
effective performance of their functions or to enable them to 
assume additional functions (ELRS, 1999: 2A-18). 
 
The provisions are clear, meaning that the issue of training according to the 
Schools Act is obligatory, while the language is emphatic when it clearly 
states that the HOD “must” provide training. Such training should firstly 
“enable them to perform their functions” and, secondly, to promote the 
“effective performance of their functions”. In my deliberations with school 
governors I found that the initial training did occur, that is the first group of 
governors received some training. The problem revolves around the idea of 
“continuous training”. The respondents revealed that this was not forthcoming. 
I referred this to parent governors at four disadvantaged schools in the 
Western Cape who summed up this situation. The first one had this to say: 
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We heard that some training would be available but nothing is 
forthcoming. This is frustrating because we don’t know whether we are 
doing the right thing. We rely on Mr. Geduld (the principal), however, 
he is tired of having to explain everything before we can actually start 
with whatever it is we are supposed to do. 
 
The second governor claimed: 
 
I am an ardent chess player and enjoy the game. What I want to get 
across is that I can participate because I am familiar with the rules. If 
you want to participate you must be acquainted with the rules. I am 
sure that when I know the rules of SGBs I shall come to enjoy it. At the 
moment I learn as I go along. 
 
When I put it to this parent-governor that she should receive training, her 
response was that she had never heard that training was available. She 
subsequently informed me that none of the current-serving members on their 
SGB received training, and that included the teacher representative and the 
principal. I subsequently put the same issue to the principal who responded 
that he had informed the education authorities and was waiting on their 
response. 
 
The third governor posits: 
 
I am expected to raise funds for the school, but I was not exposed to 
how this can be done. You must understand I am a housewife for 
whom it is a battle to make ends meet. I know very little about 
fundraising. The principal suggested that I bake cake to sell in the 
neighbourhood. This I thought was a good idea. I took it upon myself to 
invest my own money in this venture and now at least I have a source 
of income which lessens the burden from my husband. You know he 
only works part-time. I cannot share this with the governing body 
because it is my money and my effort.        
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The fourth governor responded as follows: 
 
I don’t think I need training. Our school principal knows everything 
about SGBs and I rely on him to lead me. I am sure that he will not ask 
us to do things that would not benefit the school. He cares about all of 
us. The only problem that I have is that he is very secretive about the 
finances of the school. He and Mr. Carolus (SGB chairperson at this 
school) control the money. This is worrying because the learners 
requested that the SGB make a contribution towards the matric ball. 
You know the function at the end of the year? The immediate response 
was that there is no money.    
 
From my interaction with these governors it seems clear that the lack of 
training is a constraining factor, meaning that training towards representative 
governance becomes even more essential. I am not suggesting that some 
external uniform recipe exists whereby individuals would become competent 
governors simply because they completed a training course. What I am 
arguing is that according to the legislation the onus is on the Education 
Department to ensure that initial and continual training takes place.  
 
Another strain on the training issue is that governors representing the parent 
and learner stakeholder groups are transient, meaning that when the learner 
finishes matric he/she leaves with the skills that was acquired, leaving the 
next representative to start from scratch. This also holds true for the parent 
group for the reason that a parent may only serve when he/she has a child 
who is a learner at that school. Once the child of the parent representative is 
not a learner at the school, the parent’s term of office is terminated. However, 
such a parent may still serve as a co-opted member. The point is that if 
parents in disadvantaged communities are already reluctant to serve as 
school governors it becomes less likely that they will continue to serve after 
their child had completed his/her schooling. In relation to training and 
enhancing the skill levels of parent representatives one finds that such 
individuals who initially received training leave with those acquired skills. A 
system of skills transfer consequently seems important, but it is my contention 
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that a clause in relation to skills transfer should be incorporated within the 
School Governing Bodies Act. This does not suggest that improving policy 
would necessarily transfer into improved practices. The point is that such a 
clause could empower prospective governors for the reason that it would at 
least ensure a minimum amount of training, while at the same time it would 
free the Education Department from the burden of continual training. In this 
case the training would be transferred from those who received initial training 
to those who come into the system for the first time. This then transforms into 
skills not being lost.  
 
While it is not within the scope of this dissertation to prescribe the type of 
training required to sustain democratic SGBs, I would venture the possibility of 
working towards a notion of “civic virtue” as espoused by Miller. This is not to 
suggest that virtue can easily be taught, but a life skills orientation course for 
school governors incorporating an understanding of a “virtuous citizen” could 
possibly be a starting point for governors serving in disadvantaged 
communities. During such a course the conditions can be created where 
prospective governors are exposed to choosing between contesting 
alternatives, ie between upholding the law and transgressing it. I am 
suggesting that spaces be created for individuals to be exposed to differing 
options where they are compelled to choose. They are then expected to 
defend their particular choice. It is my view that by opening the space and 
exposing individuals to alternatives can go some way in training them to 
choose that which is reasonable, and more importantly for the improvement of 
their community. According to Miller: 
 
This citizenship is less a legal status than a role the citizen assumes as 
a full member of his/her community. To be a citizen one must think and 
behave in a certain way … which includes a set of obligations: to 
respect the law, to pay taxes, being willing to take active steps to 
defend the rights of others in the political community, and more 
generally to promote its common interests” (2000: 82). 
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Furthermore, Miller argues that this citizen volunteers for public service to 
serve on SGBs (my italics) and that he/she also wants to reach an agreement 
with other citizens so that what is done, is done in the name of all of them 
(2000: 84). Moreover, the virtuous citizen acts responsibly and above all, “is 
willing to set aside personal interests and personal ideals in the interest of 
achieving democratic consensus” (Miller 2000: 85). I argue that the acquisition 
of such skills through education and training could possibly pave the way for 
SGB representatives not only to fulfil in their civic duties, but more importantly 
to function more democratically.  
 
The final point I want to highlight in relation to securing the minimum 
realisable conditions revolves around the issue of poverty as portrayed in the 
practices of School Governing Bodies in chapter three. It is my understanding 
that it would be difficult to exercise a politics of democratic governance if the 
state does not secure basic social rights to school governors, which include 
the right to basic needs such as decent housing, access to clean piped water, 
electricity, uncomplicated access to health care, to earn a living or to receive 
social benefits. In other words, providing basic social rights to school 
governors would help secure loyalty to a politics of democratic governance. A 
potential critic might argue that giving people food would not secure 
deliberative politics, and rightly so. I am, therefore, not arguing that the 
provision of basic social rights would transform the marginalised poor into 
deliberative democrats. What I am suggesting is that securing the basic 
conditions could possibly lay the foundation for such individuals to be better 
able to participate in a system of democratic school governance. Currently 
much of their energy is channelled into making ends meet thus leaving them 
with less energy to participate voluntarily in school governance. This point 
becomes more complicated for the reason that the impression might be 
created that I am arguing for basic social rights only for school governors. 
Such a view is erroneous. I am only mentioning school governors for the 
reason that my aim is to secure the minimum conditions for deliberation to 
occur.  
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I particularly emphasise the necessity for state intervention to curb the fall-out 
of globalisation in relation to job losses that swell the unemployment figures in 
this country. Minimising the high levels of unemployment through state 
intervention (and this is not only for serving governor members) would go 
some way in improving the chances of the poor and marginalised to earn a 
living thus laying the foundation for jobless citizens to overcome their 
condition of poverty. In this way socio-economic injustices rooted in a market 
related economic structure of globalisation might be reduced thus paving the 
way towards an enhanced level of freedom, which is a constitutive feature of 
democracy. The point is that unless basic social rights are provided to the 
disadvantaged poor sector of the population of South Africa, it would be 
difficult to exercise a politics of democratic school governance. Having argued 
for the minimal realisable conditions to be in place in order to enhance 
democratic school governance, I now move on to a discussion of some of the 
implications of deliberation and citizenship for school governance.  
 
5.2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DELIBERATION 
 
School governance is in essence about the internal politics of a school. In 
other words it has implications for learners, teachers, non-teaching staff and 
parents. Put differently, SGBs and the manner in which they function has a 
direct bearing on the development of the whole school, meaning that all the 
functions that a school has to perform may in some form or other be related to 
school governance. It is on this level that I claim that deliberation and a 
conception of democratic citizenship has a distinct political function for school 
governance. I shall first relate the deliberative experience to communication, 
legitimacy and governability. I then argue for the further implications of 
deliberation on three different levels. 
 
5.2.1. ACCOMPLISHMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH DELIBERATION 
 
Firstly, if one accepts that representative democracy involves the aggregation 
of preferences, then it invariably necessitates a type of bargaining among 
contrasting interests. Deliberation, as a mechanism for such bargaining, 
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emphasises decision-making through public reasoning. It is my view that the 
deliberative experience impacts on individuals’ preferences, opinions, 
understandings and appreciation for the positions held by others who are 
party to the process. Warren argues that “reasons should motivate individuals 
to alter, replace or justify existing preferences or received norms” (Carter & 
Stokes 2002: 186). I interpret Warren as referring to the idea that “altering 
your preference” includes the capacity to reason in terms of common interests 
as opposed to slavishly expecting one's personal preference to prevail. This, I 
earlier argued, is directly related to my understanding of democratic 
citizenship. From this point onwards I thus use the terms governor, 
representative and citizen interchangeably as if they are synonymous. To 
further elaborate on Warren I deduce that one cannot alter or replace one's 
preference in favour of another’s without thinking in terms of the other’s 
argument to the extent that one concedes that the other’s argument seems 
more plausible. This means that when a SGB opts for deliberation, its 
consequence should be that governors/citizens would be able to generate 
changes in interests, preferences, opinions and judgements in their mission to 
resolve conflict. This invariably involves communication between the 
representatives. It is via this communicative action that ideas, beliefs, norms 
and possible disagreements are exchanged with the view of reaching 
understanding. In other words a basic implication of deliberation for school 
governors is its communicative power. Put differently, one cannot participate 
in the deliberative process without communication, but to test whether such 
communication does not give undue power to a single or certain 
representative/school governor I turn to Benhabib who posits that: 
 
An agreement should follow the general rules and can only be morally 
binding if such agreement was achieved through the process of 
deliberation (1996: 70). 
 
This test includes the following features: 
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1. Participation in such deliberation is governed by norms of equality 
and symmetry (all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to 
question, to interrogate, and to open debate); 
2. All have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; 
and; 
3. All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules 
of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or 
carried out (Benhabib 1996: 70). 
 
In conforming to the assigned rules every representative on the SGB operates 
on the same level as every other representative. In other words framing 
communication in relation to the mentioned features could probably neutralise 
the “power play” in which particularly principals indulge. Put differently, if 
principals adhere to the assigned rules it creates the space for other 
representatives to question and interrogate the preferences of the principal 
thus forcing the principal to produce a convincing argument to support his 
preference. In this way the power of the principal, by virtue of his position of 
authority, is minimised for the reason that he is compelled to listen to, and 
consider the opinions of other representatives. The upshot of this is that 
“communication” may also be correlated to practical rationality, because it 
potentially directs the individual to a tolerance or leniency towards new and 
even conflicting information. If the procedures enable communicative power 
by displacing (power distributed evenly among representative governors) and 
constraining (curbing the power of the principal) power, then outcomes 
become more legitimate, more rational and more ethical than another possible 
political arrangement (Warren in Carter & Stokes 2002: 189). Viewed in this 
way, communication guarantees freedom of speech, not only in the sense that 
the previously marginalised representative’s voice is heard, but much rather 
that such voice has the inherent possibility of influencing outcomes. I should 
mention that freedom of speech in this sense does not relate to an 
unconstrained freedom, because it finds expression within the assigned rules. 
In other words it does not mean that one may “say what one likes” but that 
one should produce reasons for what one prefers. Furthermore, such reasons 
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should be of such a nature that others who are party to the deliberative 
process find them reasonable. 
  
Secondly, the accomplishment of legitimacy is directly linked to the concept of 
democracy. However, Warren argues that over the last several decades’ 
contemporary liberal democracies have been struggling with the deficits of 
legitimacy. He further posits that such deficits occur when “states respond to 
the imperatives of markets, often overriding the guidance of democratic 
institutions” (2002: 187). It is my understanding that the measure of legitimacy    
would determine the strength of democracy. This means that the more 
legitimate the outcome, the better the chances for its acceptance would 
become thus reinforcing my quest towards a stronger form of democracy. It is 
at this level that deliberation and the type of citizenship it potentially fosters 
may strengthen democratic decisions.  
 
Deliberation that is premised upon rational argumentation produces reasons 
to motivate a particular preference. This process should not be confused with 
legitimacy, as Max Weber argues for. Weber refers to rational legitimacy only 
to the outcomes of positive procedures (Warren 2002: 187). The legitimacy 
that I am referring to suggests that when it is produced via a process of 
deliberation it has the potential to engage most types of conflict and not 
necessarily be restricted to those that hinge on positive procedures. Once an 
understanding amongst the representative governors is reached (after 
contesting views and convincing arguments are produced), the outcome is of 
necessity more acceptable to all. In this way the decision to be implemented 
is more legitimate thus reinforcing a stronger conception of democracy. 
Legitimacy in this sense extends the Weberian notion for it may include a 
means to bring understanding even in cases where citizens conflict on moral 
grounds. With reference to moral conflict Warren argues that it is unlikely that 
deliberation about moral reasons will change moral convictions. However, 
deliberation can have another effect for negotiating moral conflict. He argues 
that deliberation can demonstrate that positions are held as a matter of 
conviction and not opportunistically. By accepting this view, deliberation may 
lead to understanding (without agreement) thus fostering a recognition and 
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respect among those who subscribe to conflicting moral identities (2002: 188). 
Recognition and respect make it less likely that one party will seek to impose 
their principles on another. I tend to agree with Warren on this point for the 
reason that individual governors/citizens are exposed to conflicting moral 
identities thus giving them some insight into the reasons others give for 
holding such principles. On another level it speaks to the notion that 
deliberation would not always lead to agreement. The upshot is that critical 
analysis of conflicting moral identities engages the representatives thus 
exposing them to the rationality behind such views. However, it affords 
governors/citizens the opportunity to deal with the situation that to disagree 
does not translate into the end of conversation. The point is that 
understanding opposing interpretations allows for the possibility to tolerate 
those who differ on moral issues without closing the space for further 
deliberation. Put differently, if deliberation was not the preferred means of 
confronting conflict, the representatives might not have been exposed to the 
reasons for the differing moral identities. In other words their opportunity to 
engage in critical discourse would have been lost, potentially leading to further 
conflict, rather than understanding. It seems plausible at this stage to claim 
that deliberation fosters critical reflection by exposing representatives to 
competing points of view and understandings. Deliberation, therefore, 
empowers and affords the citizen with the means of identifying his/her own 
restricted voice/view. This identification, I hold, could possibly lead to 
emancipation in the sense that the representative is afforded the opportunity 
to overcome that which had earlier been a restriction.   
 
Thirdly, if the argument for increased capacities for resolving conflicts by 
altering preferences, producing legitimacy and generating respect for 
competing moral identities is plausible, then the deliberative process should 
have a positive bearing on producing critical democratic citizens and 
consequently also a positive bearing on governability. The upshot is that when 
governability is improved, democracy becomes stronger, because it means 
that the capacities for collective citizenship action have increased.          
 
 181
Having sketched some of the accomplishments of deliberation I should warn 
against the understanding that every deliberative exercise will necessarily 
produce an effect that is good for democracy, but the potential exists that on 
balance the effect may be positive. Alternatively there might not be another 
way in which the effects as argued for above may be achieved.        
 
5.3. IMPLICATIONS OF DELIBERATION FOR A PRINCIPAL 
 
Although I am convinced that deliberation has implications for all stakeholder 
groups who are represented on SGBs, I particularly need to emphasise the 
role of a principal. My reasoning relates to the findings of the case studies that 
were produced in chapter three. In these case studies the power of the 
principal (more recently referred to as the manager of the school) and the 
manner in which he/she dominates proceedings at SGB level makes it 
necessary for me to attend to his/her position separately. This distinction 
between principal and manager also needs to be briefly unpacked.  
 
The term manager, with reference to the principal of a school, is a recent 
phenomenon in South African education. It is rather difficult to pin the exact 
date that the terms came to be used synonymously, but the term manager 
(with reference to the principal) made its first appearance with the advent of 
Outcomes Based Education (OBE) in this country. Much of the terminology 
changed with the onset of OBE to the extent that the teacher became a 
facilitator, Standard 6 became Grade 8, Standard 7 Grade 9 and so forth. It is 
at this stage that the principal became the manager. Now this is not an 
insignificant occurrence, taking into consideration my earlier argument for the 
influences of globalisation. The point is that the role of the principal also 
changed. He needs to operate more as a manager does in the business 
sector. This leads to an understanding that a good school is a well-managed 
school, meaning its functions is based on sound financial principles. The 
argument is that when a school is well managed, the educative portion of the 
school would automatically fall into place. Put differently, if the academic 
results of a particular school are below par, or alternatively below the national 
average, such a school is deemed to be less well managed and thus 
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dysfunctional. To solve the problem the Department of Education puts 
pressure on such a school to improve its school management system, 
reasoning that this would transform into the learners producing better results. 
Such a response slants towards top-down control in the guise of 
management. It shifts the responsibility and blame onto the management 
system of the school without considering other variables that might impact on 
poor results.    
 
It should, however, be obvious that such a myopic view towards improving 
results would not bear fruit. The improvement of results hinges on many other 
variables which include, the academic ability of the individual learners, the 
teaching/learning resources available, and the socio-economic environment 
within which the teaching and learning process takes place.  Management 
and the leadership given by the principal is consequently only a portion of 
what drives a successful school. The point is that management and 
particularly the manager have become an important position and function 
within the school. It is expected of the principal to manage his school 
effectively, while at the same time not transgress the thin line between internal 
school management and school governance where all stakeholders should 
have a voice and a role to play. It is this “thin line” between managing the 
school and school governance that becomes problematic. This might be 
because the South African School Act (SASA) does not define precisely what 
professional management entails (Education Human Resources 1999: 8).  
 
Management is interpreted as “the day to day administration and organisation 
of teaching and learning at the school and the performance of the 
departmental responsibilities that are prescribed by law. It includes the 
organisation of all activities which support teaching and learning” 
(Understanding the S.A. Schools Act 1997: 11). Such an interpretation of 
management is rather vague with the result that the role of the principal 
becomes murky. This grey area in relation to the dual role (of the 
principal/manager) might be a reason for the many problems relating to the 
role of the principal on School Governing Bodies. It is my contention that the 
principal cannot straightforwardly distinguish between his role as a manager 
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relating to the day-to-day functions, and his role as a school governor attuned 
to the lawful functions as prescribed in the South African Schools Act.  
 
The guide “Understanding the South African Schools Act” does not resolve 
this issue, but rather exacerbates the problem. For example, part of 
management is to “organise all activities which support teaching and 
learning”. However, part of governance is “to provide quality education for all 
learners at the school” (Understanding the SASA 1997: 14). The overlap 
between these two specific duties seems obvious. In other words while 
providing quality education the governance motive can easily slip into the 
management domain by determining that teacher Y does not fulfil in their 
expectations. On the other side the manager/principal might be happy with the 
educative/teaching performance of teacher Y. This then becomes an area of 
conflict between managing and governance. While this is an issue that the 
Education Department (in terms of less ambiguous policy) needs to address, 
it is my view that the problem (in the interim) can at the very least be 
minimised, if not overcome, by incorporating the process of deliberation and 
acquiring the skills of virtuous citizenship, as argued for. There are other 
examples that may be cited, but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The point is that the border between management and governance is not 
distinct, which gives rise to problems that should not necessarily be dealt with 
within schools. Alternatively they are problems that the Department of 
Education needs to address.  
 
Deliberation has a role to play on many other different levels of which I shall 
explore three. The first, being its educative power; secondly, its community 
generating power; and thirdly deliberation’s transformative ability to influence 
what Cooke refers to as “the congruence of the ideal of politics articulated (by 
deliberative democracy) with whom we are” (2000: 947).  
 
5.3.1. EDUCATIVE POWER OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
The challenge for democratic school governance is to maintain inclusiveness 
in the maelstrom of controversy, developing the ground rules for debate and 
 184
through an equitable negotiating process establishing the boundaries of 
permissible conduct. A crucial lesson in democratic school governance is 
learning how to disagree (Knight & Pearl 2000: 199). I have argued that these 
attributes, with reference to developing the “ground rules” and “learning how 
to disagree”, can best be realised through implementing the model of 
deliberative democracy which I contend fosters democratic citizenship. Knight 
and Pearl (2000: 199) argue that the deliberative process may be construed 
as “a meaningful exercise in cognitive development”, meaning that all 
governors are “encouraged to use logic and evidence to buttress” their 
preferences thus developing and refining the art of persuasion. It is my 
contention that it is how the art of persuasion is developed and advanced that 
would determine whether SGBs move towards stronger democracy. Put 
differently, by absorbing or inculcating the rules and opportunities that 
deliberation provides, school governor representatives acquire the potential to 
prepare themselves for the responsibility of becoming democratic citizens. I 
now tease out its implications for school governance.  
 
First, deliberative democracy as a normative concept emphasises the ideal of 
public reasoning, meaning that it is important that a claim/preference can be 
defended publicly (within the governing body where all stakeholders are 
present and party to the deliberations) on the basis of good reasons. Illiterate 
governors with little or no experience in the practices of democratic 
governance might not be able to realise this requirement. It is for this reason 
that I emphasised the role of training as a support mechanism for governors in 
order that they may acquire the skills to participate in deliberation. In a 
broader sense this means that we need arguments that can help us to choose 
rationally between various options on offer as a route to follow in order to 
overcome a particular problem. The point is that if the principal feels that his 
view should always hold sway by virtue of his position of power in the school’s 
hierarchy then it creates problems. This is evidenced by the case studies that 
were produced. Governors serving in disadvantaged communities readily 
admitted that they sided with the principal not in relation to him producing the 
more reasonable argument, but on the understanding that “he knows best”. 
On closer scrutiny one finds that the principal dominates proceedings within 
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SGBs by virtue of his position, and not because deliberation has produced the 
most generally acceptable outcome. To overcome this problem I think two 
issues need consideration. Firstly, the issue relating to power and how it is 
utilised, and secondly, that associated with “the rules of the game”. Before I 
explore these two issues I continue to explain the educative power inherent in 
the process of deliberation. 
 
The argument regarding the educative power of deliberation holds that it 
should be advocated primarily because of the beneficial effects it has on 
those who participate in it. J.S. Mill and Hannah Arendt advocate that 
participation in public affairs is a good in itself and, therefore, “not merely as 
instrumental in bringing about, or implementing, qualitatively better political 
decisions and laws” (Cooke 2000: 948). On this view the benefits of 
participation in public affairs (such as a SGB) are primarily personal. In other 
words participation improves the moral, practical or intellectual qualities of 
those individuals who choose to participate. Cooke argues that “it makes them 
not just better citizens – though clearly this is crucial – but also better 
individuals” (2000: 948). To enhance the argument for the educative power of 
deliberation one presupposes that it has educational benefits that a non-
deliberative process does not have. For example, it affords the deliberator an 
opportunity to acquire the skills to produce and present an argument 
coherently, rationally, reasonably and lucidly. Such production of skills, the 
adherents of deliberation argue, does not occur automatically, meaning that 
its potential is linked to participating in the process of deliberation. I am not 
arguing for the educative spin of deliberation as justification for the process. 
On the contrary I am only highlighting its educative potential in relation to 
argumentation and the skill of argument formulation. Cooke (2000: 949) 
supports viewing deliberation from such a vantage point when she claims that 
“the educative effects of participation in public deliberation are at best side-
effects, they cannot be the main point of, or the sole justification for, such 
deliberation”.                          
       
On another level deliberation affords its participants with the opportunity to 
engage others with the intention of finding a solution to a common problem. 
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The upshot of this is that the problem affects the deliberators as a group. 
Although individual governors represent particular stakeholder groups with 
distinct interests, the group identity cannot be ignored. It is my view that within 
this “group identity” deliberation creates the space for individual 
representatives not only to produce arguments, but also absorb and analyse 
the arguments of others. To this end individual governors are afforded the 
opportunity to acquire the skill of reflection not only on his/her own argument, 
but also on the arguments of others. Put differently, those who are party to the 
deliberative process are afforded with the opportunity to make contact with 
different points of view, meaning coming to grips with the thinking processes 
of others. The result is that the deliberator (school governor) comes to see the 
problem from perspectives that he/she did not imagine before. Such exposure 
to alternative points of view enriches the individual in terms of argumentation 
thus broadening his/her perspective on the issue under consideration. This 
thus becomes part of an educative process where the individual becomes 
more critical not through formal “schooling,” but through participation in the 
process of deliberation. The other important factor to consider relates to the 
process of deliberation itself. Here the educative tendency relates to the 
process instead of the contents of the argument which the process makes 
possible.  
 
When one considers that the process of deliberation makes it incumbent on 
each deliberator to adhere to the rules governing deliberation, it seems 
reasonable to expect that governors would act differently after having 
engaged in its process. Furthermore, such individuals now possess the skills 
to look at and apply information differently. I hold that such skills have been 
acquired in two ways. Firstly, during the training process (as prescribed by the 
Act) and secondly, by participating in the process of school governance where 
they are exposed to the deliberative process. . For example, let us for 
argument's sake presume that the school governor (parent) has to deal with a 
situation within his/her home environment. His/Her child wants to attend 
school, wearing “tekkies”9, knowing that such footwear is not part of the 
                                                          
9 A specific type of footwear used mostly by athletes for sport or training; might also be referred to as 
training shoes.  
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school uniform. The child might reasonably argue that the style or type of 
footwear has no bearing on his/her academic performance. The parent would 
then have to produce a counter argument, invoking the school rules in relation 
to uniform. The point is that the process of deliberation, which for this parent 
had its origins within the school governing body framework, is practically 
being invoked outside of that formal framework; something that might not 
have occurred if the parent was not exposed to the process at school 
governing body level. I am arguing that the skills acquired through 
participating in the deliberative process at school governance level may be 
acted upon in other spheres of social relations. Such an understanding of the 
educative implication of deliberation could possibly have an influence on the 
realisation of more virtuous citizens. I am consequently convinced that the 
deliberatory process has distinct educative value for its participants.  
 
Before I explore the second level on which deliberative democracy may have 
an influence I should return to the issue of power that I raised earlier with 
reference to the principal/manager. 
 
5.3.2. POWER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
 
The evidence – according to the case studies – reveals that the power of the 
principal (in especially disadvantaged schools) seems overwhelming. I shall 
now tease out this issue and argue that what power is or who has any amount 
of power should not be emphasised, but rather the manner in which power is 
used should be explored.  By bringing the different stakeholder groups 
together within the system of school governance (predetermined by the South 
African Schools Act), power and influence are distributed to individuals who 
traditionally had a previously curtailed voice within school governance. I have 
earlier argued that each representative stakeholder grouping would want to 
emphasise his or her own interests, which could possibly occur at the 
expense of another interest group. I argued that this was a recipe for conflict. 
It is my contention that the manner in which this conflict is handled fits 
comfortably into the approach in relation to the utilisation of power. 
Democracy presupposes that power would be exercised, but the use of power 
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has to be in accordance with certain democratic regulating principles, 
including the legitimate and controllable exercise of power (Criblez 1999: 
111). The question that needs to be addressed relates to what type of power 
relations are justifiable in a system of democratic school governance? In other 
words how can power be utilised legitimately and meaningfully in the interest 
of democratic educational governance? To answer this question I shall in the 
main rely on the five power-bases identified by French and Raven (in Johnson 
& Scollay 2001: 49) that include:  
 
1. Legitimate power. The legitimate right of the leader usually by virtue 
of the position that the leader holds to prescribe or control 
behaviour; 
2. Coercive power. The leader’s control over punitive measures or 
punishment; 
3. Reward power. The leader’s control over reward; 
4. Expert power. The leader’s special knowledge or expertise; and 
5. Referent power. The subordinate’s desire to identify with the leader. 
 
Johnson and Scollay posit that the school principal (manager/leader) utilises 
“one or more of these power bases to influence subordinates” (2001: 49). I am 
particularly interested in their reference to “subordinates” for the reason that it 
is significant in its assumption of degrees of authority. Interpreting them, one 
might reasonably presume that the representative groups serving on SGBs 
are not equal. Sartori (1987: 30) supports this view when he argues that within 
the people as a whole (all representatives serving on the SGB) some people 
count more, while others count less. I interpret his “counting” to relate to the 
individual capacities that each governor brings into the SGB system. If such 
an interpretation is plausible, then the understanding of “subordinates” in this 
sense should not be deemed as problematic to the politics of democracy. It 
would be absurd to expect that the principal, teachers, learners and parents 
must all be equal in terms of their skill-levels that they bring into the structure 
of school governance. Given that they posses differing levels of skills the 
possibility exists that one might exploit his/her superior ability to undermine 
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those less powerful. However, it is the manner in which this is done that would 
determine how legitimate or democratic it is.  
 
In his study Rahim (in Johnson & Scollay 2001) found that the utilisation of 
legitimate, expert and reverent power bases were positively associated with 
compliance, while reward and coercive power is associated with resistance. I 
argue that resistance fuels conflict that can potentially contribute towards the 
governing body becoming less capable of solving the original problem. I 
consequently argue that particularly the principal should have the skill to 
identify the outcomes of power-base usage prior to its practical 
implementation. In this way some of the potential conflict may be avoided to 
foster a more reasonable form of democratic governance. I am not arguing for 
the utilisation of power for the principal only. I am aware that all stakeholder 
representatives have the potential to activate their ability to employ power as 
a mechanism to influence the position or understanding of other 
representatives. Each of the representative constituencies on the SGB brings 
its own basis for influencing decisions. The point is that the evidence 
illustrates that the power of the principal (in disadvantaged communities) is 
overwhelming to the extent that decisions on SGB level become less 
democratic. The movement should thus be towards the use of legitimate, 
expert and reverent power, as opposed to reward and coercive power.  
 
When one considers that power includes the ability to influence others to 
behave in a manner in which they would not otherwise have behaved, then its 
influence on a social level is “simply a special instance in causality, namely, 
the modification of one person’s responses by the actions of another” 
(Johnson & Scollay 2001: 50). Following such a line of reasoning, it seems 
plausible that when one has influence, the effect on a decision seems to be 
without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command. Johnson 
and Scollay refers to this as “behavioural contagion”, which means involving 
the spontaneous pickup or imitation by others (governors on the SGB) of a 
behaviour initiated by one member, where the initiator did not display any 
intention of getting the others to do what he/she did. While this view is 
debatable for the reason that one might question the reason for the initiator 
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exhibiting the particular behaviour other than influencing the rest within the 
group. Put differently, if the intention is not to influence the behaviour of others 
then what is the point? It is not my intention to question this issue. I am trying 
to expose the idea that power or influence is not necessary linked to force or 
coercion. On the contrary: there are other ways in which power can be 
positively employed without relating to force. It is this kind of operation of 
power that I argue, should be the manner in which SGBs apply the concept.            
 
Giddens (1991) takes this argument further in his exploration of the duality of 
power. He posits that power refers to “ … the capability of individuals to 
intervene in events so as to alter their course, and is defined as 
transformative capacity: the use of resources to secure desired outcomes”. In 
this view power depicts a duality between the individual and the structure, in 
other words between the governor and the governing body/structure. Giddens 
argues that there is an unavoidable interplay of power between the capacity of 
the agent (individual power) and that of the capacity of the structure (power 
based within the SGB via the South African Schools Act). Structure is viewed 
as an accumulation of rules or policies (inherent in the SASA) that we employ 
to shape our practices/social conduct. I am aware that Giddens does not refer 
to structure in terms of a School Governing Body structure. His reference to 
structure is more related to the structural characteristics of a social 
community, where it forms patterns of acceptable social behaviour, 
particularly guided by the utilisation of language skills. Put differently, his 
“structure” refers to those with the skills to manipulate language having more 
power than those with fewer language abilities. However, interpreting Giddens 
in this way, meaning that structure may reasonably refer to the South African 
Schools Act, it seems as if the power of the structure in some way precedes 
the power of the individuals who serve on governing bodies. Put differently, 
the structure which is legislatively binding, is the origin of power. In other 
words the South African Schools Act determines and shapes the constitution 
of governing bodies which must be within the parameters of official policy, 
meaning that power in terms of who may assume it, is predetermined. Here I 
am particularly referring to how stakeholder groups are elected. For example, 
the Act determines that schools should ensure that a Representative Council 
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of Learners (RCL) is elected as the statutory body of recognised learner 
leadership in the school. The structure thus gives power to learners who 
otherwise might not have had such power. The point is that the interpretation 
of the Act thus becomes crucial with the emphasis on how power is 
distributed.  
 
In my reading of the Act I conclude that power should be evenly distributed 
with the exception that parents are the majority on the SGB. This translates 
into them supposedly having more power. In reality, however, the case 
studies reveal that this is not the case in disadvantaged communities. On the 
contrary, the principal wields power. Such an interpretation of Giddens 
consequently leads to an understanding that according to the “structure” the 
power as assumed by the principal leads to less democratic practices. I have 
earlier argued that a more plausible route would be to interpret power in terms 
of how it should be utilised. It is thus my view that power be practiced in terms 
of the three power bases that I have referred to, meaning those bases that are 
premised on reasonable influence rather than force or coercion.  
 
Furthermore, with power comes responsibility, meaning, “a person can neither 
be held accountable nor responsible for something which is not under his/her 
control” (Morrow 1989: 3). In referring to my earlier argument regarding 
“structure”, the South African Schools Act codifies the power in terms of how 
School Governing Bodies should function. Two examples should suffice to 
demonstrate that responsibility in this sense is directly linked to power. Firstly, 
every SGB has to operate within a binding constitution, thus limiting its sphere 
of influence and subsequently its power. Secondly, school governors are 
legally recognised as juristic persons thus opening the space for civil suits 
against them. In other words they can be legally sued. This form of built-in 
checks and balances curtail the misuse of power and could act as a deterrent, 
and alternatively it discourages irresponsible representation. This is not to say 
that the use of power is curbed to such a degree that it does not come into 
play on other levels. I have earlier argued that those who have the skills to 
manipulate language have the edge when it comes to deliberation. Superior 
language skills make the deliberation process easier thus giving an advantage 
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to those possessing such skills. One's power to deliberate in this sense might 
slant towards the exclusion of those with fewer language skills.  Having made 
my point clear on the utilisation of power I now return to the implications of 
deliberation on school governance. 
 
5.3.3. COMMUNITY-GENERATING POWER OF DELIBERATION 
 
With the demise of apartheid and the emergence of the South African Schools 
Act (1996: Act No 84) our schools have become sites of multi-culturalism, 
religious diversity, social inequality and racial diversity. It is within this 
framework that school governance should operate. The realm of school 
governance is, therefore, a melting-pot of differences that has to operate as a 
single unit (School Governing Body) notwithstanding such differences. This in 
itself is a daunting task, but add the notion that individuals already possess 
different life philosophies together with little or no training in democratic 
governance; the task of governance becomes more intimidating. How then 
can democracy flourish under conditions of such individual differences? It is 
my contention that diversity should not necessarily be equated with disorder 
or disarray. On the contrary: diversity has the potential to enhance unity. This 
point finds expression in the preamble to the South African Constitution which 
refers to being “united in diversity” (More 1998: 369). My understanding of 
being united in diversity goes to the heart of deliberation and also 
underscores my argument for critical virtuous/democratic citizens.  
 
The success of a deliberative form of democracy depends on creating the 
conditions and institutional arrangements that foster the public use of reason. 
In this respect the SGB structure with its elected stakeholder representatives 
can be said to be an institutional arrangement that is premised on democratic 
ideals. It is to the conditions within this institutional arrangement that I am 
referring in the sense that I favour free and open dialogue among 
representatives who are “equal” and who are intent on making rational 
judgements about ways to resolve problems. The consequence is that all are 
committed to resolving the conflict in such a way that the outcome is 
reasonably agreeable to all. However, such an agreed outcome should of 
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necessity have gone through the process of deliberation where each 
representative should have had an equal opportunity to influence the decision 
by means of producing a rational coherent argument in order to persuade 
others that his/her route is the most plausible under the present 
circumstances. Following such a route leads to fostering unity among diverse 
stakeholder representatives. The argument is, therefore, towards a more 
communitarian version of deliberative democracy. Communitarianism favours 
the common good, meaning that the individual (stakeholder representative) 
becomes aware of his/her co-membership within a collective (SGB). Such an 
awareness appeals to the individual’s co-membership, rather than to his/her 
individual preference. The common good thus finds precedence over the 
individual preference. In this way the power of community formation overrides 
individuality. On another level this reinforces the quality of tolerance in the 
sense that the individual gives preference to the larger picture/value as 
opposed to that from which he/she may personally derive a benefit. Following 
such a line of reasoning the deliberative process fosters a sense of 
community irrespective of individual diversity. I further elucidate the 
community formation implication of deliberation by citing an example.                       
 
At a school in the Plumstead/Wynberg10 region a meeting was called to 
resolve the conflict that had arisen because learners, together with their 
parents, of the Islamic faith felt aggrieved that they had to return to school 
after attending Friday congregational prayers. The crux of the argument 
seemed to revolve around the perception that other schools in the immediate 
vicinity closed at 12:30 on a Friday, whereas this school closed at 14:30. The 
Muslims argued their position within the framework of religious freedom 
(guaranteed by the Constitution) and the SGB having the right to determine 
school times (within the framework of the minimum hours per week, as 
prescribed by the South African Schools Act). After some heated debate a 
compromise was reached precisely because the Muslim representatives who 
argued for them were part of the school community, notwithstanding that they 
only comprised 15% of the school population. Prior to this debate/deliberation 
                                                          
10 A suburb in Cape Town in the Western Cape Province. 
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it seemed as if the status quo should remain, but the force of the 
communitarian ideal and the fact that the school community determined that 
creating divisions between Muslims and those of other faiths was more 
detrimental to the development of the school, influenced the resulting 
outcome. This example illustrates in a practical manner that deliberation has 
the ability to generate and foster a sense of community. I should, however, 
report that the deliberation process took place within an open forum, meaning 
not within the official framework of the School Governing Body. Parents of all 
learners were invited to this meeting. The point is that although the conflict 
was seemingly resolved in a forum where all constituents had an opportunity 
to influence the outcome, it still had to be ratified at SGB level. The governors 
representing different stakeholder groups were exposed to the preferences of 
all the stakeholders and the outcome and ratification thereof became a 
formality.  I now move onto my last implication of deliberation which refers to 
deliberation’s transformative tendency as being congruent with “whom we 
are”.                   
                          
5.3.4.  TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF DELIBERATION: BEING    
CONGRUENT WITH WHOM WE ARE      
 
The argument that deliberative democracy elucidates the ideal of democracy 
most harmoniously with “who we are” is premised on two key essentials: 
 
a. That there are certain key normative conceptions of knowledge, of 
the self and of the good life that are so central to modern Western 
history and traditions that rejecting them is not a matter of simple 
decision, but would require a fundamental reorientation in our 
thinking, and; 
b. That a deliberative model of democracy makes best sense of these 
normative conceptions (Cooke 2000: 954). 
 
Cooke argues that certain normative conceptions of knowledge, of the self 
and of the good life, are not simply a matter of choice, but are constitutive of 
our self-understandings. Put differently, firstly, there are no authoritative 
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standards independent of history and cultural context that could adjudicate 
claims to epistemic validity and that the knowledge in areas of science, law, 
politics and morality should be construed as fallible. Secondly, autonomous 
reasoning is a valuable part of human agency. Thirdly, everyone is in principle 
deserving of equal respect as an autonomous moral agent with a distinct point 
of view (Cooke 2000: 955). In my understanding of Cooke’s argument he 
means that knowledge of “science, law, politics and morality is never final or 
conclusive". In other words such knowledge can never be deemed to be 
irrefutable, or alternatively it is always open to contestation and 
reconsideration in the light of new evidence and arguments. It is this reference 
to unconstrained rational argumentation that seems the more appropriate 
route for mediating rival claims. Viewing knowledge in this way helps to 
explain the value attached to autonomous reasoning with particular emphasis 
on “rational accountability and objectivity of judgements” (Cooke 2000: 955).  
 
On the one hand the school governor, by implementing the process of 
deliberation, is inclined/schooled to accept responsibility for his/her self-
interpretations and judgements as expressed in his/her willingness and ability 
to provide reasons in support of his/her preference, and to enter into 
unconstrained dialogue in defence of it. On the other hand, with reference to 
“objectivity of judgement”, the school governor is inclined to engage in 
dialogue (contestation of opposing views) with others in a critical and reflexive 
way while acknowledging the principle of equality and respect for the point of 
view of others. In this sense “equal respect” should be interpreted as every 
individual/representative being capable of making an informed decision and 
that no one’s argument should be discounted on the grounds of their ethnicity, 
race, sex, socio-economic class, culture, religion, illiteracy or even 
incoherence. Put differently, deliberation affords the individual 
citizen/representative the opportunity to value any contribution to the 
deliberation process as worthy of consideration. Viewed in this way, it seems 
logical that one cannot indulge in a practice where one considers others’ 
points of view and then determine that one's own argument is less convincing, 
without that person having the capacity to change. I use change in the sense 
that the individual is willing to transform his/her view and resolve to abide by 
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the outcome that he/she agreed was more plausible. Consequently one does 
not only transform one's argument in favour of the more convincing one, but 
also one's behaviour by abiding by the agreed to decision. This in turn 
suggests a conception of autonomy in terms of an ideal of self-authorship; 
“citizens are held to be politically autonomous insofar as they can see 
themselves as authors as well as subjects of the law (political principles, 
public policies and so on) … suggesting, in addition, a deliberative 
interpretation of self authorship” (Cooke 2000: 956). To conclude this 
argument I turn to Cooke who posits that: 
 
If there are no historically authoritative standards of legal, political or 
moral validity, then in order for citizens to be able to see themselves as 
authors in this sense, they must be able to see the law, political 
principles and public policies as the outcome of a process of public 
deliberation whose aim is the best possible justification of the 
proposals under discussion (2000: 956). 
 
The three points that I have raised with reference to “fallible knowledge 
claims, autonomous reasoning and equality as moral agents” can be 
combined to provide a strong argument in favour of the implications of 
deliberative democracy, or alternatively democratic citizenship on the 
governing process in disadvantaged schools. My reasoning is that they imply 
the need for an environment in which all governors have an equal opportunity, 
and are equally encouraged, to contribute to deliberation on matters of 
common concern. I have earlier hinted that such matters of common concern 
emerge in an atmosphere of conflict where each governor might be intent on 
pushing his/her stakeholders’ preference. However, since the overwhelming 
purpose of school governance is to produce outcomes that have the best 
possible justification and is in the least instance agreeable to all, it 
presupposes a community ideal. Therefore, I tend to agree with Cooke when 
she argues that deliberation conceived in this way is in principle unbounded, 
and “has an in-built transformatory potential”. If this argument is plausible then 
the upshot is that deliberation and its concomitant implications have a direct 
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bearing on the type of critical citizen that the post-apartheid government 
wishes to realise.  
Moreover, the transformatory influence of the deliberative model of 
democracy finds resonance with the transformation agenda of education in 
general and schooling in particular in this country. The notion of 
transformation has been part of education’s aim since the inception of the 
South African Schools Act. To put it mildly, transformation has been the 
foundation on which South Africa hopes to raise its new nation, where there 
would be space for all its citizens notwithstanding our different cultures, 
religious orientations, ethnic origins, political affiliations and so forth. It is thus 
my view that deliberation’s implication for transformation underscores our 
movement towards fostering a nation within the diversity of the population of 
South Africa. I am not arguing that the deliberative model on its own can 
practically realise this objective, but I am rather arguing for the potential of the 
deliberative model in furthering the cause of forging a South African nation. I 
am aware that there are other forces that have the potential to retard this 
process. However, I am confident that following the deliberative ideal has the 
potential at least to create the opportunity for the voices of the marginalised to 
be heard. School governance has the potential to become more democratic 
when representatives acquire the skills to make persuasive arguments for 
learners, parents, teachers and even legislators. Representatives involved in 
school governance, having acquired the tools to become more critical and 
reflexive can then possibly become lobbyists, involved in the political process 
that influences the direction of education.  
 
Having argued for the implications of deliberation on school governance in 
disadvantaged communities, I am still perturbed at the possibility of exclusion. 
Although I feel that my argument for inclusion via the deliberative model of 
democracy is plausible, a potential critic may argue that deliberation’s 
insistence on the production of critical argument has the potential to either 
silence or devalue some groups. Although I have argued against this 
tendency I feel this might still pose as a brittle moment in this dissertation. As I 
have earlier explained, Young argues that the deliberative model has the 
tendency to restrict democratic discussion to argumentation thus implicitly 
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slanting towards cultural bias that can lead to exclusion. She further posits 
that: “Its assumption that unity is either a starting point or goal of democratic 
discussion, moreover, may also have exclusionary consequences” (Young in 
Benhabib 1996: 122).  To address this issue I shall frame the marginalised 
(those who might still potentially be excluded) as the “unknowable other”. My 
aim is to circumvent the supposed tendency of exclusion that might occur 
notwithstanding my argument that deliberation as a process has a better 
chance of inclusion than other strands of democracy. I now proceed with 
framing the “other”, but I shall first refer to a conception of being reasonable 
for the reason that reasonability is linked to creating space for otherness. The 
way in which being reasonable is perceived also determines the possibility for 
exclusion alternatively inclusion. I shall present my argument for a specific 
interpretation of reasonableness to further enhance the possibility of including 
those marginalised voices (learners and parents) serving on school governing 
bodies. 
 
5.3.5. AN UNKNOWABLE OTHER IN SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
 
In the main I shall rely on the concept of via negativa and Michalinos 
Zembylas to construct my argument for the “unknowable other”. I shall also 
refer to the works of Emmanual Levinas in my quest to make sense of what 
referring to the “unknowable other” means. It is my view that the tradition of 
via negativa incorporates unknowability, which can occupy an important place 
in school governance, a place that embraces the unknowable other.  My hope 
is to create space for unknowing as an act of ethical responsibility by 
emphasising the uniqueness of the other. Reflecting on the value of 
unknowing may potentially inspire in school governors a sense of vigilance, 
responsibility/accountability and reasonableness. In short, unknowing is an 
act of embracing/including otherness. I shall return to this issue after exploring 
the concept of being “reasonable”. I find this concept to be crucial in our 
relations with “the other” for the reason that it supports a view that otherness 
is reciprocal. In other words, to be reasonable have implications for those who 
regard the marginalised as other, while at the same time it has implications for 
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those who are deemed other. I now turn to an analysis of reasonableness 
after which I shall explore how “otherness” may foster inclusion.    
 
5.4.1. WHAT IT MEANS TO (BE) REASON(ABLE): A BROADER  
          CONCEPTION  
 
I cast my gaze back to the years of apartheid when it was common practice 
for the then leader of the Nationalist Party11, Mr P.W. Botha, to argue in terms 
of “reasonable people”. In his speeches on the desirability of separate 
development where South Africa’s ethnic groups were referred to as being 
nations in their own right, he would continually refer to “reasonable people”. In 
reality he argued that reasonableness meant to agree with his understanding, 
thus accepting apartheid or separate development. Those who opposed his 
view were then deemed to be unreasonable. I allude to this example to point 
to the understanding that “to be reasonable” can be in the form of a rebuke or 
in this particular case a command to silence the thoughts and feelings of 
others. Burbules reinforces this point when he argues that: 
 
When reason is held to be a strict adjudicator of legitimate and 
illegitimate expression, its effect is often to suppress those beliefs and 
values which do not measure up to its standards (1993: 1). 
 
In my reading of Burbules I deduce that when one's understanding runs 
roughshod over the understandings of others, meaning that one is averse to 
other points of view, then the individual cannot claim to be reasonable. Put 
differently, the term reasonable is invoked in a fallacious manner, meaning its 
aim actually borders on the unreasonable. The point is that invoking reason or 
being reasonable in this sense leads to exclusion. It excludes all those who 
supposedly are not reasonable.  
 
Particularly post-modern philosophers have contested a formalist conception 
of reason/rationality, firstly by arguing that any ordering system of thought is 
                                                          
11 The National Party was the ruling party that produced/steered apartheid policies prior to the advent 
of   democracy in South Africa. 
 200
inherently discursive. This might be true, for we choose the rules by which we 
want to live through the way that we converse and cooperate with each other. 
In other words we do not discover such rules or conventions in perfect form 
somewhere, waiting only to be revealed by contemplation of untainted reason. 
We make them up over the course of our collective cultural history. Burbules 
argues that this is true even for “the conventions of argumentation” (1993: 1). 
However, when a particular way of thinking, of reasoning, of rational 
argumentation and of mediating rival claims of truth have survived the test of 
time, then it suggests a flexibility and efficiency that other alternatives might 
not match. In other words reason/rationality should be fulfilling its purpose 
beyond the preferences of those who promote its application.  
 
Secondly, postmodernists argue that formal conceptions of rationality exclude 
considerations of affect and non-cognitive elements of thought and feeling. 
This criticism seems fair particularly at the level of social interaction where the 
formal validation of ideas (during discussion) may exclude the disadvantaged 
or marginalised groups, especially if their language skills should be 
rudimentary. It is this claim that I have extracted as a brittle moment in this 
dissertation. However, if reason has a discursive or communicative grounding 
(discussion), then part of the process of creating and maintaining effective 
communicative relations will entail matters of feeling, empathy, and concern. 
The result is that arguing for a more inclusive and multifaceted conception of 
reason/rationality reinforces its value, because the very values of tolerance 
and openness to diversity of modes of thought and feeling express such 
standards (Burbules 1993: 1). If such an understanding is plausible, then the 
one alternative might be that we abandon the idea of rationality as an 
impartial arbiter of the rules of clear thinking; a dispassionate means for 
reaching concrete conclusions or a common guide to human thought and 
conduct. The other alternative would be to regard reason/rationality as a 
practice growing out of communicative interactions in which the full play of 
human thought, feeling, and motivation operates. It is my view that the second 
alternative is more plausible if a more substantive conception of reason, or 
rather reasonableness, is possible.                   
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Burbules suggests (and I tend to agree) that “reasonableness” refers to the 
virtues and capacities of a person who is related in specific contexts to other 
persons and not necessarily to the following of formal rules and procedures of 
thought (1993: 3). Virtues in this sense may be flexible aspects of character 
fostered by the communities and relations with others who provide the context 
in which we choose and act. In relation to school governance, stakeholder 
representatives within the context of School Governing Bodies encourage 
such “flexible aspects of character”. Moreover, virtues affect our conduct 
because it portrays aspects of our character that affords us the opportunity to 
care about the feelings of others, meaning that such virtues are part of who 
we are. Put differently, a person who wants to be perceived as operating 
within the bounds of reason wants to make sense. To be reasonable 
consequently is to make sense, to be fair to alternative points of view, to be 
careful and prudent in the adoption of important issues, to be willing to admit 
to being fallible and so forth (Burbules 1993: 3). These are the qualities one 
hopes school governors would internalise and practice when they deliberate 
about issues that concern their school communities. Doing so would not only 
enhance the chances of the marginalised to be included in the process of 
deliberation, but also improve the likelihood of them influencing decisions. It 
should be noted that such qualities are not displayed by following certain 
formal rules of reasoning. They are rather revealed in an array of 
circumstances that are not governed by strict rules.        
 
Another dimension of reasonableness relates to one’s capacity to enter into 
communicative relations where people inquire, disagree, adjudicate, explain, 
or argue their points of view together, in pursuit of a reasonable outcome. This 
is precisely what school governance is about. The outcome is reasonable to 
the extent that those who are involved in the communicative relation (school 
governor representatives) are satisfied, not only by the means through which 
the outcome was reached, but also by the outcome itself. Burbules supports 
this understanding when he posits that: 
 
This communicative aspect is chiefly what makes the pursuit and 
attainment of reasoned positions a practical and contextual endeavour. 
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… We judge the adequacy of our reasoning and conversation by the 
efficacy and social acceptability of the conclusions they derive; and we 
judge in turn the reliability of our conclusions by the thoroughness and 
care of the processes by which we reached them (1993: 3).   
 
I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a more substantive conception of 
reason/rationality for the reason that the outcome of this form of inquiry might 
not be settled (convincingly) in advance by means of a particular logical 
argument. Rather the process of reasoned inquiry is manifested in the 
thoughts, conversations, and choices that the actual persons involved pursue 
towards some conclusion. I further argue that such a notion of 
reasonableness, incorporating my claims for deliberation makes a strong case 
for a type of deliberation that does not exclude those whom Iris Marion Young 
claims are susceptible because of deliberative democracy’s insistence on 
critical rational argumentation. Furthermore, if the participants claim to be 
reasonable people, this conclusion is as reliable as can be. The opposite may 
also be feasible, meaning that the conclusion might be mistaken/wrong, but it 
can be established as such and be rectified only by further applying the same 
process.  
 
I have shown that the patterns of investigation or scientific inquiry play an 
important but limited role when people sought to understand the “truth” of their 
situation. I argue that such patterns are effective only in social contexts of 
communication, practice, and judgement. The issue at stake now concerns 
the nature of these contexts and how we conduct ourselves within them. To 
address this issue I again rely on Burbules and his claim that four traits seem 
to be central to reasonableness, those being objectivity, fallibilism, 
pragmatism and judgement. The idea is to show that these characteristics of 
reasonableness can be translated from a formal decontextualised language 
(rationality) to one concerned with personal character, practical contexts, and 
communicative relations. Framed in this way it becomes richer and more 
effective, and is also better able to withstand some of the postmodernist 
criticisms that I have raised.  
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• Being Objective 
 
Two conditions seem to be crucial when adopting an objective attitude, those 
being tolerance and a “pluralistic sentiment”. I have dealt with the concept of 
tolerance as a constitutive feature of democracy in chapter three. I thus only 
reiterate that developing tolerance depends on the kind of communicative and 
other social interactions one has with others. A person who lacks tolerance 
cannot enact that component of reasonableness called ”objectivity”. 
 
Regarding the requirement of “pluralistic sentiment”, objectivity is supported 
by the position of having regarded a range of other points of view thoughtfully 
and to realise that each has its merits. In this way one is protected from an 
attitude that there is or can be “one best way” for all. The range of differing 
points of view should have been seriously considered (by all) before an 
outcome is reached. To do this one should not only have some intellectual 
capacity, but also aspects of character, personal relations, and social contexts 
that encourage and support the development of objectivity. When participants 
are able to do this, meaning they invoke values of tolerance and pluralism, 
they may be regarded as objective for the reason that they are able to display 
methodological as well as moral edicts (Burbules 1993: 4). In other words 
persons with a vast intellect, who cannot consider opposing points of view, fail 
to be objective. In this sense, those who are able to listen to others without 
critically reacting, also fail the objectivity test. At both of these extremes such 
persons fail to be reasonable. This particular point goes to the heart of power 
relations as played out in the school governance context. Invoking objectivity 
in this sense has the potential to curtail the power of the principal, or 
alternatively to improve the power ability of the marginalised stakeholders so 
that they may have an increased effect on outcomes.    
 
• Enabling Fallibilism 
 
Karl Popper reminds us not to be afraid of making mistakes because it is 
through discovering error (via a process of falsification) that we are driven to 
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change; that we proceed not towards truth, but away from error. This motive 
for change extends beyond scientific hypothesis testing (positivism’s 
falsifiability) to a broader vision and attitude towards life. The point is that we 
have all experienced error or failure, however, the manner in which we react 
to it is vital. If we have learnt a lesson that strengthened our capacities to 
endure then we accept fallibility may have positive aspects. The outcome of 
fallibility teaches us how to respond under the same set of circumstances in 
future. In this sense being fallible is a component of a reasonable person. 
Conversely, if the failure does not prepare us to act differently in future, 
meaning that if we did not learn anything from it then we cannot be 
considered to be reasonable people.  
 
The question that follows is what does this virtue entail? Initially it requires a 
commitment to take risks that run the possibility of error. In other words, 
withholding commitment, or always deliberately complying with the obvious in 
order to circumvent mistakes, runs the risk of avoiding change, or alternatively 
avoiding the creation of opportunities to learn. Secondly it requires an ability 
to not only recognise the wrong but also being able to admit it to oneself and 
to others. Burbules argues that in this way we learn to hear and respond 
critically to the criticisms of others (1993: 5). Thirdly, it involves reflection in 
order to determine how the error occurred and how it might possibly be 
avoided in future. In short it leads to learning, and it leads to change. 
Reasonableness in this view drives change through a process of not only 
admitting to failure, but also learning from it. Again its influence on the 
practice of governance seems obvious. Accepting that one is fallible relates to 
an understanding that it is virtually impossible that one can always be right. In 
other words if the principal wants to claim that he is reasonable, then he has 
to afford others the opportunity to make mistakes for the reason that he has 
the inherent potential to do likewise. When citizens/governors are capable of 
applying reason in this sense, it opens the space for inclusion and at the 
same time restricts the probability of exclusion. 
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• Being Pragmatic 
 
Here pragmatism is not used in the Deweyan sense, but rather referring to 
attitude: a belief that practical problems drive the process of intellectual, moral 
and political development. Pragmatism in this sense is sensitive to the 
particulars of given contexts and a variety of human needs and purposes. 
Accordingly Burbules argues that it reflects a tolerance for uncertainty, 
imperfection, and incompleteness as the existential conditions of human 
thought, value, or action, yet also recognises the need for persistence and 
flexibility in confronting such difficulties (1993: 6). For example, in practice it is 
easier to determine when we are wrong than when we are right, the 
philosophical consequence being a distrust of teleological conceptions of 
rationality. I am of the opinion that we rely on certain approaches of inquiry 
not because we can be sure that the outcome is the best, but because 
experience proved that such approaches are more reliable to pursue an 
outcome. There is, however, no guarantee that it would produce what we 
seek; it is merely the prospect that the approach is more reliable than another. 
To this end Burbules posits that: 
 
Such a commitment to a process of inquiry … without certainty of 
results is what defines the pragmatic attitude; and this is a primary 
feature of reasonableness (1993: 6).   
 
We are frequently in situations where problems appear intractable and where 
the outcome is unpredictable. In such difficulties a reasonable person would 
approach the problems with an open mind, adapting and persisting in the face 
of initial failure. The issue at stake, however, is that a choice is made. This is 
the sign of pragmatism. Furthermore, Burbules clarify that the pragmatist (as 
being argued for) needs a supportive context in which an emphasis on 
success is not exaggerated. In other words it is a context where failure or 
disappointment is accepted as a condition of growth and where cooperative 
assistance is socially and personally accepted as alternatives (1993: 6).     
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• Implementing Judgement 
 
Burbules argues that “one of the reasons that a dispositional account of 
reasonableness is prior to, and not just a supplement for, an emphasis on 
logicality is that one of the chief characteristics of a reasonable person is the 
ability to judge, to distinguish situations in which a rational calculation in the 
narrow sense might be called for” (1993: 7). In other words a reasonable 
person knows when not to try to reach conclusions in a particular rational way 
because it is not reasonable to apply logic or the strict rules of evidence in 
every situation. Part of judgement is the capacity for moderation, even in the 
exercise of reason itself. If such an understanding makes sense then it is fair 
to argue that we are not always reasonable. Conversely, we sometimes fail to 
act on our best inclinations for the reason that we are fallible or prone to 
mistakes. Accepting this, I have earlier argued is part of our pragmatic spirit. 
Also consider that there is often more than one reasonable thing to believe, to 
say or to do. It is part of our pragmatic spirit to choose without necessarily 
relying on formal conceptions of rationality. The point is that we do not always 
and under all circumstances exercise the rules of dispassionate clear thinking 
in order to derive at the “best” or “right” outcomes. In the actual practice of 
human communication, strict and conclusive argument is rare, causing us to 
sometimes act against our better inclinations. This does not mean that our 
capacity to balance conflicting views, to adhere to rules of rationality or to 
exercise serious reflection becomes redundant. On the contrary, we only 
sometimes act without considering it. Accepting, and having an appreciation 
for sometimes limiting our tools of inquiry when making a judgement, is 
consequently part of being reasonable. Moreover, reasonableness includes a 
deliberate awareness of trying to improve our communicative interaction with 
others. According to Burbules this entails remaining open to the influences of 
exploration and negotiation, but more importantly to pursue mutual 
understanding. In this endeavour, a respect for the force of reason is crucial, 
as is the attempt to be clear, coherent, and accurate in what one says. To 
conclude this argument I refer to Burbules who argues that: 
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In each of the four elements that have been discussed, the process by 
which we exercise and cultivate these virtues involves us in a set of 
communicative interactions with others. They are neither acquired nor 
exercised in isolation. … Through encountering new, challenging, and 
often conflicting ideas; through making mistakes and trying to learn 
from them; through persisting through levels of difficulty and 
discouragement to something more worthwhile; and through learning to 
judge in practice both the applicability and the limits of the general 
principles and skills one acquires. … Through the exercise of these we 
learn to be reasonable (1993: 8). 
 
Having argued for what it means to be reasonable, and how it has the 
potential to overcome the criticism of the deliberative model supposed 
tendency to exclude, I now claim that this potential pointed at deliberation by 
its critics, is now further reduced. Even though I am convinced that my 
argument is sufficient to persuade a potential critic that being “reasonable” 
could and should be incorporated in our understanding of citizenship, and in 
doing so the possibility for exclusion from the deliberative process becomes 
remote, I still proceed with exploring the notion of the “unknowable other”. My 
aim remains to create space for the voices of the marginalised thus making 
citizens more critical in my search towards a stronger form of democratic 
governance. 
 
5.4.2.  VIA NEGATIVA AND UNKNOWABILITY: TOWARDS INCLUDING  
THE MARGINALISED OTHER IN SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
 
Via negativa is based on the notion that God is ineffable and that the best way 
to God is through silence and un-knowing (Zembylas & Michaelides 2004). In 
other words, in order to come to know the indescribable God we need to un-
know the normal content of our awareness of Him so that an awareness of 
God may flow in. I should immediately stress that “to come to know” cannot 
and, therefore, should not be equated with “knowing”. Conversely one may 
come to know without fully knowing, or alternatively that which the individual 
comes to know might not necessarily be true. What a person comes to know 
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might possibly be one's interpretation of what a person estimates might 
possibly be true. The upshot of this is that where we have no rational 
understanding of something, or are unable to fully describe or explain it, we 
can nonetheless experience it as real. This form of “knowledge” St. John12 
refers to as “unknowing” (Zembylas 2005: 141). Responding to the “other” is 
therefore not an issue of knowledge about the other, but implies approaching 
the other as an unknowable entity. If we want to learn something from the 
other we should approach such Other with ignorance. In other words we 
cannot pre-empt what otherness is or what the other might be. At best our 
understanding and grasp of otherness can only be realised if and when we 
approach the Other out of ignorance, meaning our starting point is from “zero” 
knowledge of the other. Put differently, we “attend” to the other by recognising 
that the other is unknowable, in the hope that we may learn something in the 
process. In this regard Zembylas posits that unknowing describes a 
realisation of inadequacy to anything approaching full and comprehensive 
understanding (2005: 142). Consequently the Other is incomprehensible to 
the extent that we can never attain full knowledge about him/her. Levinas 
argues that one way of getting to grips with unknowing is to think of God as 
the inexpressible and the unknowable, because He keeps silent and remains 
unknowable, just as the Other is unknowable (in Zembylas 2005: 146). 
Following this argument it seems clear that our relation with the Other 
becomes an experience “of the impossible”, of the impossibility of knowing 
him/her. It is, however, possible to experience the Other. The unknowability of 
the Other signifies that the relationship with the Other is an ethical 
relationship. In this regard Levinas argues that:  
 
Ethical responsibility to the Other is not a matter of free will, because 
one has infinite responsibility to the other. The impossibility of knowing 
the Other is precisely the condition of ethics; the encounter which 
occurs between self and Other gives birth to an infinite ethical 
responsibility (in Zembylas 2005: 147). 
                                                          
12 St. John of the Cross (Spain, 1542-1591) is considered as one of the most important mystical 
philosophers in Christian history. He is responsible for major works, including Ascent of Mount 
Carmel, Dark Night of the Soul, and Spiritual Canticle of the Soul.  
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The argument that ethical responsibility is not “a matter of free will” is 
significant for the reason that it implies that responsibility for the Other 
becomes the domain of every human being. Ethics, as interpreted by Levinas, 
has no absolute rules that prescribe responsibility towards the Other, which 
means that no one ever knows whether his/her response in relation to the 
Other is just. In other words ethics “as a relationship” is a matter of sensibility, 
not the application of objective and universal rules. Conversely, there is no 
certainty whether one ever fulfils his/her ethical debt to the Other (in Zembylas 
2005: 149). Having given some insight into the “unknowability” of the “other”, I 
now move on to explore how this relates to the marginalised voices within 
School Governing Bodies in disadvantaged communities.              
 
5.4.3 THE UNKNOWABLE OTHER IN SCHOOL GOVERNANCE 
 
I have earlier argued for the impossibility of ever knowing the Other. When 
one frames the marginalised as Other the consequence is that the 
marginalised can never be known. In this regard I contend that school 
governance should not focus on “knowing” the Other (this is impossible) but 
rather approach governance as open communication and attention to the 
Other. Unknowing in governance would then refer to a commitment to the 
impossibility of knowing. One might argue that if it is impossible to know, then 
what is the sense in trying to pursue, that which in any case is impossible? 
The answer lies in how one interprets or understands “impossible”. Biesta 
argues that “impossibility” does not denote that which is not possible, but that 
which cannot be foreseen as a possibility, and thus the recognition of the 
impossibility of knowing releases the possibility of transgression (2001: 48). 
An important implication of unknowing is that stakeholder representatives 
(who serve on SGBs), especially in a pluralist society, need to give up their 
position as knowers and engage in ethical relations that welcome and attend 
to the experiences of the Other. This is a call for accepting and respecting 
Otherness, alternatively the movement should never be to “sameness”. The 
point is that once there is a radical onslaught to change the Other to conform 
or to become the same, such a practice involves unethical behaviour. On this 
issue Zembylas is emphatic when he argues that:  
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The fundamental concern of Western philosophy is to make the Other 
an object of knowledge, something to be understood. In this way 
strangeness is reduced to sameness and alterity becomes controllable 
(2005: 155). 
 
The consequence of this is that alterity should be preserved, because this 
kind of experience opens us to the voice of the Other. Once the other is 
accepted as Other, the foundation is laid for accepting ethical responsibility 
which is infinite. This implies that one's responsibility towards the other never 
stops.         
 
Following this argument, it is precisely the ethical responsibility of the 
principal, the teacher representatives and those who currently dominate 
proceedings on SGBs to respond to the marginalised representatives by 
stimulating and inspiring them. In so doing they may inspire and enable the 
“voiceless” representatives to develop their own capacities which might 
include the ability to deliberate and so overcome their seemingly powerless 
status. This does not mean the “voiceless” undergo change for the sake of 
better participation on the contrary from an ethical perspective it merely 
means that opportunities are created for the “voiceless” to be better able to 
represent the marginalised stakeholder groups. For example the marginalised 
representatives may be given the opportunity to relate their testimonies of 
poverty and hunger so that the principal and teacher representatives can 
witness their suffering. This might provoke new forms of experiencing the 
Other. The point is not to “know” the Other; the ultimate goal is to “witness” 
the unknowable Other. In this way respect for the Other becomes possible. To 
further clarify this point I turn to Zembylas who argues that: 
 
The significance of a pedagogy of unknowing is that it provokes 
dominant school governors to re-evaluate what constitutes educational 
governance in order to inspire the marginalised to develop and enact 
relations with one another (2005: 152 my italics). 
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Witnessing in this sense assumes an engagement/relations in seeing the 
Other differently thus negating the placement of the Other in habitual 
categories. Such categories may include viewing the marginalised voices of 
parent and learner representatives as having nuisance value, something that 
may easily be brushed aside. I consequently contend that Otherness should 
be maintained as “an ever deepening mystery” that continues to “revitalise the 
very meaning of every encounter” we have with the Other (Zembylas 2005: 
154).    
 
In conclusion, when framing the Other in this way, it creates the space for the 
marginalised voices on SGBs to stand a better chance of being included in 
deliberative governance. Alternatively the chances that their voices would not 
only be heard, but much rather also have an impact, would be enhanced. At 
this stage I claim that Otherness according to my understanding is reciprocal. 
This implies that we are all other. In other words the marginalised are deemed 
as Other by those who dominate proceedings on SGBs, while at the same 
time those who dominate proceedings are deemed as Other by the 
marginalised. This is what I mean when I refer to Otherness as being 
reciprocal. If this view is plausible then it should follow that we are all other. 
This point becomes the crucial moment for the reason that if we are all Other, 
then the chances for exclusion of any voice in school governance becomes 
remote.  
 
5.5. SUMMARY 
 
I shall conclude this chapter by taking some brief leaps through this 
dissertation in order to give some insight into how I confronted this research, 
and more importantly how my growth as a researcher was galvanised. I then 
expose its brittle moments and argue that such moments allow much space 
for further research. 
   
A personal reflection, on the one hand, “draws attention to the view that the 
self that researches has an autobiography marked by the significance of 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity and class” (Usher 1996: 38). Disciplinary 
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reflexivity, on the other hand, “concerns moving away from the researcher to 
the research act so that the focus switches to the communities within which 
the research as a practice is located” (Usher 1996: 37). It is my intention to 
reflect on my journey through this dissertation thus giving an autobiographical 
account of how my contact with the research material shaped my thoughts 
and practices.  
 
In chapter one I hinted that I have been in the teaching profession since 1980. 
I was, therefore, at the cutting edge of the changes that impacted on 
education in general and on schooling in particular. It was because of my 
perceived social responsibility and the social context within which I found 
myself that steered me towards adopting a particular discourse, namely 
teaching as a profession. My interest in democratic transformation (by 
confronting the development of school education) informed my desire to 
undertake this journey of struggle and growth. I shall in the main refer to the 
major theme of this dissertation, which is founded on the concepts of 
deliberative democracy and citizenship. The change from apartheid rule to a 
constitutional democracy had significant consequences for all who reside in 
this country, and more so for those who suffered the humiliation of being 
denied the opportunity to full citizenship. Given my own position within this 
social setting it seems logical that I shall attend to a conception of democracy 
and citizenship. My autobiographical account is thus rooted in the space 
within which I found myself, and informed the manner in which I confronted 
my own realities. It should also be mentioned that the demise of apartheid and 
the onset of democracy created the space for a different movement. I no 
longer felt restricted, in fact the spaces that democracy brought was at times 
overwhelming. It might sound brazen, but one may reasonably compare it with 
a prisoner who yearned for freedom knowing that its chances were remote. 
So, when the freedom suddenly dawned upon me the burden of the shackles 
of my imprisonment evaporated and the spaces that I earlier referred to 
opened.  
 
In my contact with the realities of schooling, and particularly school 
governance, I came to realise that the claim by Peters (in Aspin 1995: 56) that 
 213
“Citizens of a democracy do not simply arrive at political maturity and stand 
ready, willing and able to run its institutions” to be visionary. This then 
informed my quest to determine whether SGBs in disadvantaged 
communities’ function democratically particularly after ten years of 
democracy. In my search for reading material on the genesis of school 
governance in this country I became frustrated for the reason that such 
material was scant. By a stroke of luck I stumbled upon the writings of Hyslop 
who inspired me to link specific moments within the history of schooling in this 
country. I then proceeded to build on these moments thus recounting the 
development of school governance in specifically disadvantaged schools. It 
was during this stage of my research that I determined that democracy was 
inextricably linked to citizenship.               
   
In coming to grips with the concept of democracy my efforts soon indicated 
that this concept was extremely difficult to define (if at all). I then made a 
conscious decision to restrict myself to the liberal conception of democracy, 
but even then the dearth of research material on the subject brought me to the 
realisation that even this would be too broad. I further restricted my research 
to two strands of liberal democracy, which included the libertarian, and 
deliberative strands. This, however, was the result of much research and 
making contact with many political theorists. It was during these contacts that 
I became exposed to the work of Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, Iris Marion 
Young, Will Kymlicka, Benjamin Barber Jűrgen Habermas and Mark Warren 
(all proponents of the deliberative ideal). They reinforced my decision to opt 
for a deliberative conception of democracy, emphasising the communitarian 
ideal.  
 
With regard to the libertarian conception of democracy Charles Taylor, 
Norman Wintrop, Steven Mulhall and Adam Swift influenced my 
understandings. It is through these scholars that I was introduced to the works 
of the classical liberal theorists, including John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and 
later Jean-Jacques Rousseau. However, it was particularly the works of John 
Stuart Mill that navigated me past utilitarianism. It is my interpretation that 
 214
Mill’s defence of utilitarianism laid the foundation for its destruction. Bill 
Brugger concurs with this view when he argues that: 
 
But once pleasures are seen as qualitatively different, pleasure cannot 
be used as the criterion to assess utility and one must seek an 
alternative standard. But Mill did not provide that standard. It seems, 
therefore, that Mill’s defence of utilitarianism constituted its demolition 
(in Wintrop 1983: 31).  
 
This brought me to On Liberty where Mill makes his case for individual 
liberties and minimal state interference. His insistence on the liberal 
conception that the individual is prior to society negates the view of “collective 
action” which I argue is crucial for School Governing Bodies. Such collective 
action was abhorrent to Mill because he argued that this might lead to the 
“tyranny of the majority”. In fairness to Mill I should mention that although 
most of his writings were in defence of “negative liberty” he introduced strong 
elements of “positive liberty” (Brugger in Wintrop 1983: 32). It is at this stage 
of my growth that I determined that a more plausible conception of 
deliberative democracy should emphasise the communitarian ideal. My aim 
was continually to devise a type of democracy that I feel may best suit 
democratic school governance in South Africa. It is because of this quest that 
I resolved that deliberative communitarianism could possibly be better suited 
to drive democratic school governance in particularly disadvantaged schools. 
In this regard Kymlicka navigated me with his argument that, “the problem 
with the libertarian strand of liberalism is not its emphasis on justice, nor its 
universalism, but rather its individualism” (2002: 212). The point is that by this 
stage in my growth I concluded that school governance could not rely on an 
individualistic conception of liberal democracy at the expense of a more 
communitarian understanding. In other words it seems plausible to argue that 
in terms of school governance each individual’s concern becomes a matter of 
common interest. The other important issue raised by Kymlicka revolves 
around the notions of justice and legitimacy, two concepts with a direct 
bearing on the transformation agenda of school governance in South Africa. 
Libertarianism's insistence on a market driven capitalist economy have scant 
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regard for past inequalities, something that has to be addressed for South 
Africa’s new form of school governance to pass the legitimacy test.  
 
This ideal of a market driven economy as the panacea for the survival of 
disadvantage communities steered me towards researching the influence of 
globalisation on school governance, particularly relating to how it influenced 
school governance policies. Prior to this I thought that globalisation was 
restricted to the economy, with little or no bearing on education. My ignorance 
was rudely exposed when Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton informed me that 
globalisation was so wide-ranging that it embraced almost every aspect of 
human life, meaning that it included school governance. It was with a sense of 
trepidation that I then embarked on the course of linking globalisation to 
school governance. I soon realised that although South Africa initially seemed 
unique against the onslaught of globalisation, the politicians soon had to 
succumb to its pressures. The consequent decentralisation I found was not 
only because of the clamour for inclusion in school matters, but also because 
of economic rationalism.  
 
I could at this stage of my research for the first time understand why the 
education playing field was not level, even after ten years of democracy. I also 
started to realise that the previously marginalised would not automatically 
become part of mainstream school governance and that it would remain a 
struggle. However, such a struggle may be contextualised within a critical 
paradigm thus opening the space for the marginalised to become more 
critical, and consequently contest their marginalised position through self-
empowerment. It is my contention that school governors who become more 
critical has the potential and opportunity to become emancipated thus paving 
the way for more inclusion, something that I deem crucial for school 
governance to practice a stronger form of democracy.                 
 
This brings me to the type of citizen that democracy requires to make school 
governance part of the practices of those who are marginalised. Although I 
am concerned with school governance in particular, my participation in the 
realities of day-to-day life in South Africa informed me that one of the major 
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issues on the South African political agenda is to foster a “new nation”. With 
this realisation, and under the influence of my promoter (Yusef Waghid) I was 
introduced to what may be described as a programme of dealing with the past 
(legacy of apartheid) and at the same time developing the future. Nation 
building is a fairly new phenomenon in the politics of democracy in South 
Africa with the result that it has almost become a cliché to include the concept 
in every political speech. However, nation building can be interpreted as the 
cultivation of a South African national identity, or alternatively a call for 
responsible citizenship. It is for this reason that I grappled with the notion of 
citizenship directly linking it to school governance. This brought me into 
contact with the ideas of Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman, April Carter, Geoffrey 
Stokes, Martha Nussbaum and others. Guided by these theorists I argued for 
a citizenship based on the rules of deliberation, which I claim, have the 
potential to be more inclusive. It is my view that citizens share an obligation to 
propose reasons for settling differences via persuasive argumentation. I am, 
therefore, guided by an understanding that citizenship based on deliberation 
is a citizenship that claims that if individuals are to be subject to decisions, 
they ought to be justified in terms that all could be reasonably expected to 
accept. It is within such a context that I argue for a South African 
citizenship/nation based on deliberation for the reason that deliberative 
citizens operate on the principle that “decisions affecting the well-being of a 
collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned 
deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals” 
(Benhabib 1996: 68).  
 
One of my objectives was to make the citizen more critical in order to be able 
to better contest views and preferences thus creating the opportunity for 
inclusion. The underlying rationale was always inclusion to the extent that it 
seemed as if deliberation was the vehicle towards inclusion. In my 
deliberations with my promoter I soon realised that deliberation's insistence on 
reasoned and persuasive argument potentially excluded rather than included. 
This became more apparent when Young argued for a means to overcome 
such exclusion with reference to the notions of “greeting” and particularly 
“story telling”. However, I was not satisfied with Young’s explanation, meaning 
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that I was not convinced that “greeting and narratives” may overcome this 
problem, with the result that I sought some other alternative.  
 
In my search I became acutely aware of “time”. I was engrossed in the last 
chapter thus nearing completion, and thought that I might conclude my 
dissertation without researching a way out of this possible form of “exclusion”. 
I then pondered the situation and was on the brink of escaping the problem by 
stating that a potential critic might allude to this shortcoming. However, it 
created ample scope for further research. When I put this to my promoter he 
became extremely despondent. He could not believe that a student who had 
been under his constant supervision for more than two years could react in 
the way I did. After heated debate he introduced me to the work of Michalinos 
Zembylas which related to a “pedagogy of unknowing”. This became a 
moment of inspiration for the reason that it seemed as if my search to 
overcome the potential exclusion of deliberation had been realised. However, 
I did not keep track with the difficulty of understanding the “unknowable other”. 
This, together with working under time constraints, became almost 
unbearable. I could not make sense of Zembylas and as the days passed I 
stopped writing, determining that I would not be able to do justice to including 
the “marginalised” and finishing my dissertation in time to graduate in 
December of 2005. I also did not have the courage to approach my promoter, 
remembering our previous encounter. In my moment of despondency I 
decided to revisit the work of Burbules and his conception of “being 
reasonable”.  
 
It was by coincidence that an article by Gert Biesta entitled “preparing for the 
incalculable” lay next to the Burbules article. The inscription on the first page 
was highlighted, and it read; “Once you relate to the other as the other, then 
something incalculable comes on the scene, something which cannot be 
reduced to the law or to the history of legal structures” (Derrida in Biesta 
2001: 32). This jolted me out of my self-imposed bitterness and it became 
another moment of inspiration. By reading Biesta, while not being convinced 
that I have overcome my weakness of not being able to grasp the notion of 
“being other”, I could better understand the notion of “otherness”. I then 
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tackled the argument for inclusion incorporating the work of Zembylas, 
convinced that I have at last “discovered” a plausible route to include the 
“other” (marginalised). In short, the reciprocal understanding of the Other 
became my vehicle which chartered my argument for inclusion.  
 
I am, therefore, convinced that fostering citizenship along the lines of 
deliberation has the potential to not only evolving critical citizens, but also 
reinforcing a notion of a stronger form of democracy. It is my contention that 
the more inclusive the deliberative process, the better the chances for the 
legitimacy of the outcomes thus reinforcing a stronger form of democratic 
school governance. I have come to realise that deliberative democratic school 
governance should always be a project in the making where the otherness of 
the other should be reasonably attended to or ‘witnessed’.  
 
My attempt to critically reflect on my journey through this dissertation is not an 
easy task. It seems to me rather difficult to reflect with the intention to admit 
that my work includes limitations. I must thus acknowledge that in my self-
critique there are shortcomings, but this is not entirely negative for it opens 
the space for further research. Democracy, I have argued, is a dynamic 
concept, constantly evolving in order to adapt to the realities of life as it 
unfolds. South Africa, being a novice at this system, is to my mind at the 
cutting edge of this democratic development. My attempt at arguing for a 
deliberative conception of democracy, linking it to citizenship and being critical 
is, therefore, only a step on this journey towards realising a type of democracy 
that would include more rather than less. I am convinced that there are as 
many interpretations for inclusion as there are interpretations of what 
democracy should be. In this regard there is a great deal of scope for further 
research. One of the major brittle moments in this dissertation links precisely 
with exclusion. My research effort concentrated on the disadvantaged and 
marginalised as if the advantaged in this country have no problem with the 
manner in which democracy is practiced. Having exposed myself I proffer a 
defence from the foundation that I could not make the enquiry too broad. 
Again there seems to be much scope for further research, particularly related 
to school governance in advantaged communities. Education policy changes 
 219
would also broaden the space for research and as I am writing the Minister of 
Education has hinted towards changes in policy, specifically related to school 
governance. The debate would consequently continue because the divide 
between policy formulation and the enactment thereof needs to be narrowed. 
The scope for research that mediates between policy development and the 
reality of its practice seems to be ripe, holding much promise for educational 
researchers.                       
 
In conclusion (which might be interpreted as a new beginning), this 
dissertation brings a new perspective to the practice of democracy in general 
and its exercise in school governing bodies in particular. Much has been 
written about school governance in South Africa, however, I have not 
encountered its link to democratic citizenship. In this sense this dissertation 
makes a contribution to the debate around school governance. On another 
level, arguing for reasonableness and being Other makes this dissertation 
unique in the sense that this has not occurred at an academic level before. I 
therefore conclude that notwithstanding its shortcomings (that I referred to 
earlier), this dissertation has a contribution to make in the quest to foster a 
democratic school governance system in this country.    
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